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Abstract
The concept of the ‘information society’ has been systematically deployed to denote a new 
techno-socio-economic paradigm with information and communication technologies (ICTs) at 
the centre, which entails significant economic and social transformations and bears implications 
for governance and potential for development and quality of life. Departing from the 
deterministic view of information society as a set of uniform societal arrangements, the thesis 
examines its national variations, as they emerge from the interaction between ICTs and relevant 
policies with pre-existing social, political and economic realities. Drawing on a conceptual 
framework based on political economy and historical sociology, it proposes that the unfolding of 
any national information society is a contested process feeding on the historically formed 
relationship between the state and the national economy and society. This relationship is 
expected to inflect international policies and processes in quite idiosyncratic ways, leading to 
differentiated national information society trajectories, while the state is instrumental in 
articulating international policy directions with national societal arrangements.
Identifying an empirical gap in the examination and analysis in semi-peripheral and middle- 
income countries, the thesis seeks to address evolving characteristics and dimensions of the 
‘Greek case’ of information society, stressing the dialectic between European policy and the 
national socio-cultural, political and economic idiosyncrasies, the role of the Greek state, as well 
as the weaknesses encountered in the process. The emphasis is on the period 1998-2008, which 
includes the first comprehensive strategy and provides the opportunity to analyse preliminary 
results of the policies adopted. The empirical material includes relevant policy documents, 
quantitative indicators, personal observations, as well as a set of elite interviews with policy­
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION - THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AND THE 
STATE
Indeed, we are in the midst o f a worldwide effort, organised by many different 
companies and governments in many different ways, to make computer 
communication a transcendent spectacle ... Ev erything from advertising to trade 
shows, from demonstration projects to conferences, speaks o f  a campaign to market 
the magic, to surround computer communication with power, speed, and the promise 
o f freedom ’ (Mosco 1998, p. 61).
While information exchange and communication has been at the core of every society 
historically, contemporary Western societies have witnessed the culmination of 
institutional and social arrangements where information exchange, processing, 
storage, modification and deployment is carried out by increasingly sophisticated 
information and communication technologies (ICTs). Complex ICT technological 
ensembles are implicated in dramatic transformations in production processes, power 
relations and political organisation; in the redefinition of ways of living and working 
or cultural codes, spanning virtually all social, economic and political arenas; in the 
reformulation of time, space and social relationships, often in unintended or 
unforeseen ways; in complex and continuous dynamic interactions between the 
technical and the social at large.
At the heart of what is conceived of as a new ICT-based techno-economic paradigm 
(Freeman and Loufa 2001) is a logic and a language that transforms all inputs into 
information code universally compatible and understandable, process and exchanges 
this information at high speed and at low costs, in increasingly sophisticated ways 
across worldwide telecommunication networks. This powerful logic plays a pivotal 
role in the pervasiveness of ICTs across Western, but also non-Westem economies 
and societies, to the extent that many theorists have over the last twenty years 
organised conceptual frameworks concerning the pervasive effects of ICTs and the
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advent of what can be broadly termed ‘the information society’ (IS), the ‘knowledge 
society’, the ‘information economy’, or the ‘knowledge-based economy’ (KBE). 1
In parallel, the spread of globalisation has been vastly theorised and researched along 
a number of economic, political, social and cultural dimensions (Hall et al. 1992, 
Waters 1995, Sklair 2000). Hobson and Ramesh (2002) summarise the theorisation of 
the relationship between the state and globalisation by referring to two extreme 
schools of thought. On the one hand, the 'structuralist' approach, claiming that 
globalisation challenges the viability of the state or at least forces it to conform to the 
new global reality. On the other hand, the 'agent-centric' approach arguing that states 
can mitigate and even shape global structures.
The numerous challenges that globalisation posits for the nation-state2 have been 
reflected in new theorisations of power, politics and governance that map shifting 
power arrangements away from the traditional system of nation-states towards 
governance regimes that include both state and non-state actors at the sub-national, 
the national and the transnational level (Held and McGrew 2002). Indeed, national 
states have reacted to global challenges by forming alliances at the international level 
(e.g. EU), by shifting power to international institutions (WTO, IMF, transnational
1 The information economy idea refers to an economic organisation where information and knowledge 
tasks (as opposed to production and industrial practices) dominate economic activity. Alternatively, the 
terms ‘knowledge economy’, or ‘knowledge-based economy’, are often used (see May 2002). The term 
‘information society’ is rather broader and denotes a form of societal organisation where the processing 
and exchange of information and knowledge pervades not only economic activity, but virtually all 
spheres of social life, which are as a result transformed in incremental or radical ways (Webster 2002). 
May (2003) is a compilation of interesting articles.
A knowledge society is defined as one where knowledge is being created, diffused and deployed in 
accelerated ways through ICTs; where increasingly sophisticated products codify and manage 
knowledge; and where there is a perception of knowledge as a strategic asset for individuals, firms and 
nations. Under these circumstances, one can speak of ‘knowledge policies’, namely policies regarding: 
knowledge creation (supporting basic and applied research, the culture industries, promoting 
interchanges between different cultures and groups); knowledge diffusion (promoting broadband 
networks, Internet access, content industries, education reforms); knowledge utilisation (supporting 
product and process innovation, knowledge management and learning in firms and public organisations, 
international partnerships for innovation) (Rodrigues 2003).
2 Following Giddens, we take the nation-state to be a set of institutional forms of governance 
maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries, its rule being 
sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal (police) and external (military forces) 
violence (Giddens 1995).
10
policy regimes) and by decentralising authority towards regional and local resources, 
non-governmental organisations or other groups of civil society.
Globalisation has been routinely linked with the spread of digital ICTs, which enable 
the operation of economic, political and cultural processes on a global scale. 
Inescapably, the literature on political globalisation and international relations has met 
the ICT/information society literature in what concerns the relationship between ICTs, 
politics and the nation-state. Various voices have come out, including those who see 
evident the diminishing role of the state in the light of the joint operation of 
globalisation and technological processes and the growing interdependence of world 
economy and polity, as well as those who identify increased technological state 
capacities, including data-processing, bureaucratic and surveillance functions (Herrera 
2002).
There have also been extensive debates on the ways in which the ICT-enabled flows 
and the rise of the cyberspace (including the Internet) put into question the notion of 
state boundaries and the ability of states to control such information flows. Law 
enforcement and taxation of electronic commerce are two of the challenges that states 
seem to face. In international relations, neo-realists stress threats to national security 
and the formation of online communities that operate in parallel with state authority as 
dimensions of the new state of affairs. In political sociology, ICTs are said to 
annihilate time and space and transform the landscape of power away from the state, 
as social movements and a number of actors broadly belonging to civil society are 
given the opportunity to become politically active using new technologies and thus 
resist established power arrangements (Sassen 2002). Power is seen in these 
approaches as embedded in the practices, which, reproduced over time and space, 
constitute the material social structures of the information age (Nash 2000), and is 
linked with the capacity to control global networks, which are put to different uses 
(Castells 1996, 1998). Other authors investigate the ways in which ICTs change 
institutional contexts (Rosenau and Singh 2002), or the links between the technical 
and the political and the governance of the ‘technological society’ (Barry 2001). Such 
approaches provide a flavour for the intricate issues arising with respect to the 
operation of global processes, the place of the state as agent in their unfolding and as 
recipient of their outcomes and manifestations, but also the importance of ICTs as the
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technological infrastructure of the ‘information age’, which becomes sine qua non for 
global economic, political and social arrangements in transformative and constitutive 
ways.
Sceptics have offered counter-arguments regarding the relative weight of cross-border 
flows compared to economic activity taking place within the limits of national 
economies and have presented evidence that the latter seems still to play a much 
greater part than the former. Some of them refuse to acknowledge the effects of 
globalisation (which they see as an ongoing process that has been evolving for 
centuries) and downplay the ostensible transformations of the roles and power of 
states, preferring to stress their continuing significance in a number of issues 
determining national and international politics (Hirst and Thompson 1996).
Critical approaches stress the continuing relevance of the state as mediator between 
international flows and national contexts, as a mechanism for integrating the national 
economy and polity into global arrangements and as a link between the rise of sub­
national actors and the intensification of supranational arrangements. In this respect, 
the national state retains considerable capacities, in strategic terms in defence and the 
economy, in political terms as guarantor and defendant of the rights of its citizens, and 
in socio-cultural terms as intermediary between global processes and national or local 
social and cultural particularities (Smith et al. 1999).
The search for and formulation of international and national information policies has 
been a significant issue in the last thirty or so years. These processes are inextricably 
linked with various perspectives on the information society, which they use as a 
starting point so as to promote and justify particular policy directions (Duff 2004). At 
the European Union level, as we will see in chapter 4, there has been since the 
beginning of the 1990s the vision of a new society built on ICTs. This has been 
presented as a unique historical opportunity and has directed policy towards the 
promotion of ICT infrastructures at the national level, adopting necessary measures 
for the deregulation of telecommunication and media sectors so as to conform to the 
requirements of flexibility that are built into the new technologies.
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tViJust as the state established market society in the 19 century (Polanyi 1957), the 
contemporary state is being instrumental in the realisation of a framework for the 
operation of the capitalist system in the 21st century based on the advent of the 
information society and the knowledge-based economy (IS/KBE). This thesis indeed 
sets out to bring together some of the problems occurring at the intersection of the 
emerging IS/KBE with the place and role of the state in the unfolding of these novel 
IS/KBE arrangements.
The IS/KBE is a particularly interesting terrain for examining the challenges facing 
the national state and its reaction to them for three main reasons:
Firstly, because the IS/KBE policy is a manifestation of the interplay between the 
transnational level (in our case the EU) and the national arena; this interplay is often 
seen as merely conflictual but it might be more fruitful to approach it as a 
contradictory relation (both conflictual and collaborative) in the formulation (at the 
transnational) and implementation (at the national) of specific policy agendas.
Secondly, because the IS/KBE can be seen as part of a broader socio-economic 
transformation related to the post-Fordist paradigm, due to the flexibility provided by 
ICTs. This includes a transformation of the role of the state from the Fordist era. If the 
IS/KBE is indeed the dawn of new societal arrangements, then there are governance 
and regulation questions that need to be asked, with ensuing implications for the role 
of the state; this role is redefined in line with new demands for economic reproduction 
and social cohesion. As the nation-state is the political institution that is called upon to 
promote and implement IS/KBE at the national level, it retains significant authority 
regarding the methods and procedures adopted, as well as the outcomes of the 
implementation process.
Thirdly, because there is hitherto a lack of substantial theorisation of the particular 
issues involved in the relationship between the IS/KBE and the nation-state. In 
parallel, there has been a notable absence of distinct examinations of the ways in 
which international ICT policies are diffused, translated and appropriated in the 
national and local context. In effect, there has been an often limited and superficial 
consideration of the national frame vis-a-vis the information society, regarding both
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the role of the national state and the possibility of identifying and studying variable 
forms of the IS/KBE paradigm according to the national context.
The approach in this thesis is that the overarching IS/KBE policy paradigm, 
associated with a set of significant technological, socio-economic, political and 
cultural transformations, has to be seen in a balanced way that identifies 
transformations but also examines the ways in which these are articulated with pre­
existing societal arrangements. Following from this, a second premise is that the 
national frame is significant as a context where such transformations are played out, 
which makes it an important base for an examination of IS/KBE developments. Based 
on these two premises, the IS/KBE in the national context does not involve merely the 
diffusion of ICT innovations and the replication of practices adopted in other national 
contexts, but is expected to be a process of translation into behaviours and practices 
according to the path dependency3 of pre-existing national arrangements, including 
structural and institutional characteristics, technological, innovative and economic 
capacities, aspirations of actors and social coalitions involved. The third premise is 
that, when it comes to IS/KBE and the national frame, it is analytically useful and 
interesting to look into the coupling of the state (and its structures), the economy, and 
the civil society, and the ways in which this coupling informs and interacts with the 
evolution of the IS/KBE paradigm and its manifestations at the national level of 
reference.
Identifying an empirical gap in the examination and analysis of the IS/KBE in semi­
peripheral and middle income countries, it seeks to address the evolving 
characteristics and forms of the ‘Greek case’ of the IS/KBE, stressing the dialectic 
between European information society policy and broad Greek social, political and 
economic aspects, the national manifestations of EU policies in the Greek context, 
and the role of the state in articulating the global and the national through rhetoric and 
policy. The emphasis of the study is on the period 1998-2008, which includes the first
3 Meaning that ‘the range of choice about change is strongly constrained by the outcome of past 
choices’ (Radice 2000, p.723).
14
comprehensive information society strategy in Greece and provides the opportunity to 
assess preliminary results of the policies adopted.
The thesis is structured as follows: chapter 2 provides a literature review, which 
includes a review of theories of the IS/KBE, in particular around the debate of 
whether IS/KBE should be seen as a set of qualitative new arrangements radically 
breaking with the industrial paradigm or as a continuation of pre-existing socio­
political and economic patterns; chapter 2 also includes an overview of the challenges 
facing the state drawing on globalisation theory and IS/ICT literature and a 
preliminary sketch of the role of the state in the information age.
Chapter 3 outlines the conceptual and methodological approach adopted in our study: 
conceptually, drawing on a high-level theory of the state and the IS/KBE and 
complementing it with political economy and historical sociology tools, as well as 
with a conceptualisation of the national context through the tools of historical 
sociology and the writings of several Greek scholars; methodologically, describing in 
detail the research design and the data collection methods pursued in the study.
Chapter 4 begins the empirical work by looking through key documents, analysing the 
philosophy behind them and presenting the EU information society policy in 
juxtaposition with the Greek information society policy; it also includes a first picture 
of the situation of the information society in Greece circa 2008, as emerging through a 
set of basic quantitative indicators, as well as through a selective presentation of the 
diffusion of ICTs in basic areas, e.g. business, the public sector and educational 
institutions.
Chapter 5 complements chapter 4 and contains the bulk of the qualitative empirical 
material gathered through interviews with key experts and players involved in the 
IS/KBE developments in Greece, which is presented as a set of themes linked with the 
conceptual framework of chapter 3. In contrast to chapter 4, chapter 5 provides a 
detailed, low-level picture of the implementation of information society policies as 
expressed in the policy documents and materialised by means of the Greek 
“Operational Programme for the Information Society”.
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Chapter 6 provides a reflection on the entire research process, brings the dominant 
ideas together, outlines the theoretical and empirical contributions of the work and 
draws broader implications for further research in the area of IS/KBE.
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CHAPTER 2: THE INFORMATION SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN A 
GLOBAL WORLD
2.1. Introduction
In the postwar period, the vision of a new information society has featured 
prominently in the writings of futurologists, academics or technologists either of a 
utopian or of a dystopian orientation, who have signalled the coming of a new age. 
This dominant vision has regarded the oncoming information society as a set of new 
economic, social, political and cultural arrangements, deriving from the diffusion and 
generalised use of ICTs, involving new patterns of living and working, as well as 
using information and knowledge as central assets for competitive advantage, profit, 
growth and employment.
The vision of information society as epochal change has been accompanied by an 
emphasis on the opportunities presented by the new arrangements: some have been 
related to citizen empowerment, political participation, or a different relationship 
between citizen and government; others have focused on development, quality of life 
and alleviation of poverty. Contrary to these, the opposite potential trends have been 
identified, namely the threat of state surveillance or the exacerbation of economic 
disparities with increasing poverty and social polarisation (Martin 2005).
The dominant approach to information society has particularly guided the activities of 
policymakers and governments communicating the need to promote the diffusion of 
ICTs as a national goal, a necessary imperative of adjustment to an apparently 
overpowering reality. This has been a global policy-making movement involving 
powerful nations, including the US or Japan, international systems of states such as 
the UN, the EU and the OECD, international organisations such as the International 
Telecommunications Union and key global events (for instance, the recent World 
Summits on the Information Society in 2003 and 2005).
In this review, we start by outlining various streams of research that have informed or 
have been informed by this dominant vision of the information society and the
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knowledge-based economy. After identifying some of the limitations of these 
theorisations, we proceed to present alternative views of the information society. The 
work of Castells, considered a milestone in information society theory and research, is 
given a reasonably extended presentation; this is followed by several other critical 
information society conceptualisations. At the end of this presentation we outline our 
own approach which is critical of the dominant version. Moving on, we turn to the 
contemporary nation state, its forms and functions, as well as the challenges that it 
faces under conditions of globalisation. We subsequently complement this with a 
presentation of the place of the state in information society or ICT-relevant literature, 
before arguing for the continuing significance of the nation-state and the ways in 
which this relates to information society arrangements.
2.2. The information society as a new techno-social paradigm
The debates regarding the transformative (or less so) economic, social, political, 
cultural and institutional effects of ICTs and the question whether the ‘information 
society’ can be seen as a new type of society have been at the heart of recent social 
theory.
A number of theorisations of information society as a qualitatively new type of 
society have been attempted since the 1960s. Frank Webster has undertaken a 
classification, as well as criticism of the relevant theories, dividing them as follows: a) 
technological, where the emphasis is on the dramatic technological innovations and 
the development of ICTs, which appear to be leading to significant qualitative 
changes; b) economic, which attempt to establish measures of the information society 
in economic terms; c) occupational, which argue that an information society is 
signified by the increasing amount of information-related occupations; d) spatial, 
which view the information society through the development of information networks 
bringing about dramatic implications for time and space; e) cultural, which focus on 
the tremendous increase of the volume of information in contemporary society, the 
spread of advertising, the increasing presence and power of the media and the plethora 
of signs (Webster 2002, 2006).
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Technological theories have been around since the 1970s, emphasising the dramatic 
rate of technological innovation in ICTs (PCs, communications, cable and satellite TV 
and so on), which appears on such a scale that will ‘lead to a reconstitution of the 
social world’ (Webster 2006, p.9). Since the 1990s, a central element in these 
accounts has been the convergence between computers and telecommunications. 
Parallels have been drawn between the railways and canals of the industrial era and 
contemporary IT networks, including the Internet, which are seen as the infrastructure 
and ‘information highways’ of the information age. Chris Freeman and Carlota 
Perez’s (1988) ‘techno-economic paradigm’, for instance, is a neo-Schumpeterian 
theorisation that emphasises ICTs as a technological revolution defining a new long 
wave in the economy with major institutional changes across the entire social 
spectrum (a new Kondratiev economic cycle). These are necessitated by the technical 
properties of ICTs, which generate constraints on firms’ operations and strategies and 
lead to a new industrial organisation; an important element is the need for structural 
adjustments so as to follow the transformations taking place.
Webster objects to such approaches by stressing the difficulty of measuring the rate of 
technological diffusion and the amount of ICTs needed for a society to qualify as an 
information society. Evidence seems to be limited and technological definitions are 
often vague (e.g. unclear references to terms such as new technologies or new media 
or new technological innovations). A second and more important criticism is that most 
of these theories suffer from technological determinism: technology is seen as the 
main engine of society and social change follows technical change and is the result of 
the impact of technical change, often defining an era (e.g. the age of steam, the age of 
electricity, the age of computers). At the same time, the social, economic and political 
dynamics and circumstances of technological developments are ruled out (Webster 
2006).
Economic theories attempt to measure information society in economic terms. Fritz 
Machlup’s work is considered pioneering in analysing knowledge production and 
dissemination in the US industries; in this, he distinguishes five broad information 
industry groups (education, communication media, information machines, information 
services, and other information activities), ascribes an economic value to each of these 
and measures its contribution to GNP (Machlup 1962). Building on this model, M.
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Porat has designed a computer model of the US economy in the late 1960s by dividing 
the economy into the 'primary' and 'secondary' information sectors, as well as the 
'non-information' sectors. In the primary sector, knowledge and information are 
manipulated to produce new knowledge products and services; in the secondary, 
knowledge and information are deployed in material production, as well as 
distribution, sales, etc. The primary information sector can be directly evaluated and 
has a market price, while the secondary is less tangible and includes information 
activities that are part of the operations of firms and public organisations (Porat 1977).
Criticism to these theories highlights that the quantification of the economic 
significance of information, though useful, presents certain problems with regard to 
the categories included in and excluded from the information sector. In reality, the 
boundaries between information activities, such as R&D, and non-information ones, 
e.g. manufacturing, are often blurred. On the other hand, quantitative aggregate data 
homogenise very different informational activities, not all of them of equivalent 
significance (e.g. consumption of blockbuster films, vs. using an online educational 
library). In short, there is a great degree of subjectivity in categorising and quantifying. 
Overall, the empirical evidence regarding the economic significance of information 
refers to very diverse service sectors that cannot be analysed collectively (Webster 
2006, Miles and Gershuny 1986). Moreover, technological determinism also enters 
these economic theories, in that they seem to overestimate the impact of ICTs across 
the economy.
In occupational theories, the argument is roughly that we have entered an information 
society since information work accounts for the majority of occupations. One of the 
most significant conceptualisation of the information society has been that of the 
American sociologist Daniel Bell (1973), who used the term ‘post-industrial society’.
Bell classifies societies according to the predominant mode of employment: in the 
pre-industrial society there was agricultural manual labour, in the industrial society 
there was labour in manufacturing processes, while in the post-industrial it is 
employment in services that assumes the central position. He traces a historical 
continuity from the pre-industrial to the industrial and post-industrial society by 
means of rationalisation, which brings greater efficiency and increased productivity
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within each stage and enables the passage to the next. Rationalisation leads to 
superfluous labour and increased profits and consumption, driving society first from 
the agrarian mode to manufacturing (industrial society) and then to services (post­
industrial society). In the first stage, it is manual labour and physical power that 
defines work and societal organisation. In the second, it is technology and the use of 
energy that constitutes the fundamental social parameters and determines the content 
of jobs. In the third stage, it is organised knowledge that defines social relations and 
labour occupations. The decline of manufacturing with the decrease in the number of 
manual workers, the generation of a number of new service sectors and the overall 
increase in information-handling tasks and specialities lead to more white-collar 
occupations and the predominance of information and knowledge. These mark a new 
type of society, the post-industrial or information society (Bell 1973, Mackay 2001, 
Webster 2006).
As Webster argues, occupational definitions seem to overcome technological 
determinism, since they stress the transformative power of information, and not ICTs 
per se. But this is also controversial, as Bell contends that technology is the basis for 
productivity and productivity is the transforming agent of the economy, indirectly 
ascribing to technology the major role in social change. Further, he analyses society in 
terms of three independent realms, namely social structure, polity and culture. Social 
change emerges from changes in social structure, rather than the other two realms. 
Advanced societies are presented in a homogenised way, as characterised by similar 
technological and occupational arrangements, with increased emphasis on 
rationalisation. Therefore, Bell’s approach contains neo-evolutionist and teleological 
elements (societies evolving towards some ultimate stage), leaving out differences in 
politics, culture and history. This idea of progressing through stages towards the 
information society has been seen as problematic.
Occupational theories seem also to suffer from the lack of adequate empirical 
evidence. Firstly, the distinction between a manufacturing and a service occupation is 
not clear-cut (Mackay 2001). Moreover, a number of service activities are related with
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manufacturing production (e.g. distribution, advertising).4 In addition, in the service 
sector there are production activities as well (while Bell speaks mainly of service 
consumption). Further, within the service sector, employment growth seems to be 
happening more in personal services, which have been central to modem economies 
and societies for a long time, rather than knowledge-based services (Gamham 2001a).
A further limitation in occupational theories concerns the allocation of workers into 
particular categories. Categorisation simply in terms of informational and non- 
informational work groups together people with very different professions. Such 
definitional problems have given rise to the claim that the expansion of services 
should be placed in a picture of intricate relations between manufacturing and other 
activities in contemporary economies, as well as relations between the economy, 
culture and politics; thus, it should not be interpreted as signalling a new kind of 
society but, rather, as highlighting the articulation of the past with present 
developments (Webster 2006, p.59).
Significantly, the pursuit of a quantitative measure of information work ignores the 
importance for society of certain types of information and does not say anything about 
hierarchies and positions of power. Indeed, it is important to differentiate the role of 
individuals who possess knowledge that is considered ‘strategic’ in contemporary 
society from those who merely carry out practical tasks. The rise in the 20th century of 
a professional class of intellectuals and expert technocrats who can exert influence 
upon business and politics challenges the quantitative methodology of standard 
occupational approaches and demands emphasis on the importance of the qualitatively 
different nature of the jobs of certain minorities (Webster 2006).
In spatial conceptualisations of information society, the notion of the information 
network is central; the connectivity that information networks offer presents dramatic 
implications for time and space and generates the possibility for a fully wired society.
4 Analysis by Gershuny has shown that of the increase in ‘knowledge workers’ during a sample period 
in the 1970s, ’less than a quarter appears to be due to the growth in the service industries, while, more 
than three-quarters comes from the increase in the proportion of employees in service occupations 
within industries’ (Gershuny 1983, p. 107, quoted in Golding 2000).
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Daily life creates increasing awareness of this connectivity to networks of different 
kinds (e.g. through electronic transactions, or Internet surfing). The notion of 
information flow is also important in these approaches. Nevertheless, the problem of 
measurement recurs in such conceptualisations: should this measurement be done in 
terms of the spread of networks as technological systems or in terms of information 
flows? And how much of either is required so as to constitute an information society? 
Further, networks can be seen in a historical evolution as more sophisticated forms of 
communication in continuity with the early days of postal services, the telegram and 
the telephone, which poses the question why they should be seen as signifiers of a 
new type of society (Webster 2006).
Cultural approaches to information society focus on the proliferation of information 
circulated in everyday life and propagated by powerful mass media. Convergence of 
different media (television, video, audio, cable and satellite) through processes of 
digitisation and the spread of the Internet have played a significant role in information 
circulation. Advertising techniques have become increasingly sophisticated, 
addressing individual tastes and building identities through consumption. The spread 
of media under globalisation processes in the contemporary world has been 
accompanied by individualisation processes adopting and adjusting information 
content to personal lifestyles, interests, preferences (in food, dress, entertainment and 
other spheres of life), which are then fed back to the processes of production, 
distribution and advertisement. The symbolic level has become clearly more 
important, as signs and symbols are overwhelmingly deployed to convey power, 
status and wealth. The articulation of representation, production, consumption, 
identity formation and regulation of the cultural spheres has been theorised in the 
domain of cultural studies, which emerged in the context of the ‘cultural turn’ in 
social sciences (Du Gay 1997; Hall 1997; Thompson 1997).
While many scholars have placed the operation of these cultural processes in a context 
of global capitalism and have approached them in terms of media power relations, 
cultural representations, consumerist ideologies, formation of meaningful identities 
through cultural products or the structuring of social relations through new ICTs, 
some thinkers preoccupied with these cultural processes have gone as far as signalling 
the emergence of a post-modernist society or the post-modern condition (Lyotard
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1984). In these conceptualisations, the plethora of signs and information in everyday 
life is apparently celebrated as the dominant characteristic of the contemporary world. 
The abundance and continuous and instantaneous communication of signs leads to the 
construction of what they term ‘hyper-reality’, i.e. the condition where nothing is real 
and meaningful, everything is relevant and artificial, any notion of truth is rejected, 
differences and individual preferences are promoted, fragmentation, reconstitution, 
bricolage and pastiche dominate; a situation where eventually the superficial is 
promoted and where no message has any meaning, where everything is reduced to just 
a sign that does not signify anything, a signifier without any signified (Baudrillard 
1988; Poster 1990).
Globalisation literature has also dealt with the increasing presence of the symbolic 
level. Waters, for instance, suggests that globalisation means ‘material and power 
exchanges in the economic and political arenas ... progressively becoming displaced 
by symbolic ones, that is by relationships based on values, preferences and tastes 
rather than by material inequality and constraint’ (Waters 1995, p. 124). 
Notwithstanding the truth of some of these claims, it is very hard to locate empirical 
evidence of the tendencies described by post-modernist theorists, though one is 
certainly aware of the multiplication of information and signs in everyday life. Even if 
significant and respectable evidence can be found, it has to be decided whether it 
means displacement or co-presence of the material with the symbolic. Criticism of 
these theories suggests that there is continuing evidence of ‘hard’ realities that cannot 
be subsumed by the symbolic level, e.g. inequalities on a planet in which 70% of 
resources are consumed by 15% of the population (Golding 2000).
Overall, the use of quantitative measures, such as the presence of more information or 
more information jobs, has been questioned, not least because of the definitions used 
to collect data (Menou and Taylor 2006). Further, it has been criticised as inadequate 
to sustain an argument about a qualitative break towards a new type of society. 
Qualitative measures are demanded to support such an argument, e.g. what kinds of 
professions, activities, power relations emerge in the contemporary world and how 
they are related to information (Webster 2006). Grouping different sectoral trends and 
dynamics together under the ‘information society’ or ‘knowledge economy’ umbrella 
is not helpful (Gamham 2000, p. 14). The approaches signalling the advent of the
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information society seem to neutralise or conceal such qualitative dimensions under 
an apparently uncontroversial reality of information domination. In this way, they also 
become a useful vehicle for a technocratic approach conveying the need for nations, 
groups of people and organisations to adapt to these ‘objective’ changes.
Some of the above conceptualisations defined the dominant view of information 
society and indeed triggered relevant policies. Bell’s intention, for instance, was to 
‘forge a strong commitment to technological innovation as the mobiliser of economic 
and social progress’ (Mansell 2008, p.4). De Sola Pool (1974) advocated information 
society policy with ICTs at its centre. Porat, in contrast, has been criticised for 
introducing a notion of ‘information policy’ that would cover too large a number of 
policy domains apparently penetrated by ICTs, including education, job satisfaction, 
quality of life, rehabilitation, equality of opportunity, energy planning, airline industry 
regulation or national security (Duff 2004). Such policy directions contained a strong 
prescriptive element as to what steps western societies should take to achieve progress 
through ICTs.
2.3. Between technological determinism and social constructivism
Based on evolving notions of information society, mainly drawn on theories 
mentioned in the previous section, a number of futurologists have made predictions on 
a future dominated by ICTs, while an equal number of politicians have introduced 
relevant political agendas since about the late 1970s. Often focusing on shifts in 
employment (either dystopian views of job losses, or structural changes involving 
move to service occupations and necessary skills adjustment), these social 
speculations and political projections, together with the academic theorisations 
mentioned above, were operating within assumptions of technological determinism. 
Technological determinism has approached technology as an autonomous force, 
exogenous to society and able to impose its own logic. The most extreme forms see 
technology as the prime factor determining social change, while more moderate views 
approach technology as one of the determinants of societal arrangements (Mackay
2001). Critics, however, have voiced concerns regarding the idea of ICTs determining 
the nature of societal configurations (Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt 2006). The question of
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technological determinism is significant, as its policy implications are often exhausted 
to the need to adjust to the imperatives of new technologies.
Other approaches go beyond this ostensible need and treat technologies as essentially 
social and political products that arise under particular circumstances and derive from 
specific choices. Langdon Winner (1986), for instance, argues that technologies are 
inherently political: firstly, they are designed in ways that open certain possibilities or 
exclude certain others; secondly, they are compatible with different social 
arrangements, e.g. nuclear power requires a techno-military industrial complex, while 
solar power fits better with decentralised institutions.
Evolutionary approaches to technological innovation take into consideration macro 
processes, refer to ‘technological paradigms’, and the structures through which they 
are selected (including state, firms, institutions and others), diffused and eventually 
stabilised into a ‘technological trajectory’ adopted by the majority of firms in the 
economy (Dosi 1988). These processes involve the notion of technological 
momentum, which frames future technological developments and institutional and 
social realities. Subsequent technological developments unfold according to the needs 
of the existing technological systems (Rosenberg 1976), creating various forms of 
path-dependency. Often the pervasiveness of certain technologies (ICTs in particular) 
establishes logics and dynamics of its own, shaping social and political structures and 
patterns of personal and social life. Evolutionary approaches, however, tend to 
underplay the ways in which these selection structures are themselves socially shaped, 
thus presenting determinist undertones (Rammert 1997).
Science and technology studies have over the last twenty-five years or so struggled 
with the dynamics of causality between technology and society. Departing from the 
idea that technology determines social change, the social constructivist approach to 
technology has insisted that technological development, innovation and application is 
very much dependent on individuals, conditions, pre-existing structures and 
circumstances (Bijker, Hughes et al. 1987). Far from treating technology as an 
autonomous force that is context-free, abstract, imposing its objective logic, social 
constructivists focus on the particular historical and social context where technology 
is placed, as well as on the values and interests imbued in technical artefacts, claiming
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that the social shaping of technology and the technical building of society are two 
aspects of the same process (Bijker 2001).
Building on social constructivist views, recent theorisations have addressed the 
‘technological society’ (Barry 2001) or the ‘technological economy’ (Barry and Slater 
2002); others, applying the so-called ‘actor-network theory’ have ascribed equivalent 
analytical value to the human and the technical artefact, treating both as actors that are 
inextricably linked in networks (Law 1992). Social constructivism has gradually 
gained considerable popularity across disciplines, e.g. international relations (Rosenau
2002).
Criticism of social constructivism, nonetheless, has highlighted its often extreme 
devotion to studies of technology development and use in context and the exaggerated 
potency of the human actor to twist and shape the infinitely malleable technology. 
Winner identifies three problems with this approach: firstly, that social constructivism 
seems to be paying little attention to the consequences of technical choice and 
technical change (for individuals, power distribution in society, etc.); secondly, that it 
deals with those who have the means and power to participate in the social shaping of 
technology, while leaving out the political biases that affect the spectrum of choices 
becoming available to relevant social actors; thirdly, that it only focuses on the social 
activities clearly connected with technical change and rules out the deeper and 
broader issues surrounding technological choices, including their externalities 
(Winner 1993).
Thus, social constructivism seems to be missing the wider technological, 
organisational, social, and political context, including changes in infrastructure, 
cultural and attitudinal changes, power relations and social conflicts (Kallinikos 2004, 
Rammert 1997). An implication of this is the bracketing of the constraints that are put 
into place by these wider arrangements. A second implication is the downplaying of 
technological effects, which are present, though not ‘profoundly determining’, as Bell 
would have it (Mackay 2001, p.32).
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2.4. The ambiguous position of Castells
Such wider arrangements and concerns have been addressed by Manuel Castells in the 
most comprehensive account of the information society, namely his trilogy The 
Information Age, published between 1996 and 1998, with revised editions of Vol I 
and III in 2000. This work occupies a unique position within the relevant literature 
and deserves particular attention, due to its breadth of conceptualisation, as well as its 
systematic attempt to substantiate general claims and a macro level theoretical 
approach with empirical evidence from a number of contexts, entities, subjects and 
processes. Furthermore, it has been widely and wildly criticised as equivocal and 
contradictory.
2.4.1. Castells’ approach
In The Information Age, which describes the ‘historical period in which human 
societies perform their activities in a technological paradigm constituted around 
microelectronics-based information/communication technologies, and genetic 
engineering’, Castells addresses the transformations taking place in social structures 
as a result of ‘the prevalence of information networking as the organisational form of 
dominant activities’ (2000, pp.5-6).
This new technological paradigm is treated as a technological revolution: ‘While this 
technological revolution does not determine per se the emergence of a social system, 
it is an essential component of the new social structure that characterises our world: 
the informational society. By this concept, I understand a social structure where the 
sources of economic productivity, cultural hegemony and political-military power 
depend, fundamentally, on the capacity to retrieve, store, process and generate 
information and knowledge’ (Castells 1994, p.21).
As Stalder (1998) notes, Castells draws on the Marxist tradition and uses the concept 
of ‘mode of production’ (meaning the social relationships of production),5 while
5 Castells contrasts between the capitalist mode of production, whose goal is the maximisation of profit, 
i.e. maximisation of the surplus value, and the statist model, whereby surplus is not economic, but 
rather stays with the state and whereby the goal is maximisation of power, meaning the imposition of
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borrowing from Touraine that of ‘mode of development’, which denotes 'this complex, 
interacting system of technology and organisational processes, underlying economic 
growth and social change1 (Castells 1989, p. 17), or the 'technological arrangements 
through which labour works on matter to generate the product, ultimately determining 
the level and quality of surplus’ (Castells, 1996, p. 16). Each mode of development is 
defined by a central element in increasing productivity: in the agrarian mode of 
development, it is the increased amounts of labour power and land; in the industrial 
mode of development, it is the use of (new) energy sources in the production 
processes. In the present era, Castells identifies what he calls ‘the informational mode 
of development’ (or ‘informationalism’), which has the generation, processing and 
distribution of information and knowledge at its core. In the informational mode of 
development, Castells argues, it is knowledge generation, information and symbol 
processing and communication that determine productivity levels. By pervading every 
aspect of society, the informational mode extends from production and permeates 
power and experience, alters social relationships and leads to new forms of social 
interaction, social control and social change (1996, pp. 17-18).
The characteristics of informationalism as a technological paradigm according to 
Castells are: first, it comprises technologies that act on, modify and exchange 
information; second, by implication, it has profound pervasive effects across the entire 
economic and social landscape; third, it possesses a networking logic which serves 
increasingly complex interaction patterns and needs, while simultaneously creating 
new enhanced communicative patterns that would be inconceivable in the absence of 
ICTs; fourth, it provides an element of programmability and flexibility that permits 
reconfiguration of organisational processes, rearrangement and alterations of 
operating components according to user needs and changing circumstances; fifth, it 
facilitates convergence between the different technological subfields and integration 
into sophisticated interconnected information systems in order to take full advantage 
of the ICT potential, something which is also reflected in movements of ICT firms to 
form mergers, acquisitions, or strategic alliances with other industrial and business 
partners (ibid., pp.61-63).
the goals of the political establishment by means of military capacity and organised ideological 
brainwashing and propaganda (1996, p. 16).
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Castells distinguishes carefully between the information society and the 
‘informational society’, ‘in which information generation, processing, and 
transmission become the fundamental sources of productivity and power’ (1996, p.21) 
and where ICTs promote networking as a ‘dynamic, self-expanding form of human 
activity’, which ‘transforms all domains of social and economic life’ (1998, p.336- 
7).6 For some, the use of the term ‘informational’ is an attempt to avoid technological 
determinism (Heiskala 2003). The distinction is not translated into any operational 
difference between the two terms, which are often used interchangeably in the third 
volume of the trilogy (Stalder 1998, p.308).
The concept of ‘network’ is central in Castells’ work: ‘A fundamental feature of 
social structure in the Information Age is its reliance on networks as the key feature of 
social morphology. While networks are old forms of social organisation, they are now 
empowered by new information/communication technologies, so that they become 
able to cope at the same time with flexible decentralisation, and with focused 
decision-making’ (Castells 2000, p.5).
The network is defined as a set of interconnected nodes and can be used to describe 
practically everything: ‘What a node is, concretely speaking, depends upon the kind 
of concrete networks of which we speak. They are stock exchange markets, and their 
ancillary advanced service centres, in the network of global financial flows. They are 
national councils of ministers and European Commissioners in the political network 
that governs the European Union. They are coca fields and poppy fields, clandestine 
laboratories, secret landing strips, street gangs and money-laundering financial 
institutions, in the network of drug traffic.. .’(1996, p.470).
6 Information, taken to be data that have been organised and communicated, and knowledge, taken to 
be ‘a set o f organised statements of facts or ideas, presenting a reasoned judgment or an experimental 
result, which is transmitted to others through some communication medium in some systematic form’ 
(Bell 1973, p. 175) have been present in past societies, not least in the industrial society; nonetheless, 
their place is more enhanced and more complex in the ICT technological revolution, the reason being 
that production is organised around and productivity is based upon the application of knowledge for the 
generation of more knowledge, information processing for improving the deployment of technological 
tools and utilisation of information technology to ameliorate availability, interaction, communication 
and processing o f knowledge (Castells 1996, p. 17).
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Castells later abandons the notion of ‘information society’ altogether for that of the 
‘network society’. Nevertheless, his strong emphasis on ICTs makes for most 
commentators the difference between the ‘information society’ and the ‘informational 
society’ or the ‘network society’ hard to discern (Stehr 2000).
2.4.2. Criticism of Castells
Castells’ approach is overall controversial with regard to the position he takes vis-a- 
vis the question of the network society as signifying a radical break with previous 
industrial capitalist arrangements.
On the one hand, he argues that the global diffusion of ICTs has given rise to an 
informational global economy, which has not undermined the structural basis of the 
industrial economy, but has extended its potential through ameliorated production 
processes, the deployment of knowledge, information and management in production 
and distribution processes, i.e. projecting principles on which the industrial economy 
had been based on a global scale. At the same time, according to his analysis, the 
diffusion of ICTs on a worldwide basis has led to deep organisational, institutional 
and cultural transformations and has created new sets of values; therefore, he suggests 
that the ICT paradigm has modified the dynamics of the industrial capitalist paradigm. 
In this respect, the ICT revolution has given rise to a global economy that is not 
merely information-based, but it has become informational, in an analogous way that 
the Industrial Revolution was not only founded on new forms of energy, but it created 
a completely novel industrial culture, based on a new social and technical division of 
labour and eventually brought the industrial economy into place (Castells, 1996, p. 
91).
Nonetheless, Castells also points out that ‘... the shift from industrialism to 
informationalism is not the historical equivalent of the transition from agricultural to 
industrial economies, and cannot be equated to the emergence of the service 
economy’ (Castells 1996, p.92).
Further, he treats the emergence of the technological revolution and the diffusion of 
new technologies, not as accidental, but as a result of specific political choices
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attributed to a number of factors, including the activities of certain nation states, in a 
historical period of the global restructuring of capitalism, for which it was an essential
n
tool. Specifically, he traces historically a set of parallel processes starting more or 
less in the mid-1970s, namely the revolution in ICTs, the restructuring of capitalism, 
as well as the legitimation crisis of the nation-states and their orientation towards 
market forces, competitiveness and liberalisation. The combination of these recent 
tendencies has shaped processes of economic, political and cultural globalisation and 
the emergence of what he calls ‘the networking organisation’ and have eventually 
brought about a new economic and social paradigm, the ‘network society’, with 
informationalism at its heart.
However, for many ‘the strong impression persists throughout the three volumes that 
it is a process of capital-driven globalisation which continues to bear more 
responsibility for powerfully shaping our world’, and that analytical priority is given 
to the emergence of informationalism as a new mode of development (Smart 2000, 
p.56). Calabrese, for instance, argues that there is in Castells a ‘tendency to fetishise 
information and information technology’, as he presents throughout his trilogy a 
number of social processes, ‘some with scant mention of information technology’s 
embeddedness or imbrications’, and finally imposes on the reader the conclusion that 
informationalism is ‘at the core of it all’ (Calabrese 1999, p. 174).
Indeed, for many thinkers, Castells seems to suggest more than ‘a change within 
capitalism’, but rather ‘an epochal transformation’ (Waterman 1999, p.375). The 
following quote supports this claim: ‘We are just entering a new stage .... Because of 
the convergence of historical evolution and technological change we have entered a 
purely cultural pattern of social interaction and social organisation. This is why 
information is the key ingredient of our social organisation and why flows of
7 The role played by ICTs has been absolutely instrumental in the realisation of a globalised economy: 
a) the new technological revolution has provided the facilities of time and space integration that led to 
new production and management processes purveying flexibility in firms vis-a-vis labour; b) it has 
generated a vast array o f new products that have maintained high levels of consumption both in capital 
machinery and in consumer products, counterbalancing the curtailments in public spending that were 
deemed as necessary after the outbreak of inflation in the 1970s; c) it has enabled the global 
integration of financial markets in the beginning of the 1980s forcing national governments to conform 
with supranational policies proposed at the OECD level with the enhanced role of the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international financial institutions (Castells 1996).
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messages and images between networks constitute the basic thread of our social 
structure .... It is the beginning of a new existence, and indeed the beginning of a new 
age, the information age marked by the autonomy of culture vis-a-vis the material 
bases of our existence’ (Castells 1996, pp.477-78).
Further, Castells often resorts to binary oppositions to denote the ways in which the 
new opposes the old: space of flows vs. space of places, territorial vs. virtual 
dynamics, global elites vs. the Fourth World, the net and the self, old labour 
movements vs. new gender ones. Critics wonder whether it might be more fruitful to 
approach these in a dialectic way, i.e. both being part of contemporary developments 
and linked with each other, an approach that would no doubt highlight both change 
and continuity (Waterman 1999, p.376).
Is Castells adopting the logic of homogenisation with eventual convergence of all 
societies towards the informational paradigm? He sums up his view as follows: 
‘While capitalism’s restructuring and the diffusion of informationalism were 
inseparable processes on a global scale, societies did act/react differently to such 
processes, according to the specificity of their history, culture, and institutions. Thus, 
to some extent, it would be improper to refer to an Informational Society, which 
would imply the homogeneity of social forms everywhere under the new system .... 
Yet we could speak of an Information Society in the same way that sociologists have 
been referring to the existence of an Industrial Society, characterised by common 
fundamental features in their sociotechnical systems .... But with two important 
qualifications: on the one hand, informational societies, as they exist currently, are 
capitalist (unlike industrial societies, some of which were statist); on the other hand, 
we must stress the cultural and institutional diversity of informational societies’ (1996, 
P-20).
Eventually, ‘the new society emerging from such a process of change is both capitalist 
and informational, while presenting considerable historical variation in different 
countries, according to their history, culture, institutions, and to their specific 
relationship to global capitalism and information technology' (ibid., p. 13).
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Based on the above early writings, Castells seems to consider the network society as 
nothing more than an evolution within capitalism, extending and intensifying the logic 
of capitalist accumulation, rather than departing from the capitalist economic and 
social configurations. His references to ‘informational capitalism’ emphasise the 
element of continuity, as opposed to a radical break. As a result, certain analysts 
separate Castells from more deterministic conceptualisations, most significantly 
Daniel Bell’s ‘post-industrial society’, or other approaches identifying radical 
historical breaks (e.g. theories of postmodemity) (Mackay 2001).
In later writings, Castells seems again to be following the logic of continuity, rather 
than radical change. Approaching the evolution and spread of the Internet as a socio-
tVitechnological phenomenon, he argues that in the late 20 century ‘three independent 
processes came together, ushering in a new social structure predominantly based on 
networks: the needs of the economy for management flexibility and for the 
globalisation of capital, production, and trade; the demands of society in which the 
value of individual freedom and open communication became paramount; and the 
extraordinary advances in computing and telecommunications made possible by the 
micro-electronics revolution’ (2001, p.2, emphasis added).
Certainly this is not determinist language and this is made more explicit: ‘The point of 
departure of this analysis is that people, institutions, companies, and society at large, 
transform technology, any technology, by appropriating it, by modifying it, by 
experimenting with it. This is the fundamental lesson from the social history of 
technology’ (2001, p.4). Speaking of the Internet he declares that it ‘is a particularly 
malleable technology, susceptible of being deeply modified by its social practice, and 
leading to a whole range of potential social outcomes -to  be discovered by experience, 
not proclaimed beforehand’ (ibid., p.5, emphasis added).
Here, Castells seems to come very close to social constructivism: ‘In contrast to 
claims purporting the Internet to be either a source of renewed community or a cause 
of alienation from the real world, social interaction on the Internet does not seem to 
have a direct effect on the patterning of everyday life, generally speaking, except for 
adding on-line interaction to existing social relationships.’ (2001, p. 119). Ironically, 
then, he has invited criticism from those who think that ‘Internet-related technologies
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have directly altered the patterning of everyday life, including the ways we work, 
access and exchange information, shop, meet people, and maintain and organize 
existing social ties’ (Gane 2005, p.475, italics in the original).
In his book on the Finnish information society, the argument is that ‘information 
society can exist, and indeed does exist, in a plurality of social and cultural models, in 
the same way that the industrial society developed in very different, and even 
antagonistic, models of modernity, for instance in the United States and the Soviet 
Union, as well as in Scandinavia or Japan’ (Castells and Himanen 2002, p.2).
Nevertheless, Castells argues that the network society is a new type of societal 
organisation with its own logic (the network logic), which he claims to be imposed on 
social and political processes, reconfiguring and redefining them. In this way, the 
economy becomes informational, global and networked; the firm is transformed 
towards the network enterprise; work and employment adopt flexible patterns and 
continuous occupational mobility; the state and the exercise of political power are 
mutated towards a network state characterised by power-sharing across different 
geographical scales (from the international down to the subnational and the local) and 
among different power holders (including NGOs and other political entities, 
information networks of capital, trade, science and so forth); relationships of 
production become globalised, labour segmented and social classes less coherent; 
consumption patters become diversified, individualised and unequal, with growing 
social polarisation; organisational hierarchies in all organisations are challenged; 
culture and meaning become increasingly fragmented (1996, 2000, 2001).
To be sure, there is plenty of truth in the transformations that Castells describes 
eloquently; the question however remains whether indeed all these processes of 
transformation ‘are enacted by organisational forms that are built upon networks, or to 
be more specific, upon information networks’ (2000, pp. 14-15). For many, this 
overemphasis on the concept of network reveals a technocratic view of development 
whereby the ICT revolution shapes the network society. The frequent reference by 
Castells to the ‘morphology of the network’ as the dominant enabler of certain types 
of social action and disabler of certain others certainly lends itself to criticism of this 
sort: ‘How can power reside in networks without reference to any other economic or
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material basis?’ (Mackay 2001, p.40).
The centrality of the network in Castells’ analysis is also evident in the concept of the 
‘space of flows’, which refers to ‘the technological and organisational possibility of 
organising the simultaneity of social practices without geographical contiguity’ (2000, 
p. 14). The space of flows involves the technological (network) infrastructure, places 
(which are taken to be nodes on the network) and people located in specific places. 
However, in the space of flows meaning is generated by the flows and is not linked 
with the particular places, as is the case with traditional forms of space and place as 
we know them. Financial markets, transnational production networks, transnational 
media, but also transnational social movements, form examples of the space of flows. 
Castells seems to assume that although initially the space of flows coexists with the 
traditional space of places, the former gradually displaces the latter and becomes the 
dominant social logic in the network society (Stalder 1998). Put in another way, ‘once 
introduced, and powered by information technology, information networks, through 
competition, gradually eliminate other organisational forms, rooted in a different 
social logic’ (Castells 2000, p. 16).
Castells then seems to be placing too much emphasis on the network paradigm, 
subsuming older capitalist institutional infrastructures, for instance bureaucratic 
models. For certain thinkers, networking practices do not seem to produce and 
organisation form as solid as bureaucracy (Kallinikos 2007). Likewise, Heiskala 
argues that the concept of the network seems to be inadequate as an overarching 
analytical device. It is overused, and sometimes imposed on national contexts (e.g. 
south Korea) which do not seem to bear network characteristics and on political 
entities (e.g. EU as a ‘network state’) which are built on complex governance systems, 
including some kind of hierarchy. Castells overemphasises the antithesis between 
hierarchical and network organisations and uses the concept without qualification as 
to the structures and power dynamics present in the network. As Heiskala suggests 
‘there are different types of networks, some of which are not hierarchical at all, some 
of which are very hierarchical, with some inbetween these two extreme ends of the 
continuum’ (2003, p.240).
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While for Heiskala the term ‘informational revolution’ is too vague to be used to 
analyse societal processes, for Gamham, ‘Although Castells attempts to retain a 
notion of human agency and is careful to point to the importance and possibility of 
differing national policy responses and to the growing importance of social 
movements and local forms of cultural resistance, in the end the Information Society, 
as he presents it, is technologically determined. The source of the dynamic of social 
change and what are seen as epochal and global transformations in the structure of the 
economy, in social stratification, politics and culture are a technological paradigm 
based upon a cluster of innovation in information and communication technology 
largely stemming from Silicon Valley in the 1970s.’ (2001a, p.3). In similar terms, 
Golding (2000) argues that Castells’ approach is reminiscent of the modernisation 
thesis, in that he suggests that all societies will eventually simulate late twentieth- 
century southern California. Stehr makes the compatible argument that ‘although 
Castells is not a strict proponent of technological determinism, a number of theses in 
his study tend to resonate unavoidably with the paradigm of technological 
determinism that stresses context-insensitive consequences of technical products 
rather than the social processes of innovation and deployment’ (2000, p.85).
Castells indeed seems at points enthusiastic about discovering the novelty in all 
possible terrains, including the cultural realm, where he traces a new ethic in the 
information society, namely a ‘spirit of informationalism’ that has replaced the well- 
known ‘spirit of capitalism’ identified by Weber. The profundity and ethical 
foundation of the spirit of informationalism, is challenged, however, by Smart who 
argues that according to Weber it was profit-making that became the driving force of 
capitalism early on, displacing the work ethic; likewise, the ethical basis of 
informational capitalism seems also to be collapsing under a consumerist drive (Smart 
2000).
To be sure, there is some degree of confusion regarding the cultural aspects of the 
network society. The ‘spirit of informationalism’ is celebrated as a spirit of innovation, 
experimentation, originality. For instance, innovation has been a key to the success of 
the Finnish information society model, mentioned above, the analysis of which has 
included a prominence ascribed to the ‘hacker ethic’ (Castells and Himanen 2002).
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The spirit of informationalism is conflated with the ‘culture of virtuality’ or virtual 
culture, which is seen as the dominant cultural code of the network society and the 
network enterprise and which bears strong similarities to the ephemeral and eclectic 
culture of postmodemity (Harvey 1989). Gamham wonders whether we can 
empirically prove the existence of the ‘spirit of informationalism’ and whether virtual 
culture is indeed dominant and more importantly whether this cultural form is 
liberating or ideological, ‘in the sense of distracting from underlying, more deeply 
rooted, structures of interest’ (2004, p. 179).
Castells also associates this ‘spirit’ with the culture or ‘creative destruction’, which 
arguably has been a characteristic of the capitalist system historically, rather than a 
defining cultural characteristic of a new epoch. Further, the imperative of innovation 
seems to pull state policies of a certain kind, namely liberalisation and deregulation, 
which ostensibly promote this innovative spirit (Patomaki 2003). In the end, one is 
left wondering whether the idea of the spirit of informationalism is not an attempt to 
fit the network paradigm with a certain culture which demands societal adjustments 
and policy directions in a deterministic way.
Throughout his work, Castells suggests both that informationalism is a novel 
technological and socio-economic paradigm and that it has been appropriated by 
capitalism for its own purposes. Speaking of the new economy, he argues that it is 
certainly capitalist. However, ‘this is a new brand of capitalism, in which rules for 
investment, accumulation, and reward, have substantially changed’; further, ‘since 
nothing authorises capitalism as eternal, it is essential to focus on the characteristics 
of the new economy because it may well outlast the mode of production where it was 
bom, once capitalism comes under decisive challenge and/or plunges into a structural 
crisis derived from its internal contradictions’ (2000, p.l 1).
This reveals a tension between the dynamics of informationalism and capitalism, i.e. 
informationalism challenging the dominance of capitalism through dynamic forms of 
networking and learning and networked forms of governance or capitalism impeding 
the realisation of an information society (Jessop 2000). While ambitious, challenging 
and far-reaching, his work does not seem to ultimately resolve this tension. On a
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straight line between continuity and change in societal arrangements, Castells seems 
to be closer to the point of change in contrast to other critical approaches.
2.5. Information society as continuity -context and embeddedness of ICTs
The perspectives that are in concord with the dominant view of the information 
society as epochal change often emphasise the opportunities associated with ICT- 
driven new arrangements. For Mosco, however, all this is based on the ‘myth’ of the 
Information Highway, ‘a story about how ever smaller, faster, cheaper, and better 
computer and communication technologies help to realise, with little effort, those 
seemingly impossible dreams of democracy and community’ (1998, p.58).
The key to cultivating this myth is exactly the departure from history and the 
emphasis on transformation: ‘The denial of history is central to understanding myth as 
depoliticised speech because to deny history is to remove from discussion active 
human agency, the constraints of social structure, and the real world of politics. 
According to the myth, the Information Age transcends politics because it makes 
power available to everyone and in great abundance’ (ibid, p.60).
The majority of critical approaches to ICTs and the information society indeed prefer 
to view it not in terms of radical change from previous (western industrial) societal 
arrangements, but rather in terms of change within historical continuity. In doing so, 
they depart from an ahistorical perspective that reifies ICTs and emphasises their 
transformative effects out of historical context. On the contrary, they re-insert context 
in the analysis coupling the synchronic dimension (what is happening at the present) 
with the diachronic (what has been happening over time). At the macro level this 
takes the form of dealing with the extension of capitalist relations on a global scale 
through the diffusion of ICTs and the systematic transformation of contemporary 
societies into societies where information and knowledge generation and processing 
play an increasingly central role.
In this spirit, Beniger describes the complex, interrelated processes of change in 
technological, economic and organisational arrangements (technical innovations, 
bureaucratic changes, formation of new firms and corporate organisations) related to
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ththe manipulation of information, originating in the mid-19 century and evolving over
tlithe 20 century. He considers these developments part of a ‘Control Revolution’, 
which uses increased amounts of information for control and has an impact on all 
levels of society, both material and cultural (Beniger 1986).
From a political economy approach to information and communication, Herbert 
Schiller stresses the structural features, such as patterns of ownership, sources of 
advertising revenue, etc., that lie behind media messages and constrain their content 
and undertakes a systemic analysis of information and communications in their 
general socio-economic context, which is the capitalist system. For Schiller, the 
information society reflects capitalist imperatives and information has become an 
essential ingredient of the capitalist system and the market economy, which prevail 
despite technological change (Schiller 1981). Information networks are in the hands 
of corporate media and computer giants who have the power to control content and set 
prices (Schiller 1996).
Multinational corporations dominate the international economy and sophisticated 
ICTs are deployed by them to pursue their goals, while transnational media 
corporations are acting as their ‘ideologically supportive informational infrastructure’ 
through the promotion of consumerist lifestyles (Schiller 1979). Information is 
commodified, while class inequalities determine the distribution, access to and 
capacity to generate information. Internet advertising, security controls, access fees, 
software for firewalled intranets for firms, as well as for identity verification and 
billing related to e-commerce, are all testimonials to the market appropriating ICTs 
(Mosco 1998, Sassen 2002). Moreover, they contribute to the consumption activities 
by exploiting the flexibilities offered by ICTs and the Internet; for Comor, ICTs have 
extended and deepened commodification and the market system, and the institution of 
consumption is a central, though understudied, cultural dimension of twenty-first 
century capitalism (Comor 2002), a point reminiscent of Sklair’s (2000) analysis of 
global capitalism and the ‘culture-ideology’ of consumerism.
Mattelart (2003) is also sceptical vis-a-vis the dominant views of the information 
society as new societal arrangement brought about by ICTs and positions himself 
towards the continuity side of the debate; he presents a historical account of the
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evolution of ideas around the information society, placing them in the rhetoric of 
modernisation and progress that has been present in the western world for centuries 
and arguing eventually that social changes that are seen as ingredients of the 
information age in fact ‘testify to structural developments that have been underway 
for a very long time’ (Mattelart 2003, p. 161).
Webster likewise agrees that ‘while there is undoubted change taking place, and this 
at a speed and with a reach hitherto unimaginable, it is for the most part a matter of 
the continuity, consolidation and extension of established relations’ (Webster 2000, 
p.3). He thus identifies global informational capitalism as the dominant force shaping 
contemporary society, stressing differences of this contemporary form from corporate 
or laissez-faire capitalism, but still arguing that information trends have to be placed 
in a framework of capitalist development. For this reason, he speaks of the increasing 
‘informatisation’ of modem society, rather than a new information society paradigm 
(Webster 2002).
In his own attempt to approach contemporary times, Barney views informationalism 
as a species of capitalism, where substance seems to be following a logic of continuity 
of previous capitalist arrangements, while form and praxis are changing: the former 
from industrial to informational, the latter from hierarchical to decentralised 
operations and practices (Barney 2004, Gripenberg 2006).
Ian Miles (1996) summarises the debate regarding the extent of change brought about 
by ICTs in terms of two extremes. On the one hand, 'continuism', i.e. the views that 
ICT-related change is limited on an economic and social level and that the 
contemporary Western society bears roughly the same qualitative characteristics as
thprevious social formations in the 20 century, leaving the basic power structures 
unaltered -although social and political initiatives may bring social change. On the 
other hand, 'transformism', namely the set of beliefs that the information society 
represents a historical break with previous social organisations, changing existing 
power patterns and transforming social stratification with an enhanced position for 
information and knowledge workers and classes; in this view, ICTs are considered 
revolutionary technologies with potential social benefits and significant long-term 
effects. In between the two extremes lies what Miles calls 'structuralism', a more
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synthetic view acknowledging that there are both prospects and barriers to radical 
social change and that the outcome is dynamically determined by actors (groups, 
organisations, governments or nations) and interests guiding ICTs and intervening in 
unequal ways. Actions and interactions between them make up a complex shaping 
process of many contradictory dynamics and many possible outcomes, i.e. many 
possible information societies.
Many thinkers have stressed that understanding ICTs calls for a departure from a 
purely technological interpretation and the acknowledgement of their embeddedness 
within different economic, political, and social orders. Sassen stresses the 
embeddedness and the variable outcomes of ICTs by focusing on the interactions 
between the digital and the material world, and the ‘mediating cultures’ that organise 
the relation between ICTs and users. She places emphasis on the embeddedness of the 
digital space in social structures and power relations, and the significant implications 
that this might have for the role and actions of the state and citizens (Sassen 2000b, 
Sassen 2002). Thrift approaches critically what he sees as ‘an undue emphasis on 
information technology’, not because he denies the substantial reliance of capitalist 
economies on ICTs, but because he thinks that ‘it should be seen as having differential 
effects on numerous circuits of practice, rather than as a determining effect of its own’ 
(2001, p.377, emphasis added). Drawing on Karl Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness of 
economic actions in social, political and cultural institutions, Rogerson (2003) also 
argues that ICTs, information and its consequences have to be placed in greater 
contexts of social interactions and arrangements to be properly analysed and 
understood.
ICT developments are in general the result of complex interactions between market 
demands (and user involvement) and public and technology policies, in a balance that 
builds on existing ICT properties, but is also open to negotiation (Dutton 1996). 
Existing structures are of course instrumental in determining courses of action 
associated with ICTs and results are bound to be sealed by an intermingling of 
predominant cultures and institutions with the organisational modifications imposed 
by the new technology.
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In his analysis of the work of Lewis Mumford, May (2000) claims that writings on the 
information society tend to be adopting either an ‘enclosing’ dynamic, whereby 
capitalism and commodification still persist and absorb any contrary tendencies, or in 
opposite terms, a ‘disclosing’ dynamic, which argues that sooner or later the potential 
of ICTs for democratic politics and human empowerment will overcome the enclosing 
tendencies inherited from the previous societal arrangements. Mumford has rather 
insisted that these two dynamics are not contradictory, but both are part of the 
unfolding of the history of society and technology. In this sense, May argues, the 
information society, can also be approached as evolving in ways incorporating both 
the two complementary, and not contradictory dynamics. Likewise, Sassen (2002) 
claims that these opposite dynamics can be captured by approaching the digital 
domain as embedded: new technologies and the Internet in particular contribute to the 
reproduction of existing hierarchies and functions, as well as challenge them by 
providing to new actors opportunities for contestation.
Echoing this point and drawing on recent changes in the broadband environment, 
patent law and spectrum rules, Lessig provides examples of Internet deployment 
whereby ‘an attitude of control, perfected by an idea about property, is in tension with 
a system that protects a commons’ (2002, p.236). Servaes tries to strike a balance 
between the potential offered by ICTs and the barriers to the materialisation of this 
potential in different contexts, as well as identifying the gap between policy-making 
rhetoric and socio-political reality in national, regional and global contexts (Servaes 
2003, Cammaerts 2005).
2.6. Towards a continuity-change approach
From the above, one can conclude that the technologically determinist view of the 
information society as inescapable misses this rich articulation between the technical 
and the social and the ways in which they build upon each other in dialectical 
relationships.
Seeking to exploit the advantages and avoid the drawbacks of constructivism and at 
the same time overcome mechanistic evolutionism, Rammert proposes a sociological 
method of approaching technology and technical change, which purports to combine a
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constructivist view of technology in context at the local level, combined with a ‘social 
evolutionary’ approach on the global level, which incorporates human agency and the 
institutionalisation of the selective structures. This approach draws from structuration 
theory (Giddens 1984) and treats technologies as ‘technostructures’, seen as socially 
constructed realities ‘which are constituted and produced by the action of subjects ... 
rather than a taken-for-granted world of material objects’ (Rammert 1997, p. 174).
Rammert’s synthetic approach enables awareness both of the macro-properties that an 
ensemble of technologies (in this case the ICT paradigm) can establish and the macro­
circumstances (including constraints and enabling conditions) in which its advent and 
establishment occurs. It takes into consideration an overall social shaping of 
technology through social processes and actors’ choices (MacKenzie and Wacjman 
1985), including the role of information society policy and the mechanisms it 
emanates from. These advantages make it relevant for this thesis, since it opens up the 
possibility of approaching the information society as a balance between continuity 
(the pre-existing social arrangements in which the new technologies are developed 
and placed) and change (the modifications, transformations, and constitutions of new 
structures, practices and social arrangements).
Emphasising change within continuity (as opposed to change as historical and social 
rupture) gives the opportunity of articulating social transformations within existing 
historical patterns with the ultimate benefit of identifying ways in which pre-existing 
arrangements are modified (often quite radically, no doubt) and the new forms into 
which these arrangements are mutated in interaction with the spread of new ICTs.
The examination of emergent patterns of socio-technical interaction introduces the 
role of the context into which technologies are developed, diffused and implemented. 
This does not mean denying that technology is indeed ‘a distinct realm of human 
experience that is not reducible to social or institutional relations’ (Kallinikos 2002). 
Rather, it means avoiding attributing to technology the prime role as the motor of 
social change and rather investigating emergent patterns of socio-technical 
interaction. As May puts it, ‘technology has no fixed logic, no pre-inscribed 
trajectory. The information age, like previous technological “ages”, will not be unitary 
or uncontested in character; society has a profound impact on ICTs every bit as much
44
as they have an effect on society’ (2003, p. 10). Castells and Himanen (2002) likewise 
argue for the mutual adaptation of institutions and technology so as to create a 
satisfactory fit. They admit that there is no unitary and homogeneous network society, 
but rather different social, institutional, and cultural manifestations of it, as has been 
the case for the industrial society.
A continuity and change information society perspective (Feather 2000) entails a 
multidimensional and contextual approach to the information society, which combines 
the possibility for the exercise of agency through ICTs, e.g. decentralised networking 
by civil society agents and social movements (Sassen 2002), as well as 
acknowledging continuing structural features, for example unequal distribution of 
capabilities, power relations and the commodification of information (Cammaerts 
2005, p.75).
Following the above critical views, then, we also choose to approach the information 
society not in terms of radical change from previous (Western) societal arrangements, 
but rather in terms of change within historical continuity, i.e. the extension of 
capitalist relations on a global scale through the diffusion of ICTs and the systematic 
transformation of contemporary societies into societal formations where information 
and knowledge generation and processing play an increasingly central role. This 
stance resolves the issue of continuity and change so often encountered in the 
literature on the information society. Instead of the rubrics of information society, 
post-industrialism, post-modernity, we prefer the language of informational capitalism 
(or perhaps of global informational capitalism), which should not be seen as a new 
kind of society, but rather as a reconfiguration, transformation, and re-orientation of 
capitalism. Having said that, as there have been variants of capitalism, depending on 
institutional differentiations in the economy and society (Hall and Soskice 2001), 
there is no single informational capitalism, but rather different arrangements and 
configurations of capitalism and informationalism, i.e. different types of informational 
capitalism.
Eventually, the ‘information society’ can be a useful term only to the extent that it is 
deployed as a paradigm for structuring discussion with the intention of identifying 
both continuities with pre-existing structures and societal patterns (temporal
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dimension) and of pointing out variations according to social and cultural context 
(spatial dimension). In this sense, it makes more sense to speak of different 
information societies (Miles 1996).
2.7. The nation-state: roles and functions
The modem nation-state has been the principal form of political rule across the globe, 
since the seventeenth century, which marked the beginning of the contemporary 
international system made up of sovereign states claiming exclusive authority within 
their geographic boundaries (Held and McGrew 2000). The history of nation-state 
formation shows that it was only at that time that states began to be transformed from 
circumscribed and limited central apparatuses to ensembles of institutions and 
procedures of rule over a national territory. This process involved the imposition of a 
national language, the demarcation of a specific territory of rule, the unification of 
legal codes, the institutionalisation of practices of rule in constitutional forms, the 
authority to demand taxes and the monopoly of legitimate use of force over the given 
territory. This ‘coincidence of a defined territory of rule and a project and apparatus 
for administering the lives and activities of those within that territory... warrants us to 
speak of the modem nation-state as a centralised set of institutions and personnel 
wielding authoritative power over a nation’ (Rose and Miller 1992, p.176).8
Giddens differentiates between the capitalist state, i.e. the state in a capitalist society, 
in which there is interdependence in the division of labour, both internally and 
internationally, and the state in pre-capitalist or non-capitalist societies. In capitalism 
there is economic and technological innovation and the accumulation process is based 
on the mobilisation of privately-owned capital, which is not under the control of the 
state. At the same time, the state assumes a range of community services deriving 
from state revenues which depend on the activities of employers and workers. This 
constitutes a major contradictory element of the capitalist state.
8 One can for analytical reasons speak of ‘the state’ when referring to the structures, institutions and 
mechanisms of government within this territory, while using the term ‘nation-state’ or ‘national state’ 
when projecting the state entity to the international field and examining its position and relations with 
other forces, structures and entities operating beyond the boundaries of the given territory. Generally 
speaking, this is the convention that we follow throughout this thesis.
46
The state has from the beginning of capitalism played a significant role in economic 
activity and since the late 18th century, with the advent of industrial capitalism, it has 
expanded its activities as the manager of economic life. Surveillance lies at the heart 
of this authoritative power, since a modem state needs to have a clear picture of its 
people for defence or taxation purposes. During the late 19th and 20th century there 
was a tremendous expansion of office statistics on everything, from education to 
employment. Nowadays, surveillance has expanded for the purpose of developing the 
administrative capacity necessary to serve the citizenship rights (vote, education, 
welfare, services, etc.) of the citizens (Giddens 1985).
Nonetheless, surveillance is not the only dimension that defines the roles and 
functions of the modem nation-state. Castells, for example, analyses the state through 
the dynamics of domination and legitimation on the one hand and of development and 
redistribution on the other. Domination refers to the structural interests 
institutionalised in the state mechanisms (e.g. the predominance of the market in a 
state of neoliberal orientation); legitimation results from the capacity of the state to 
represent the interests of its subjects (and/or to persuade these subjects that their 
interests are indeed represented and satisfied). The balance between domination and 
legitimation ensures the stability of state institutions. In addition, as the existence of 
state mechanisms and of society at large depends on material resources, the state has a 
developmental role to play so as to increase material wealth; this has to be 
accompanied by redistribution of the material resources generated among different 
societal segments. Again, the stability of the institutions of the state is conditioned by 
the processes of development and redistribution (Castells 2004, pp.360-61).
Sorensen presents an ideal-typical picture of the modem state comprising the pillars 
of government, nationhood and the economy. Government is the centralised system of 
democratic rule, based on a set of administrative, policing and military organisations, 
sanctioned by a legal order, claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, all 
within a defined territory’; nationhood involves ‘a people within a territory making up 
a community of citizens (with political, social and economic rights) and a community 
of sentiment based on linguistic, cultural and historical bonds’; the economy refers to
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a ‘segregated national economy, self-sustained in the sense that it comprises the main 
sectors needed for its reproduction’ (Sorensen 2004, p. 14).
2.8. Globalisation, ICTs and the nation-state
Globalisation literature has dealt extensively over the last decade or so with the 
challenges facing the nation-state as a result of pressures emanating from global 
processes (McGrew 1995). Globalisation was induced by the national state to address 
its legitimacy crisis but has gone out of its control, making it increasingly dependent 
on financial markets, globalisation of production, trade, technology, communication 
and the ideological apparatus of global media (Camoy and Castells 2001). The 
national state is being predominantly regarded as too small to address the global 
context, but also too big to tackle increasingly complex and differentiated local 
problems, as Daniel Bell has appositely remarked in his The End o f Ideology (Bell 
1988).
Hyperglobalists argue that the nation-state is a political entity no longer capable of 
addressing the challenges presented by economic globalisation. They subscribe to the 
view of the ‘retreat of the state’ from the national and international political scene 
(Ohmae 1990). Arguments about the impact of economic globalisation on state 
authority have emphasised the increasing possibilities for cross-border economic 
activity (owing to ICT developments, including the Internet) that escape state control 
and regulation. Sceptics refuse to acknowledge simplistic approaches to globalisation 
(which they see as ongoing a process that has been evolving for over a century) and 
prefer to stress the continuing significance of the state in a number of issues 
determining national and international politics.9 Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue 
that the nation-states retain significant regulatory powers which can be used to 
facilitate or prohibit the movement of capital, labour, products and information.
Sorensen summarises the debate on state transformation by resorting to three basic
9 A comprehensive literature review on the place of the nation state under conditions of globalisation 
would necessitate a survey of a vast literature on political globalisation and is out of the scope of this 
thesis. However, we touch upon the basic issues and try to link them with the challenges facing the 
nation-state in the information age.
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schools of thought. Realist state-centric views look at the state from outside and argue 
that states continue to be the basic units of the international system and they set the 
rules for other actors, including corporations, the market, civil society, international 
organisations and so on. Liberals focus on individuals, companies and groups in civil 
society, which they see as determining what states do. They tend to underestimate the 
autonomous power that governments, bureaucracies and state institutions might have. 
For them, the retreat of the state is a positive development, as it strengthens the 
importance of individuals and the market economy. Finally, the critical view, 
involving political economists and historical sociologists, includes theorists who focus 
on state-market dynamics and the evolution of the state-market relationship, which 
they see as one of mutual dependence. These theorists tend to argue that the state 
faces complex processes of transformation, as will be demonstrated in chapter 3, 
notably through the work of Bob Jessop (Sorensen 2004).
The literature on globalisation and the place of the state is complemented by a 
growing body of scholarship seeking to make sense of the place of ICTs in 
contemporary politics, the emerging novel power arrangements in the information age 
and the place of the state within them.
There have indeed been extensive debates on the ways in which the ICT-enabled 
flows, including the Internet, challenge the notion of state boundaries and the ability 
of states to control such information flows. Neo-realists stress threats to national 
security and the formation of online communities that operate in parallel with state, 
while neoliberals highlight state interdependence and the possibilities for international 
cooperation in new governance regimes that will address the new ‘space of flows’.
Steinberg and McDowell claim that trans-state information flows are not posing a 
qualitatively different challenge: ‘Flows of various kinds across borders always have 
taken place, and actors in the state system have a long history of developing regimes 
to facilitate and regulate the movement of capital, commodities, labour and 
information’. In this respect, flows and states have developed in parallel and 
sometimes in conflict. On the other hand, however, they regard information flows as 
the latest expression of a broader tension in the spatial organisation of capitalism,
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namely ‘between capital’s tendency toward mobility and its concurrent tendency 
toward spatial fixity’ (Steinberg and McDowell 2003, p. 199).
The issue of digitisation, in particular, has been time and again emphasised in recent 
contributions. Singh (2002) describes how digitisation has ‘undone the technological 
logic behind separate industry types and pipelines’ (p.5), meaning that through 
digitisation different types of media (voice, text, video and image) are all stored in 
digital code. This enables the horizontal integration of different information pipelines 
(computing, entertainment, publishing), forming information highways, where 
information in digitised form is exchanged through multimedia devices.
For Singh, as ICTs involve networking, i.e. communication and information exchange, 
they have an impact on the exercise of power and on governance at the international 
political level. More specifically, they have a significant impact on instrumental 
power (enhancing the capabilities of firms or nation-states, but also new actors, who 
used to be underprivileged, e.g. social movements or terrorist groups); structural 
power (providing the ability to transform rules and institutions); and what he calls 
‘meta-power’ (reconfiguring, constituting or reconstituting identities of all actors 
involved, as well as interests and institutions) (Singh 2002).
The increasing dominance of the Internet challenges the idea of territorial space as 
defining security or human rights or a number of other political issues; it enables the 
pursuit of democratic practices and becomes a medium of non-elites to communicate 
across different scales, ranging from local to transnational. This is why Sassen calls 
for the reconceptualisation of the local as a micro-environment, which, though 
attached to local circumstances, is also informed by global developments and acquires 
through technological connections a global span (Sassen 2002). This does not mean, 
however, that territorial space is abolished, nor that these new spaces (and the issues 
framed according to them) are defined conclusively by the Internet. It is rather a 
matter of ICTs bringing about and becoming part of new social, political, and 
economic circumstances. It is important to identify these transformative and 
constitutive effects of ICTs, without underestimating however the imbrications 
between the digital and the material, which are manifested in various contexts, e.g. the 
spatial concentration of a variety of service professions in global cities (Sassen 2002).
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2.9. Continuing importance and transformation of the nation-state
Critical approaches argue that against new structural forces (new ICTs, neo-liberal 
discourses, or new geopolitical configurations) and in the light of varying responses to 
these challenges, a general model of the national state still persists as a significant 
actor in global processes and their national expressions, albeit through a rearticulating 
of its various functions and roles (Smith, Solinger and Topik 1999; Mittelman 2000; 
Sklair 2000). They claim, for instance, that while there have been significant 
processes of liberalisation worldwide, these developments are more moves towards 
re-regulation and regulatory reform, rather than simple de-regulation processes (May 
2002, p. 133). The implications for state mechanisms seem to have included shifts to 
new practices, roles and functions and new areas of regulation, rather than the 
diminishing of state roles as such; a model of regulatory state has been proposed to 
account for these changes (Thatcher 2002).
The national state is considered important for global capital as it can guarantee stable 
economy and polity; moreover, national competitiveness is still pursued by the state 
so as to make the national economy attractive to foreign multinationals (which 
themselves rely on their home states for protection). National education and human 
capital policies are important in this respect for achieving productivity at the national 
level (Camoy and Castells 2001).
Critical theorists do not underestimate the different circumstances in which state 
power operates. Goldblatt, Held et al. (1999), for instance, argue that economic 
globalisation does not necessarily entail a reduction of state power, but, rather, the 
transformation of the conditions under which state power is exercised. The example of 
knowledge, traditionally controlled by state apparatuses is perhaps characteristic. 
Camoy and Castells (2001) claim that in the information age knowledge is central to 
any contemporary hegemonic project but the locus of the relation between knowledge 
and power has moved out of the nation-state; this is because information, knowledge 
and innovation operate in a global space in terms of generation, circulation, profit- 
making and capitalist value definition.
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Critical literature has indeed been at pains to elaborate upon the transformation of the 
role of the state and its interactions with the global economic system (Held and 
McGrew 2002). Sassen (2000a) calls for the need to disentangle multiple and specific 
structurations of ‘the global’ (e.g. legislative acts or firms) inside what has been 
historically constructed as ‘the national’. According to her, the expressions of global 
processes and operational rules in national institutional arrangements need to be 
identified. She approaches the contemporary encounter between the global and the 
national as one in which the state is not only resisting and declining in significance, 
but is also shaping, participating in and implementing the global economic 
arrangements, and is being reconfigured as a result. This reconfiguration involves 
elements of standardisation and convergence, as well as national particularities and 
different responses. Further, Sassen calls for the deployment of new conceptual tools 
to identify sub-national formations and processes as instances of global forces in 
operation (Sassen 1996, 2003).
Jessop (2002) argues that the national state has changed in three key respects: a) 
towards the denationalisation of the state, or statehood; b) towards the de-statisation 
of the political system and a shift from government to governance; c) towards the 
internationalisation of policy regimes. These are opposed by three counter-trends: a) 
the attempts of the national state to retain control over the articulation of different 
spatial scales; b) the increased role of government in meta-governance; c) the growing 
importance of national states in the struggle to shape the development of international 
policy regimes in the interests of their respective national bourgeoisies.
Even some of the sceptics acknowledge that the state’s role is changing: ‘The 
emerging forms of governance of international markets and other economic processes 
involve the major national governments but in a new role: states come to function less 
as “sovereign” entities and more as components of an international “polity”’ (Hirst 
and Thompson 1996, p. 171).
The notion of global governance is prominent in the literature on globalisation and 
international relations. In a global governance approach, the national government is 
considered a strategic site for linking together governance infrastructures and 
legitimising non-state regulation. These infrastructures include the supranational (e.g.
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UN), the regional (e.g. EU or MERCOSUR), the transnational (e.g. civil society or 
business networks) and the sub-national (e.g. community associations, local 
governments) (Held and McGrew 2002, p.9). A basic problem with global governance 
is that it ‘embodies a complex patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions, generating 
ambiguities about the principal location of authority and political responsibility’ (Held 
and McGrew 2002, p. 10). This is more so with the involvement of private or quasi­
private bodies and agencies which exist alongside global public authorities (in areas 
as diverse as credit-rating, the setting of technical standards, or humanitarian aid).
The links between the technical and the political in the contemporary ‘information 
age’ take more specific forms in the discussions of issues of governance. ICTs are 
involved in the governance arrangements of specific issues and areas (e.g. the 
economy, security, the cultural domain and so forth); further, governance includes the 
governance of the new technologies themselves (governance of the 
telecommunications regime, or the Internet) (Rosenau and Singh 2002). Sassen, for 
instance, summarises the debate on Internet governance: on the one side, those who 
see the Internet as a single entity that can be governed and propose different forms of 
Internet regulation, including governance by the Internet institutions themselves, by 
an international organisation (e.g. ITU) or by means of an international framework 
convention; on the other, those who consider it a decentralised network of networks 
that will render external regulation ineffective and can at best be subjected to 
coordination of standards and rules. In between these two extremes, other approaches 
highlight the ways in which technology built into the Internet itself shapes some of the 
forms of governance and coordination through the standards and constraints built into 
the hardware and software, through property rights protection and through the 
addressing system and domain registry. In this respect, the claims that the Internet 
escapes state regulation appear largely unsubstantiated. Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that a minority of countries, notably the US, dominate the above instruments 
(Sassen 2000b).
2.10. The nation-state and the IS/KBE
If governance is the framework in which a ‘retained’ type of national state will be 
functioning and if this governance regime involves ICTs and the information society
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at large then the extent and type of state involvement in the development and 
governance of the emerging information society becomes a central question for 
research.
Historically, the state has participated in technological development through pursuing 
different policies in different contexts: from state protectionism of industries, to the 
centrality of relevant ministries in technological development (e.g. the role of the 
Japanese MITI which contributed to the Japanese miracle in the post-war era), even to 
the adoption of market-oriented policies (Mattelart 2003). From the original 
innovation milieux in the US to the technological excellence centres developed in 
Japan, and to the research and development programmes in the EU, the state has 
always been present and in close collaboration with technological research and 
development throughout the ICT evolution. Military and economic interests forced 
government intervention from the early years on and governments provided funding 
and markets for technological projects to succeed and for a host of products to come 
into existence. Administration and defence have always been crucial in establishing 
demand patterns promoting technological innovation in information and 
communication (Castells 1996). Further, the state has also taken a keen interest in the 
development of infrastructure (railroads, postal services, telecommunications), not 
least for reasons of national security and the consolidation of administrative power 
(Singh 2002).
Still, early views on the state and the information society from a left-wing perspective 
hoped for a withering away of the state (the operations of which were seen as 
enhancing the power of capital), as information flows would create the circumstances 
for a more decentralised, spontaneous society, which would be less dependent on state 
mechanisms for its constitution. From a right-wing perspective, the information 
society was seen again as a hope against the strong state and as enabler of a voluntary 
society based on individual behaviour and interaction in a free market. Even those 
who did not feel so strongly against the ‘strong state’ argued that the state indeed 
could not continue to play the socio-economic role it used to play in the post-WWII 
period (May 2002).
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In his writings in the beginning of the 1970s, Daniel Bell regarded the state as 
significant in providing the economic decisions, which would increasingly gain 
importance, as well as other governance dimensions in the oncoming information 
society. The information society itself would be based on the rule of the technocratic 
elite operating through state institutions, which would use depoliticised knowledge 
and planning to support an equitable society (Bell 1973).
In France, on the other hand, an influential report by Nora and Mine was arguing for a 
role of the state in liberating markets from the monopoly of large companies and in 
regulating markets so as to ensure that monopoly effects are prevented. The role of 
government as a service provider was stressed, as well as the anticipation that state 
utilisation of ICTs would have an impact on ICT diffusion in French society in 
general. Additionally, the report acknowledged that it was highly difficult for a 
government to direct ICT developments towards a particular trajectory (Nora and 
Mine 1980, May 2002).
Moreover, states have historically provided the legal underpinnings to societal 
arrangements and economic activities and this continues to be the case with the 
necessary legislative shifts to bring about and maintain the emerging information 
society arrangements: ‘The argument that the state is in decline due to the emergence 
of the information society conveniently ignores the state’s role as guarantor of the 
legislative infrastructure that underpins market activity’ (May 2002, p. 127).
As Singh (2002) argues, it was the legitimacy of powerful interests, established 
through state instruments that guaranteed the success of the technological order of the 
industrial era. However, in the information age, the state is not the only actor 
promoting new ICTs at the national and international level and the notion of 
legitimacy itself is weakened as other entities, namely international organisations and 
advocacy groups, are also involved in these processes. Examples in this direction are 
the development of technical standards promoted by the UN, the EU, or multi­
national corporations and the role of NGOs and civil society in promoting networks.
From a different perspective, Barry (2001) sees a reconfiguration of the space of 
government due to the centrality of technology in contemporary society and
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conceptualises the practice of government as operating ‘not just in relation to spaces 
defined and demarcated by geographical or territorial boundaries but in relation to 
zones formed through the circulation of technical practices and devices’ adopting 
practices ‘oriented towards the problems of defending, connecting, and reconstructing 
such technological spaces’ (Barry 2001, p.3). In this respect, the promotion of the 
information society through the diffusion of ICTs in the national context can be seen 
as a top-down attempt to ‘produce’ informational capitalism as a transnational ‘space’ 
that is to be governed.
For Steinberg and McDowell (2003), the emerging information society is not so much 
a matter of the technological imperatives of ICTs, but rather of the policies of leading 
states (and international institutions) seeking to reconcile capital’s mobility demands 
(translated in the growth of the world economy through the annihilation of space), 
with capital’s fixity requirements (resulting in increased production within state 
boundaries). According to them, both state and non-state institutions are constantly 
reconfigured by new modes and degrees of communication, without however 
information flows challenging the system of state and non-state entities; nonetheless, 
such changes lead to struggles for the design of new governance and regulatory 
regimes (pp.216-217).
Thus, while the state’s role in technological development in the industrial era is 
unquestionable, in the information or network age this picture becomes more 
complex: ‘The elegance of an order driven by the state is replaced by actor 
multiplicity who at times demand state intervention, sometimes run parallel to state 
goals, sometimes have nothing to do with the state, and at other times directly clash 
with the state’ (Singh 2002, p.23). International organisations, NGOs, social 
movements, professional associations, multi-national corporations, global elites, 
media executives, professionals and other individuals, all are part of this multi-centric 
political order.
Still, Castells notes that the state plays an active role in the emerging IS/KBE: 'the 
role of the state, by either stalling, unleashing, or leading technological innovation, is 
a decisive factor in the overall process, as it expresses and organises the social and 
cultural forces that dominate in a given space and time’ (Castells 1996, p. 13). May
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also argues that the state continues to be important as far as the provision of 
investment and resources for technological innovation are concerned, while it also 
acts as a rectifier of market failures (May 2002, Cammaerts 2005).
This suggests a continuing active role for the state both in regulatory, but also in 
developmental terms. For certain space theorists, the information society rhetoric of 
deregulation and limitless mobility is contradicted by policy objectives stressing the 
need for network infrastructures, which involves fixed investments (in the national 
context) and are based on the conceptual distinction between territory/fixity non­
territory/mobility (Steinberg and McDowell 2003, p. 199). For others, regional 
development is not amenable to technological solutions, but rather depends on a 
complex interplay of economic, social and cultural forces. Appropriate policy models 
may involve indigenous human resources and institutions, with technology as a 
constituent part: ‘The role of regional information society strategies is to facilitate the 
emergence and development of regional learning economies and regional learning 
societies. ICTs have a part to play in such strategies, but only as components of 
broader policies’ (Gibbs 2001, p.75).
Furthermore and taking into account that governments have always been and continue 
to be the biggest producers and users of information, it is reasonable to assume that 
the public sector (including public bureaucracies) could potentially function as the 
engine of ICT diffusion and the generation of demand in the relevant national IT 
market. The fashionable discussion on eGovemment is not only about providing 
better services to the citizen and potentially redefining the state/economy/society 
relation, but also involves economic aspects of technology diffusion and public 
procurement (Heeks 1999).
The developmental dimensions of the role of the state extend to its role in welfare, 
which is in itself under the process of redefinition under the information society 
arrangements. As new risks and needs emerge and are spread unequally in a national 
population, and as the information society entails a significant place for human capital 
because of the increasing presence of information and knowledge functions, the state, 
operating in a global governance framework, is expected to retain (at least in certain 
national cases) tools and procedures to involve citizens in the employment and social
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life aspects of the information age.
A significant dimension of the role of the state is the drawing or redrawing of 
private/public boundaries in the context of knowledge. Drawing on Poulantzas, 
Camoy and Castells (2001) emphasise the importance of (scientific) knowledge as 
well as the importance of the state in the generation of new knowledge and its ways of 
use in the society.
The role of the state in defining, distributing and deploying knowledge to shape power 
relations is, nonetheless, changing. The state’s presence in the largely public 
educational system deserve particular emphasis: on the one hand, the state-financed 
educational system continues to dominate the educational process, hence the 
transmission of knowledge to the young; however, under conditions of globalisation, 
it is global markets and not national markets and moral values, that determine the kind 
of knowledge transmitted in the national educational system. As a result, the nation­
state changes from having the monopoly of knowledge to becoming a major actor in 
the production and communication of knowledge for the global system. Through 
knowledge management, the state both attracts legitimacy and integrates the national 
economic and political space to the global economy (e.g. providing skills to its 
workforce to make it attractive for global capital investment (Camoy and Castells 
2001, pp.l 1-12).
Gamham has emphasised the inherent contradiction of knowledge, the creation of 
which demands monopoly rights for authors, while its social productivity is ‘enhanced 
by the free flow of that knowledge unencumbered by copyright and other related 
barriers to its use and exploitation’ (Gamham 2000, p. 147). Rogerson also exposes the 
tension between the tendency of information to be free-flowing and the attempts to 
appropriate it and turn it into a commodity. Following Polanyi and his industrial 
revolution account, Rogerson advocates state intervention: ‘If the nature of 
information is to flow, then the Polanyi response would be that it should flow for the 
public good and that government should be actively involved in providing that space 
for it to flow. This involvement ... must be at the nexus of technological-societal- 
political-economic relations’ (2003, p. 120, italics in the original). The trajectory of
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this intervention, however, varies according to the type of government and the state of 
technological advancement in a country.
Webster has pointed out some of the ways information is increasingly being treated as 
a commodity and as a proprietary good: publishers’ attempts to enforce copyright 
terms on photocopies, university ownership of educational materials and online access 
to publications, ownership rights on patents, or television shifting from a public 
broadcasting medium to a commercial entity (deploying advanced ICTs as in the case 
of digital TV) providing information and entertainment services at a profit 
(subscriptions or profit through advertising) and without much concern about 
educating or provoking thought in the public (Webster 2000).
Due to the centrality of knowledge in the information age, the new legal 
configurations that states are called upon to guarantee are the various intellectual 
property rights regimes that have become increasingly salient. Paradoxically, although 
the private sector has been calling for less state authority, in the area of intellectual 
property extended legal activities of the states have been demanded. Evidence of this 
trend has come from multinational firms for the protection of intellectual property by 
states, as expressed in the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs), which has been part of the WTO (May 2002).
Based on and culminating the above discussion, the following functions of the 
national state vis-a-vis the IS/KBE project and its implementation can be identified:
• make the necessary structural adjustments in the economy and the society
• introduce and supervise appropriate regulation for a fair operation of market 
forces
• invest in productive and human resources and in activities that are socially 
beneficial (though not always profitable)
• increase awareness by presenting the information society project as a 
developmental goal and a socially desirable evolution
• ensure universal access to new technologies (including universal availability 
of infrastructures) and prevent new processes of exclusion in the information 
society
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• deploy ICTs to provide better public services and reinforce and upgrade 
education, health and welfare services, the environment and transport
• protect the rights of citizens in the digital age, including privacy, security and 
personal freedom
• maintain desirable social and cultural national characteristics by articulating 
international imperatives with the national context
In recapitulation, the informational capitalist economy leaves a special place for 
political processes deriving from and being associated with the state in what concerns 
the assimilation of new technological developments, the necessary institutional and 
social restructuring and the pursuit of the wealth of a nation in a globalised 
competitive economy.
2.11. Conclusions
The concept of the information society (IS) has often been approached theoretically 
and deployed in policy circles as a signifier of radical social change and departure 
from previous societal arrangements. The debate around the information society has 
been, generally speaking, structured around two broad groups of approaches to current 
social transformations. Both groups have the increasing presence and the 
transformative effects of information and communication technologies (ICTs) at their 
core of the theorisations, but they differ as to the extent to which the emerging 
dominant societal arrangements constitute a radical break with previous ones. In this 
respect, the former speak of the information society as a new type of society, while 
the latter prefer to identify continuities with industrial capitalist societies and place 
ICTs in context, trying to identify the profound transformations deriving from the 
articulation between new technologies and pre-existing economic, social, political, 
cultural patterns.
Following the more critical scholars, we retain that, while it is important to identify 
the unquestionable changes following the pervasive character of ICTs in the 
contemporary world, it is equally significant to place them in their social and 
historical context. On the one hand, this calls for historical sociology so as to identify
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the long-term patterns of continuity and change (Webster 2005). In parallel, however, 
the research task becomes how we can ‘develop relatively enduring sociological 
insights into informational capitalism within socio-cultural and technological contexts 
that it (information capitalism) generates’ (Burrows 2005, p.467, italics in the 
original). This approach serves to highlight how particular social circumstances, both 
at the micro- and at the macro-level, operate in dynamic relations with the new 
technologies. As a concept, the ‘information society’ seems to have only limited 
value, as it seems to ignore both the capitalist frameworks into which it emerges and 
its rich social, political, institutional and cultural variations.
Historically, the nation-state has been associated firstly with the security of the 
community defined by its borders and secondly with creating the conditions for 
economic and social reproduction. This involves guaranteeing property rights, 
developing legal and monetary systems; regulating the economy and ensuring the 
availability of labour force; providing infrastructures (water, roads, railways, 
electricity, etc.); caring for those at a disadvantage or in need through social policies. 
As Perrons notes, there is a tension between capitalist accumulation and social 
sustainability, the resulting balance depending on power differentials between classes 
and social groups in different countries (Perrons 2004).
Far from sidelined, the nation-state retains significant capacities that make it 
indispensable in the context of globalisation and the information society. The 
challenges it faces, nonetheless, have necessitated a re-alignment of its functions and 
roles in the economy and society. Further, it has witnessed a rescaling of its 
operations, its legitimacy and its accountability in a context of global governance 
arrangements.
These developments suggest a problem of detachment of the national state from the 
national society: ‘In seeking to promote or regulate the forces of globalisation, states 
have created new suprastate layers of political authority which have weak democratic 
credentials and stand in an ambiguous relationship to existing systems of national 
accountability’ (Held and McGrew 2002, p. 14). But, it might also be the case that ‘the 
central functions of the nation state-state will become those of providing legitimacy
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for and ensuring the accountability of supra-national and subnational governance 
mechanisms’ (Hirst and Thompson 1996, p. 171).
Moreover, while it is true that state protectionism happens to be in decline in favour 
of free trade (including e-commerce which increasingly happens over the Internet and 
surpasses nation-state regulations), in the case of the information society there are 
new legal challenges to be undertaken and legal arrangements to be implemented by 
the state. In addition, as the information age has involved the commodification of 
forms of knowledge that used to be public, states will continue to be involved in the 
resolution of the contradictory character of knowledge, i.e. intellectual property vs. 
public good (Jessop 2000). Further, development in the information age is very much 
linked with technological and educational policies, pursued by the state with the 
intention of enhancing ‘endowment in informational production factors’ (Castells 
1996, p.90).
A question that emerges is the mix in state functions of elements of competition with 
regulatory and developmental aspects. The answer might depend both on the 
particular global arrangements of the state and on the national context in question, its 
imperatives, its tradition and its current needs; we further pursue this question in the 
following chapter which lays out the conceptual and methodological elements the 
thesis is based upon. In this, we will draw on a theory which conceptualises the 
relationship between (an ideal type of) the contemporary capitalist state and the 
IS/KBE. Departing from it, however, we will introduce elements from literature that 
could be deployed to theorise the possibility of national variations of the IS/KBE 
paradigm, as well as the role of the state in the process of IS/KBE development.
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
3.1. Introduction
In chapter 2 we departed from the extreme views of both the hyperglobalists, who see 
the national state as irrelevant and powerless in a ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae 1990) 
and of the sceptics who argue that globalisation is not new in any significant way and 
as a result its effects on the functions of the nation-state cannot be taken as substantial 
(Hirst and Thompson 1996). Our interest lies in more critical positions: some identify 
noteworthy changes in the state’s forms and functions, as well as emphasise its overall 
continuing significance (Smith, Solinger et al. 1999); others stress its active role both 
in terms of social reproduction in the national context (Perrons 2004) and as player 
together with non-state actors in the international arena (Held and McGrew 2002).
In parallel, chapter 2 discussed the information society (IS) and the knowledge-based 
economy (KBE), both as a contemporary social transformation taking place in the 
developed world (and increasingly in semi-peripheral contexts), as well as a grand 
sociological concept (Castells 1996; May 2002; Webster 2006).
Following the lines adopted in the literature review, our intention is to maintain a 
balance between social continuity and social change. On the one hand, the state has 
been approached as a continuingly significant, albeit changing, entity under 
conditions of globalisation. On the other, the IS/KBE paradigm, has been examined as 
a broad set of socio-economic transformations placed in historical continuity, 
including both the emergence of post-Fordist discourses of competitiveness and the 
active pursuit of policies to promote IS/KBE in a context of globalisation (Mattelart 
2002).
Balancing change and continuity informs a methodological approach that can address 
the IS/KBE at the national level by examining: a) the role of the state and the ways in 
which its forms and functions are transformed with regard to the emergence of the 
IS/KBE paradigm; b) the extent to which there are significant national variations (and 
national continuities) within the overarching techno-economic IS/KBE paradigm, as
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well as the ways in which these are manifested and can be identified and studied. This 
in turn could open up a research agenda to address the hitherto limited treatment of 
the state/IS relationship within the national frame of reference.
To approach the above two questions we deploy a conceptual framework made up of 
the following two components.
a) Drawing on work by Bob Jessop (Jessop 2002, 2005): a high-level analytical 
approach to the KBE which regards it as a dominant, overarching, hegemonic vision 
in the context of a broader post-Fordist paradigm and combines it explicitly with a 
transformed role for the nation-state directly linked with the promotion of the KBE.10
b) Drawing on comparative political economy and Weberian historical sociology: a 
more empirically grounded second pillar which seeks to address the issue of capitalist 
diversity at the national level within the IS/KBE paradigm. This involves the 
deployment of a state/society (or state/economy/civil society) framework of analysis 
in order to examine the social, economic, political, cultural characteristics present at a 
certain national level in the Fordist era that are replicated or in any case interact with 
the IS/KBE paradigm at the national level.
This conceptual framework is deployed to address the argument of the thesis:
The development o f  a national IS/KBE entails processes o f translation o f  
international policy directions into strategies and practices informed by the national, 
historically formed state/society relation, while the state is instrumental in 
articulating these policies with the path dependency o f  existing national 
arrangements.
10 Jessop’s analysis focuses on the KBE, but since he also takes into account social aspects we regard it 
as applicable to the IS /KBE paradigm.
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3.2. Conceptual component 1: the state and the IS/KBE vision
The work of Bob Jessop is one of the very few attempts to capture the complex 
relation between the state and the knowledge-based economy, as well as the 
historically continuities but also contingencies and discontinuities of the latter. We 
draw on a variety of his contributions for the first pillar of our conceptual framework.
3.2.1. Theorising the state
In a number of recent papers and in his major work The Future o f the Capitalist State 
(2002), Jessop develops a theory of the capitalist economy and society, as well as a 
theory of the state within it. His starting point is the work of the French Regulation 
school, according to which capitalist economies do not result merely from the 
operation of market mechanisms, but are rather socially embedded and regulated 
(Boyer 1990; Lipietz 1993). According to Regulation theorists, specific forms of 
capitalism are made up of a regime of accumulation and a mode of regulation, which 
involves ‘an ensemble of socially embedded, socially regularised and strategically 
selective institutions, organisations, social forces and actions organised around (or at 
least involved in) the expanded reproduction of capital as a social relation’ (Jessop 
2002, p.5).
For Jessop, the core of the state apparatus is a distinct ensemble of institutions and 
organisations whose function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions 
on a given population in the name of their “common interest” or “general will”. This 
definition views the state as a macro-political organisation with a specific orientation, 
while indicating that there are important links between the state and the political 
sphere and the wider society. His strategic-relational approach to the state, inspired 
by Poulantzas and Gramsci, is summarised as follows: a) there are various institutions 
and organisations linked with the core apparatus in uncertain ways and states are 
never clearly separated from society and societal practices; b) the nature of these 
organisations, their links with the core apparatus, as well as the connections between 
state and society depend on the nature and history of the social formation; c) the forms 
in which the legitimacy of the state is expressed also vary and its political functions
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are constituted through relevant political discourses; d) the state possesses a range of 
means of intervention, capacities and limitations, which carry different relative weight 
in different contexts; e) the boundaries and identity of the society in question are often 
constituted through the same processes by which states are built; f) the “common 
interest” and “general will” are constructed concepts concealing different articulation 
and aggregation of interests and values (Jessop 2007, pp. 9-11).
3.2.2. From Keynesianism to Schumpeterianism
Along these lines, Jessop uses his strategic-relational approach to argue that the 
various forms of post-WWII welfare capitalism and the social democratic political 
regimes in Europe were part of the Fordist regime of accumulation. This was 
established in Western Europe, North America and Australia roughly in the period 
1945-1975 and was essentially a paradigm based on industrial mass production and 
mass consumption coupled with a mode of socio-economic regulation which took 
place within the national frame (comprising the national economy, national state, 
national citizenship and national society). Fordism went hand in hand with an ideal 
type of statehood, which Jessop calls ‘Keynesian Welfare National State’. 11
Jessop identifies a contemporary economic and social transformation towards a new, 
post-Fordist accumulation regime, which emerged in the 1990s (after neo-liberal 
attempts to roll back the state in the 1980s) through political strategies (neo-liberal, 
neo-statist and neo-corporatist). The outcome is the establishment of a 
‘Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime’, which is accompanied by a new 
form of statehood, namely the “Schumpeterian competition state”.
These strategies were pursued in the wake of the crisis of Fordism from, roughly, the 
mid-1970s. This was related to the exhaustion of the growth potential of mass
11 Keynesian, because it used demand management policies and provision of national infrastructures to 
govern the national economy and to secure full employment and economic growth; welfare, because it 
pursued social policies aiming at extending welfare rights; national, because its frame and scope was 
defined by the boundaries of the nation and the economic and social policies adopted were addressing 
the historically formed national frame (national economy, national society comprising the citizens of 
the nation); and, last but not least, statist, as state institutions were the agencies that held market forces 
under check to ensure economic growth and social integration (Jessop 2002).
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production, the saturation of markets for mass consumption, the internationalisation 
and globalisation of production (together with the evolution of new ICTs), the 
inflationary impact of the Keynesian state and the growing fiscal crisis, the social 
security crisis emanating from part-time and temporary forms of employment (Jessop
2002). They were also informed by political rhetoric, including: a) the discourse on 
state and government failures, which emanated from both the right (problems of 
public sector inefficiencies) and the left (failure of the welfare state to provide 
adequate redistribution); b) the ‘crisis of legitimation’ discourse, which involved both 
neo-liberal criticism as to the inefficiencies of bureaucracy and leftist arguments 
regarding the disempowering effects of bureaucracy; c) the ‘fiscal crisis’ discourse, 
which involved public debt and pressures from the ageing of the population (Torfing 
1999).
The emerging, post-Fordist accumulation regime is supposed to provide answers to 
the above crises through a number of strategies: a) the transformation of mass 
production; b) the opening of new markets and provision of new profit opportunities;
c) the decreasing reliance on national demand conditions and the emphasis on national 
and regional innovation systems; d) the adoption of supply-side policies seeking to 
boost innovation; e) the management of a more cost-effective social consumption; f) 
the increasing recognition of international competition and new structural and 
systemic imperatives; g) the rejuvenation of business (including new industrial sectors 
and the exploitation of a flexible labour force); h) the adjustment of social 
reproduction (including social policies and welfare) to the new conditions of 
internationalisation, marketisation and flexibility (Jessop 2002).
3.2.3. The Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime
The Schumpeterian regime appears as a promising response to the Fordist crisis and 
can be described in its ideal type along the following lines (Jessop 2002, 2005):
a) In terms of capital accumulation, it is Schumpeterian, as it promotes innovation and 
flexibility in open economies by supply-side interventions to achieve structural and 
systemic competitiveness; the knowledge-based economy is the central concept 
informing accumulation strategies and the Schumpeterian competition state plays a
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major role ‘in the material and discursive constitution of the globalising, networked, 
knowledge-based economy that its activities are seeking to govern’ (Jessop 2002, 
p.95).
b) In terms of reproduction of labour power, it is workfare, as it seeks to accommodate 
the demands for labour market flexibility and economic competitiveness in the 
globalising knowledge-based economy. To this end, it exerts downward pressures on 
wages and relegates social policy and social spending to a secondary position, as well 
as invests in education and training to create an autonomous and flexible workforce 
with emphasis on knowledge skills, entrepreneurship and lifelong learning.
c) In terms of the spatial and temporal scales involved in its activities, it is 
postnational, as the national scale has become less important in what concerns 
economic and social policies, which are increasingly managed by new multilevel 
governance regimes. This relativisation of scale might involve international 
organisations, intergovernmental fora, arrangements such as the EU and its relevant 
imposition of norms and regulations or the devolution of social and economic policy 
to regional urban and local actors and institutions, though the national retains a 
significant role in all of the above.
d) In terms of the mode of government and policy-making, it is a regime, in the sense 
that a number of policies are administered by non-state mechanisms and actors with 
the intention of rectifying both market failures but also the weaknesses of statism. 
These include public-private partnerships organised at different levels, from the local 
to the supranational, neo-corporatist arrangements, as well as networking and other 
forms of self-organisation, which convey more of a picture of governance, as opposed 
to traditional government.
3.2.4. The Knowledge-Based Economy
A core element of the post-Fordist accumulation regime, according to Jessop, is the 
knowledge-based economy (KBE); this can be defined as one where knowledge is 
being created, diffused and deployed in accelerated ways through ICTs; where 
increasingly sophisticated products codify and manage knowledge; and where there is 
a perception of knowledge as a strategic asset for individuals, firms and nations. In the 
same vein, one can speak of ‘knowledge policies’, namely policies regarding: 
knowledge creation (supporting basic and applied research, the culture industries,
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promoting interchanges between different cultures and groups); knowledge diffusion 
(promoting broadband networks, Internet access, content industries, education 
reforms); knowledge utilisation (supporting product and process innovation, 
knowledge management and learning in firms and public organisations, international 
partnerships for innovation) (Rodrigues 2003).
In Jessop’s own words, ‘the KBE seems to have become a master economic narrative 
in many accumulation strategies, state projects and hegemonic visions and has 
steadily acquired through the 1990s a key role in guiding and reinforcing activities 
that may consolidate a relatively stable post-Fordist accumulation regime and its 
mode of regulation’ (2005, p. 152). He views the knowledge-based economy as a 
dominant, albeit heterogeneous, hegemonic paradigm and strategic guide for 
economic, political and social restructuring, owing to the importance attributed to 
knowledge in the post-Fordist socio-economic regime.
Jessop draws on Gramsci (Gramsci 1971) in his theorisation of a new accumulation 
regime based on the knowledge-based economy, the emergence and consolidation of 
which ‘depends critically on the exercise of political, intellectual, and moral 
leadership and its translation into the reorganisation of an entire social formation’ 
(Jessop 2005, p. 151). Part of the process has been the development of a new economic 
imaginary which is instrumental in the restructuring of economic and political 
institutions and practices. The forces involved in its development are organised 
interests (e.g. professional associations, industrial lobbies), political parties, social 
movements and the mass media.
This new economic imaginary around the knowledge-based economy has been 
capable of informing economic strategies, state projects and political visions and 
agendas, as well as processes of socialisation. It has been deployed as a vehicle for 
managing social and political uncertainty and to connect private, institutional and 
wider economic and social concerns. It has also been translated and articulated along:
a) scale (from the global to the local) b) organisational and institutional sites (from 
firms to states) c) functional systems (education, science, health, welfare, law) d)
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spheres of activity (public sphere, politics and civil society). This translation of the 
general ideas has given rise to many smaller visions and strategies.12
Jessop is keen to emphasise that the knowledge-based economy has been selected 
among many possible discourses informing a possible landscape under post-Fordism; 
moreover, he traces the ideological roots of this master discourse in the early debates 
on post-industrialism, while he attributes its momentum to the efforts of US capital 
and the US state during the 1980s to respond to what was seen as growing 
competitiveness of Europe and East Asia. Through a number of multilateral 
agreements and dissemination of US standards and norms (e.g. the promotion of the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement in the WTO) the 
base of economic competitiveness was established around intellectual property rights 
regimes. Efforts to safeguard US capital continued until the knowledge-based 
economy discourse became dominant and other states were called upon to adopt it. 
Subsequently, the master discourse was appropriated and supported by political 
entities, from international organisations (OECD, WTO, IMF, World Bank) and 
regional blocs (NAFTA, Mercosur, EU), down to nation-states, metropolitan areas 
and small cities (Jessop 2005).
12 In the area of science and technology, strategies about smart machines and intelligent products and 
information-intensive innovation processes have been developed. In the economy, emphasis has been 
given on the development of knowledge-based firms and provision of knowledge-intensive services 
(e.g. consultancies of various kinds), as well as an overall articulation of the learning economy as a new 
paradigm for competitiveness and growth. In the areas of capital and labour, a plethora of 
conceptualisations of knowledge, informational, digital and virtual capital and capitalism, as well as the 
terminology of knowledge workers and teleworking have been promoted. In education, discourses 
around the learning society and lifelong learning have been articulated. In culture, the development of 
cultural and creative industries has been supported. In law, debates on the nature of property in 
knowledge and the intellectual property rights have been ongoing. In the state/govemment/politics 
domain, conceptualisations of the virtual state, the network state, e-govemment, e-democracy, 
cyberpolitics and cyberactivism have come about. In warfare, a variety of versions of smart weapons 
and virtual warfare have been invented. In terms of space, the importance of learning regions and 
innovative milieux, the informational, digital and global city, cyberspace etc. has been highlighted. 
Last, in socialisation at large, debates and political and social mobilisations regarding the information 
society, surveillance, virtual and cyber-communities, access, and the digital divide have been 
conducted (expanded from Jessop 2005, table 7.1).
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3.2.5. Functions of the state in the knowledge-based economy
The post-Fordist paradigm and the knowledge-based economy have major 
repercussions on the role of the state and politics in helping secure some of the 
conditions for profitable accumulation, the reproduction of labour power, the 
management of the spatial and temporal horizons of capital accumulation, as well as 
on the relationship between government, governance and meta-governance (Jessop 
2000).
Jessop identifies changes in economic discourse related to the reorientation of the 
contemporary nation-state. These are as follows:
a) shift of emphasis from traditional goals such as ‘productivity’ and ‘planning’ to 
‘flexibility’
b) shift from stable full employment to lifelong learning to ensure flexibility
c) the discourse of globalisation as a new phase of capital accumulation
d) emphasis on knowledge as an engine for growth in the new economy
e) shift from monetarism to the ‘new growth theory’, which stresses the benefits of 
state intervention to create conditions favourable to economic growth
All these changes have modified the discourse of competitiveness: ‘The articulation of 
these and related discursive-strategic shifts into new accumulation strategies, state 
projects and hegemonic projects, and their capacity to mobilise support are shaping 
the restructuring and reorientation of the contemporary state and helping to produce 
new regulatory regimes’ (2002, p. 133). The conceptualisation of the state in Jessop’s 
model includes elements of what has been termed the ‘regulatory state’, whose 
functions are orientated towards the production of economic and social order within a 
globalised economy. In particular, this model shifts the function of the state from the 
direct allocation of social and material goods and resources to the provision of 
regulatory frameworks and agencies for the correction of market failure within the 
economic order (Jayasuriya 2005, Majone 1996).
As mentioned in chapter 2, new growth trajectories have historically relied on 
increased state direction for management of a socio-economic transition (Perrons
2004). The Schumpeterian competition state plays a significant role both in the
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realisation (in material and discursive terms) of the globalised knowledge-based 
economy, as well as in its governance. Despite the predominance of the economic in 
the post-Fordist paradigm, these governance functions that the state is called upon to 
undertake are not only economic, but essentially involve the socio-political sphere in 
the light of new problems of social cohesion and social conflict as they appear in the 
transition to the IS/KBE (Jessop 2005).
As knowledge is central in the IS/KBE, states are keen to promote its production and 
diffusion, and to exploit and expand the provision of intellectual resources. In 
addition, knowledge management becomes a significant function in governance 
processes. This involves the management of the idiosyncratic and contradictory 
character of information/knowledge, which can be taken as both a factor of production 
and as a public good: intellectual property is the key source of profit in the IS/KBE, 
but the production of knowledge is dependent on the intellectual commons, the social 
basis and the public availability of knowledge (Jessop 2000). This contradiction has 
been previously acknowledged and the need for states to design knowledge 
investment policies to benefit society has been emphasised (e.g. Bell 19.79).
States are therefore called upon to promote the commodification of knowledge 
(through patents, copyright, licenses) so as to turn it into a source for profit, but also 
to guarantee an intellectual commons basis for achieving competitive advantage of the 
economy on the whole and for building social capital and the learning society. It is in 
this vein that some or all of the following functions of the state can be understood: 
development of infrastructures (including broadband), content and services for the 
IS/KBE, governance of activity in cyberspace, transformation of national utility 
structures to more flexible and competitive arrangements, links between university 
research and business needs, provision of platforms for education, lifelong learning 
and knowledge skills (Jessop 2005). Moreover, states assume discursive functions 
related to the promotion of the IS/KBE as ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) 
through advertising campaigns and other rhetorical means.
Different states assume different knowledge management policies, others promoting 
intellectual property and knowledge privatisation, others seeking to preserve (and 
enhance) intellectual commons and knowledge-sharing with the intention of
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protecting social capital embedded in communities by promoting innovation and 
designing apposite institutions (Jessop 2000). This suggests that within the 
Schumpeterian regime and the regulatory state model there are certain degrees of 
differentiation. The extent as well as the type of state intervention in the IS/KBE is a 
significant object of study; for instance, in certain national contexts the state might 
assume merely a competitive or a regulatory role, while in others it might intervene in 
more developmental ways. A crucial parameter in this differentiation is the 
effectiveness of state governance of the IS/KBE in the national context, which can be 
evaluated by using the concepts of embedded autonomy and capacity of the state in 
question (to be discussed in the next section).
Further, it is reasonable to expect that differentiations or variations in the role and 
functions of the state will have an impact on the process of transition, as well as the 
eventual physiognomy of the IS/KBE at a local and national level. While Jessop’s 
analytical IS/KBE framework captures adequately long-term developments in the 
international political economy, it cannot observe and capture the national empirical 
outcomes of the project it purports to describe at a high level. It is expected that these 
will be differentiated and this divergence can manifest itself across diverse levels and 
in various ways, according to aspirations of different actors involved and the 
perceptions of the population, pre-existing national socio-political circumstances, 
institutional traditions, conflicts, politics, tensions in implementation, interaction 
between market demands and public policies.
Jessop acknowledges the variable positioning of different states as far as the 
information society project is concerned, as well as the different institutional 
arrangements in which the IS/KBE project is encased. He recommends empirically 
informed research, which would unravel in a national context the structural coupling 
between each type of Fordism and the character of the national state, the complexities 
of the capital relation, the implications for the forms of economic and political 
struggle to resolve the crisis, the problems occurring when the state does not have the 
capacity to manage the transition (2002, p. 139).
Our interest in the national aspects of the IS/KBE project, together with the role of the 
state in the process of IS/KBE development, necessitates a conceptualisation of the
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national context, its particularities and its articulation with the IS/KBE international or 
global vision, captured by the high level analytical framework of Jessop. We now 
turn to our second conceptual component, which is intended to bring the issue of 
capitalist diversity and national variations into the picture.
3.3. Conceptual component 2: national variations of the IS/KBE paradigm
State and society debates in political economy have arguably been fragmented 
between the fields of comparative and international political economy. The former, at 
least in older approaches, has ruled out the structural context of global processes into 
which states operate and has followed a simplistic state-centrist approach, while the 
latter has evolved around the notion of ‘convergence’ and homogenisation resulting 
from globalisation. This fragmentation, it has been suggested, has substantially 
limited the study of states and societies, as well as the processes of state 
transformation in the contemporary (global) political economy, failing to address the 
nature of contemporary states in conjunction with the structural context in which they 
are rooted. Recent work in political economy has sought to address the evolution of 
national economies and societies under the influence of global forces by keeping a 
balance between the persistence of national characteristics and the ways in which 
these are transformed under conditions of globalisation (Phillips 2005).
3.3.1. Conceptualising capitalist diversity at the national level
The issue of national variations within general historical macro-tendencies has been 
quite prominently addressed by sociological theory in the last decades (e.g. Mann 
1986, Moore 1966). Likewise, in political economy, neo-institutionalist accounts have 
pointed to capitalist differentiations at the national level (often presented in terms of 
clusters of nations around a few ideal-types). We will also draw on these approaches, 
which we see not only as compatible with Jessop’s framework, but also 
complementary as they are informed by a lower level of abstraction and are more 
rooted in empirical reality. They are compatible, firstly because they support Jessop’s 
overall belief that the structural tensions of capitalism and encased in different 
institutional arrangements in different spatio-temporal contexts (Jessop 2002). 
Secondly, because they highlight differentiations in the (Keynesian welfare) state in
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relation with the historical differences between national societies without 
compromising a set of basic features that legitimise the study of the Keynesian state 
as a high level analytical model (Pop and Vanhuysse 2004).
Neo-institutionalist accounts have originally conceptualised capitalist diversity by 
means of a dichotomy. Michel Albert identifies two types of capitalism, namely the 
free market type of the Anglophone countries and the Rhenish model (Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, France, Scandinavia), the division based on the capacity to 
make long-term decisions that maximise individual or collective goods (Albert 1991).
In their influential work Varieties o f Capitalism, Hall and Soskice promote an actor- 
centred institutional approach which takes national-level institutional specificities as 
given and accentuated under globalisation. This approach is a recent comparative 
perspective on the national political economy, which offers an account of how the 
national institutions confer comparative advantage, especially in the sphere of 
innovation (Hall and Soskice 2001).
Hall and Soskice’s approach is influenced by Albert. It is also a dualist perspective 
which specifies on the one hand a model of liberal market economy (LME) associated 
with neoliberal policies, radical innovation and new economic sectors and on the other 
a type of coordinated market economy (CME), in which social and political 
institutions participate in economic policy and which is characterised by social 
democracy, incremental innovation and traditional economic sectors. The former type 
includes the Anglophone countries (US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and 
the UK), while the latter clusters together Germany and the Scandinavian countries 
(but also includes the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Japan and Korea). 
Hall and Soskice’s framework suffers from rigidity, in that it does not account for 
cases combining characteristics from both types, e.g. CMEs carrying out radical 
innovation in new technological sectors (e.g. telecoms in Finland). Its importance for 
this thesis, however, lies in their conceptualisation is that they identify a so-called 
‘southern European group’, including France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey and 
Greece, which comprise a state-led and post-agrarian type, and which are treated at
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times as CMEs and at times as economies in between CMEs and LMEs (Crouch
2005).13
A seminal contribution regarding capitalist diversity that has gone beyond 
dichotomies has been G. Esping-Andersen’s (1990) path-breaking work on the 
typologies of welfare states in capitalist societies. Esping-Andersen’s analysis is 
useful for us because he deploys the notion of ‘regime’, as opposed to ‘type’, in order 
to denote the complex articulation between the state and the economy.14 Significantly, 
his analysis has given rise to further research on national regimes but has also 
attracted criticism for not including south European welfare states (with the exception 
of Italy), which are seen as presenting their own idiosyncrasies.
To address this omission, Leibfried (1993) developed a further typology, according to 
which these states form a fourth cluster, namely the ‘Latin Rim’ regimes, which are 
based on older religious welfare traditions and on the family and informal 
mechanisms for welfare provision (Bonoli 1997). These have developed in national 
contexts (notably in south Europe) that still depend highly on agriculture and feature 
large informal economies and on socio-political organisations in which allocation of 
resources is dominated by clientelistic relations, which distribute favourably to 
particular groups at the expense of others (Rhodes, 1997).
In a similar vein, Richard Whitley has differentiated national capitalisms in 
accordance with type of business system (he identifies six: fragmented, coordinated 
industrial district, compartmentalised, state-organised, collaborative, highly
13 This is a first step towards surpassing dichotomies in neo-institutionalism; a step which indeed has 
been taken more elaborately by other theorists such as Vivien Schmidt who describes three types of 
European capitalism: the ‘market’ type which is equivalent with the LME, the ‘managed’ type, where 
economic actors cooperate in an environment guided by an enabling state, a model similar to the CME, 
and the ‘state’ type, which is characterised by significant state intervention in the economy. Schmidt 
also argues significantly that being confronted by new challenges o f globalisation, states react in 
different ways and produce new forms of diversity (Schmidt 2002).
14 Esping-Andersen distinguishes between three such regimes:
a) the ‘Corporatist/Conservative’ Regime, includes states with corporatist traditions, such as Austria, 
Germany, France and Italy; b) the ‘Social Democratic’ Regime, in which social democracy has been 
the driving force, e.g. Sweden and Norway; c) the ‘Liberal’ Regime, in which the logic of the market 
prevails, typical examples falling in this regime are the US, Australia, and Canada (Esping-Andersen 
1990).
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coordinated), type of firm, as well as links of them with the state financial system, 
skill development, trust and authority relations (Whitley 1999). Other approaches 
have included Bruno Amable’s quantitative method using data on product and labour 
markets, social protection and financial systems to come up with five groups of 
countries, namely market-based (Anglophone), social democratic (Nordic), Asian 
(Japan and Korea), Mediterranean (south European) and continental European 
(Amable 2003).
Some of the above categorisations are undoubtedly mechanistic and cannot capture 
the complexity of capitalism at the national level. Useful as they may be, the ideal 
types (models, clusters, etc.) described above should not be treated as a panacea. 
Models are only tools to make the study of a national case easier and are not set in 
stone. Methodologically, national empirical cases should be seen as an eclectic and 
constantly changing constellation of features, rather than being forced into a 
straitjacket of one or the other model.
We indeed expect the delimitations of the various types of postwar welfare capitalism 
that helped identify the models outlined above to be more and more blurred in the 
IS/KBE. Consequently, drawing on ideal-types, but at the same time surpassing them, 
might be a more fruitful way to capture the balance between historical continuity and 
historical change regarding the information society project in a national context. Still, 
capitalist diversity can lend support to the argument that different national 
characteristics in the industrial era are expected to give rise to diverse forms of 
information societies. This is due to the anticipated persistence of at least some of the 
initial different characteristics (albeit transformed) and to a certain degree of 
replication of structures and institutional features that were present during the Fordist 
paradigm.
The capitalist diversity discussion is useful in initially positioning the Greek case in 
the south European type of capitalism with certain distinct characteristics: a large 
informal economy, the centrality of clientelism and patronage systems, an extensive 
reliance on agriculture with incomplete industrialisation and a significant share of 
small family firms, as well as a low level of welfare provision. These features are 
important and useful in the study of IS/KBE in Greece. Although the mechanistic
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logic of models and clusters should be treated with caution, such features can be used 
as signposts of the interaction between prior social arrangements and new policy 
imperatives. Since capitalist diversity rests historically on the characteristics of the 
national society, the national state and, broadly, the particular relations between them, 
we argue that a conceptualisation of the national variations of the information society 
ultimately calls for a more profound state/society socio-historical approach. This will 
provide a non-mechanistic perspective highlighting capitalist diversities at the 
national level and would also complement Jessop’s framework, which captures 
developments in international political economy.
3.3.2. The state/society socio-historical approach
The value of a state/society approach is related to alerting the researcher to the 
historical unfolding of a national economy/society relation (and inescapably the role 
and evolution of the specific national state in this process). As such, it prepares the 
ground for an adequate comprehension of the outcomes of what has been operating as 
the IS/KBE vision and project at the international level by considering pre-existing 
historically formed (at the national level) economic arrangements, social relations, 
cultural characteristics, institutional traditions, together with the role of the particular 
state in the socio-economic development of the national context in question. By doing 
so, however, it does not rule out the (global) structural context in which such national 
variations are placed, which is indeed captured by the IS/KBE framework. The 
ultimate goal in using this approach is to argue that the impact of IS/KBE global 
processes will depend on the nature of the society and the state (seen through the 
state/society relation) under examination. The state/society perspective is compatible 
with Jessop’s strategic/relational approach to the state (outlined in page 65), which 
also attends to the connections between state and society.
Comparative political economy and political sociology have been preoccupied with 
state/society debates at least since the 1970s, when demands to ‘bring the state back 
in’ were responding to ‘society-centred’ approaches which were seen as attributing to 
the state a secondary position in terms of analytical importance (Phillips 2005). 
Marxist theory was criticised for economic reductionism, which stressed the 
importance of the economy and the class struggle, pluralism was criticised for
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underestimating the interests of state managers in accounts of interest groups 
competing for state power, while structural functionalism was seen as subsuming the 
development and operation of state mechanisms to the imperatives of societal 
structures (Jessop 2001). The ensuing state-centric theories were preoccupied with the 
notion of ‘state autonomy’, which at the first instance meant the ability of states ‘to 
formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests 
of social groups, classes, or society’ (Skocpol 1985, p.9).
In the field of political economy, the scholars involved sought to articulate the role of 
the state in economic development. Originally, the (first) developmental state research 
programme was built essentially on the claim that the state has ‘strategic capacities to 
plan, monitor and enforce key developmental objectives, which will shift the 
comparative advantage of national economies towards those sectors that are of 
strategic value in the global economy’ (Jayasuriya 2005, p.382). While initially these 
capacities were identified in autonomous agencies operating outside socio-political 
interests (e.g. Gerschenkron 1962, Johnson 1982), the second generation 
developmental state theory, influenced by the neo-Weberian paradigm, placed state 
autonomy within the state/society relationship.
The notion of state autonomy, which initially communicated the idea of independent 
state bureaucratic and policy-making activity, was therefore subsequently coupled 
with the idea of embeddedness of state mechanisms into the wider society, resulting in 
the notion of ‘embedded autonomy’, as coined by Peter Evans. This concept sought to 
overcome the division between state autonomy and embeddedness into the social 
structural context. In this conceptualisation, autonomy refers to the degree to which 
state elites and bureaucracies shape policies that are above the interests of their 
members; Evans claims that the more state bureaucracies approach Weber’s ideal type 
(i.e. based on meritocratic recruitment, secure careers and rewards, independence 
from external interferences) the more coherent they are, and this gives them a certain 
kind of autonomy and enables them to contribute to economic development (Evans 
1995).
In addition, and unlike Weber’s conceptualisation, state apparatuses should not be 
insulated from external interference (from business, church, the military, etc.); on the
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t  contrary, they should be ‘embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state 
to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and 
renegotiation of goals and policies’ (Evans 1995, p.59); and it is only through 
embeddedness into society that state policies can have successful developmental 
outcomes (Form 1997; Hobson 1998).
Based on comparative research, Evans argues that the ways in which states are 
coupled with their societies vary significantly and this has impacts on the role of the 
state in the economy, which can be either developmental or detrimental to economic 
development (or a mixture of both). He claims that successful state involvement in the 
economy presupposes an understanding of the limits of state action, as well as a 
realistic positioning in the global economy with close societal links. For him the state 
is a ‘historically rooted institution’, the state/society interaction is ‘constrained by 
institutionalised sets of relations’, while economic outcomes are ‘the products of 
social and political institutions, and not just responses to prevailing market 
conditions’ (Evans 1995, p. 18). His emphasis on diverse outcomes, as opposed to 
imposing a straightjacket across national cases, makes his approach suitable for this 
thesis.
The degree to which the state enjoys embedded autonomy is also linked with the 
capacity of the state. In realist international relations, capacity usually refers to the 
power of the state, i.e. its resources and their deployment (Gill 2003). However, in 
other conceptualisations state capacity expresses the degree to which the state actively 
participates and shapes historical conjunctures, as well as ‘interpreting’ global 
processes and formulating their national ‘versions’ in accordance with its institutional 
base and its relationship with the national society (Voulgaris 2006). In this respect, 
state capacity becomes a more elaborate term and involves resource endowment, 
quality of leadership and political institutions, as well as traditions of governance, 
national culture and previous political decisions (Smith, Solinger et al. 1999).
A comprehensive notion of state capacity spans a broad spectrum of areas including 
the economy, institutions and politics. It presupposes capable public bureaucracies, 
together with competent leadership and the ability of the state to organise social 
contracts and promote goals in democratic ways. Under conditions of globalisation
80
this involves an understanding of contemporary problems and the promotion of viable 
solutions implemented democratically. This calls for the participation of societal 
forces and the promotion of an active civil society and eventually a healthy and 
organic relationship between state and society, which is captured by the extent of 
embedded autonomy of the state vis-a-vis the society (Kotzias 2004).
In this direction, Linda Weiss discriminates between ‘despotic’ and ‘coordinative’ 
state capacity. The former refers to the ability of the state to act without the need to 
enter negotiations with civil society. By contrast, the latter is the institutional ability 
of the central state to pervade its national society and see to the application of 
collective decisions through its institutions; as such, it is a collective power running 
through the society and involving the coordination of social life through public 
infrastructures (Weiss and Hobson 1995; Voulgaris 2006). The ‘coordinative’ state 
capacity is similar to the notion of Michael Mann’s ‘infrastructural power’, i.e. ‘the 
institutional capacity of a central state ... to penetrate its territories and logistically 
implement decisions. This is collective power, “power through” society, coordinating 
social life through state infrastructures’ (Mann 1993, p.59). This notion is also quite 
close to the concept of ‘embedded autonomy’.
Neo-Weberian concepts such as ‘embedded autonomy’ and ‘state capacity’ signified 
the advent of a neo-Weberian historical sociology school, which contained a more 
informed approach to the study of the state in the economy/society and its role in 
socio-economic development.15 Embedded autonomy, which implies state capacity, is
15 Hobson (1998) identifies six principles informing a Weberian historical sociological approach: a) the 
study of history is a means for problematising the origins of modem domestic and international 
institutions and practices, as well as understanding processes of change both at the domestic and at the 
international; b) social and political change can only be accounted for through interaction of multiple 
forces not-reducible to one another (multi-causality); c) societies, states, and international systems are 
inherently linked; as a result, national societies and their economic, ideological, political etc. 
institutions cannot be seen as bounded entities and cannot be analysed through domestic variables only, 
but as entities partly shaped by international forces (multi-spatiality); d) consequently, power actors 
such as states or classes cannot be conceived of as completely independent and delimited agents with 
separate interests; e) change and development (national and international) do not follow predictable 
patterns, but are subject to unintended influences and interactions between multiple power forces; f) 
state autonomy is not seen as the ability of the state to separate itself from society, but, on the contrary, 
is measured in terms of the degree of the embeddedness of the state within society: state power depends 
on the capacity to mobilise society and maintain social consent. State capacity, in Hobson’s account, 
includes its degree of concentration, infrastructural reach and autonomy within society.
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taken to express the embeddedness of state mechanisms in wider societal 
arrangements and their institutional capabilities (ample or limited) to promote social 
projects. In this respect, it is useful in capturing the information society development 
process at the national level as a social process, as well as providing the tools for 
assessing the developmental profile of a nation-state.
The IS/KBE framework together with the neo-institutional literature on capitalist 
diversity and the Weberian historical sociological state/society perspective through 
the notion of ‘embedded autonomy’ can provide a useful array of conceptualisations 
through which information society developments can be studied. Specifically, they 
can be the vehicle for approaching the diversity of IS/KBE at the national level in a 
European context (as national variations of the IS/KBE project identified in historical 
continuity with national variations of the industrial society and the postwar welfare 
regimes in Europe).
3.4. Research Design
Research and theorisation on the role of the state under conditions of globalisation has 
been marked by analysis of states in the industrialised world. Likewise, the 
information society and knowledge-based economy has been more often than not 
examined in a developed national context. It is then small wonder that there have only 
been few attempts to examine the relationship between the state and the IS/KBE in a 
developing country context and even less in national contexts that belong broadly to 
the developed world, but are semi-peripheral and middle-income (southern and 
eastern European countries are cases in point).
To address to some extent this gap we apply our conceptual framework in the context 
of the evolving characteristics and forms of what we provisionally call the ‘Greek 
case’ of information society with a view to examining the dialectic between the 
European (and global) vision and the national particularities, the role of the state in 
articulating the European/global frame with the national through rhetoric and policy 
and the hitherto outcome of the process of bringing about the IS/KBE in Greece. 
Empirically, then, this is a case study, with emphasis on the period between 1998- 
2008, which includes the first steps towards an information society in Greece and
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provides the opportunity to assess preliminary results of the policies adopted.
A case study is a particularly advantageous research approach when “how” or “why” 
questions are asked, when the phenomena under investigation are contemporary and 
when the researcher has little or no control over them. Moreover, a definitive property 
of a case study is that it examines a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context, 
especially when the boundary and context are not clear. Since context is considered 
important, more interesting variables are expected than the direct data provided by the 
phenomena under examination, which in turn implies the reliance of the research on 
multiple sources of evidence and the triangulation of data, while making the 
formulation of a priori theoretical premises helpful as a guide for data collection and 
analysis. The case study offers the advantage of combining a variety of research 
methods, including analysis of documents, interviews, as well as observations (Yin
2003).
Based on the above premises, the case study research method is suitable for the 
empirical elements of this research. The aim is to interpret central developments in the 
Greek information society, rather than testing a particular hypothesis. This is an 
investigation in depth of certain aspects of the Greek case by deploying a 
predominantly qualitative research methodology. But the inquiry is also influenced by 
ethnographic approaches, in the sense of at least ‘providing a critical way of 
interrogating’, being ‘attentive to the internal messiness of any organisation’, as well 
as to the ‘failures of technologies to meet the expectations which are made of them 
and they ways in which failures are recognised and addressed’ (Barry 2001, p.23). It 
also places emphasis on specificity, in particular the national specificity of the case in 
question.
In other words, on one level our approach is an idiographic one, concerned to bring 
forward the unique features of the information society in Greece. This approach is 
consistent with the argument, which itself focuses on variations, unique state/society 
dynamics and national dimensions. However, while the empirical focus is on the 
Greek case, the purpose is to make more general claims for information society theory 
and methodology, as well as for the role of the state in the information age. This aim
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is also reflected in the argument, where reference to ‘a national IS/KBE’ and to ‘the 
role of the state’ retain a reasonably general and abstract form.
Since the Greek case is used for extracting more general conclusions that are 
applicable to other cases a problem of generalisation arises. Yin has addressed this 
problem by arguing that ‘case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to 
theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes’ (Yin 2003, p. 10). In this 
research the goal is to reach certain theoretical outcomes vis-a-vis the information 
society and the role of the state in a national context; in this respect the case study 
approach is expected to provide the materials for the production of such “analytic 
generalisation”. While we do not claim that the Greek case is representative of a class 
of similar cases (despite possible similarities with other countries in the south 
European context), we do claim that the broad mechanisms of IS/KBE establishment 
in Greece are to all intents and purposes generalisable (i.e. present in other contexts). 
In this way, the thesis really looks for the ‘indivisible connections of theory and real- 
world observation’ and aims to ‘produce generalised statements of significance 
regarding the character of societies, while committed to ensuring that theories are 
substantially grounded and subject to reconceptualisation in light of empirical 
evidence’ (Webster 2005, p.442).
3.5. Research Questions
The aim of the thesis is to examine the relationship between the state and the 
information society drawing from the Greek experience during the period 1998-2008 
and using the following research questions:
1. What information society policies have been adopted by the Greek government, 
and what aims, priorities and ideological framework do they reflect? (to be addressed 
in chapter 4)
2. How have these policies interacted with the historical, social, economic, political 
and cultural specificities of the Greek context as encapsulated by the state/society 
relation? What is the present physiognomy of the Greek information society? (to be 
addressed in chapter 5)
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3.6. Research Methods
Based on a case study research methodology, the thesis includes a variety of data 
collection methods. The gathering of evidence was informed by the conceptual 
components mentioned above. The intention was to collect evidence on information 
society policy, policy implementation and societal responses, placing such policies 
and responses in the institutional contexts (EU and Greek) producing them and 
analysing them in accordance with interests and aspirations, as well as pre-existing 
structures and practices (Evans 1995).
An overview of the EU and Greek policies was obtained through study of relevant 
documents, including the Greek White Paper of 1999, the OPIS policy document, the 
“Digital Promise” strategy document, as well as the 2006-2013 strategy. These were 
coupled with other relevant documents, as well as statistics on the information society 
in Greece, obtained from the Greek information society site (www.infosoc.gr) (mainly 
using surveys carried out by the National Research and Technology Network EDET). 
National statistics were juxtaposed and synthesised with statistical data obtained from 
relevant Eurostat indicators on the information society in the EU. Last, but not least, 
two comprehensive overviews of the Greek IT sector carried out in 2006 and 2007 
were consulted. These had been conducted on behalf of the Greek Observatory for the 
Information Society (www.observatory.gr), from which further online data was 
obtained.
The core of our research methods were elite interviews with about thirty individual 
actors related to information society policies: the hitherto three special secretaries for 
the information society and their advisors, members of the special bodies set up to 
implement the Operational Programme for the Information Society (OPIS), 
government officials from the Ministry of National Economy and Ministry of Interiors, 
IT corporate executives and academics. The interviews were semi-structured and 
open-ended, based on a list of questions to structure discussion around broadly 
defined areas (the questions are included in Appendix I). It is clear that interviews can 
offer only partial and subjective views on a topic, but subjectivity was treated as 
evidence in itself. The choice of open-ended questions was based on the need to elicit 
the personal views of the actors involved. The choice of conducting semi-structured
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interviews was to ensure that the responses obtained would be standardised at least as 
far as the basic topics were concerned. This helped extract many different views on 
the same set of questions, while leaving open the possibility of follow-up questions. 
On many occasions, interviewees created links with broader issues of theoretical 
value.
The interviews were carried between 2005 and 2009 and, generally speaking, lasted 
between one and two hours. In many cases interview follow-ups were conducted after 
preliminary analysis of interview results. A group interview with seven IT executives, 
members of the Public Projects Committee of the Federation of Hellenic Information 
Technology & Communication Enterprises (SEPE) 16, was conducted at their 
premises in 2006.
Interview material is deployed in chapter 4 and mainly chapter 5 and direct quotes are 
provided when the insider’s view is considered particularly interesting, or when a 
degree of detail is regarded as necessary. As this is not the case with all our interviews, 
not all of them are represented explicitly, though all of them have indeed informed to 
a greater or lesser degree the collection of empirical evidence. Direct quotes are given 
in italics, while reference to a particular interview is made by providing the initials of 
the interviewee alongside the year the interview took place. Appendix II gives a list of 
the interviewee names and their capacities.
Importantly, the evolution of the information society in Greece in the period under 
examination was followed on a regular basis, through data sources such as 
newspapers, magazines and press releases, as well as through visiting the relevant 
web sites, not least the www.infosoc.gr site, which was established early on. In 
addition, the issues at stake were discussed and debated in a number of conferences 
and meetings held in Greece, in which we participated: the 2008 Greek ICT Forum, 
the workshop on the Greek Information Society organised by the National Technical 
University of Athens in Ermoupolis, Syros (July 2006), the International Conference: 
“The Greek Industry in the Knowledge Economy”, organised by the Technical Chamber
16 Founded in 1995 and representing about 400 ICT firms, which cover 95% of the Greek ICT 
market(www. sepe .gr)
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of Greece in Athens (July 2006), the International Conference: “Deployment of ICTs 
for Electronic Government and Local Development”, organised by Central Union of 
Greek Municipalities (KEDKE) in Herakleion, Crete (May 2006), the 3rd Economist 
International E-Government Forum: “Reform and restructuring in the Greek public 
sector through E-commerce, E-Govemance and IT policy”, in Athens (June 2005), the 
presentation of the 2006-2013 IS strategy in Athens (July 2005), as well as a SEPE 
meeting in 2006, which we were granted access to observe.
3.7. Conceptualising Greece through a state/society historical approach
We now turn to the conceptualisation of Greece through a state/society perspective 
informed by Weberian historical sociology (as appropriated mainly by Greek authors), 
as well as its positioning within the south European context in terms of certain 
dimensions. State structures (including bureaucracy) and the state/economy/civil 
society relation are part of the overall state/society approach that we adopt (Evans 
1995).
3.7.1. State, economy and civil society in Greece: dominant reading
As a starting point, in the taxonomy of world system theory Greece is taken to belong 
neither to the capitalist centre (most developed western economies) nor to the 
periphery (developing countries), but rather to the semi-periphery. Moreover, Greece 
can be seen as belonging to the late-late development paradigm, i.e. to the economies 
where industrialisation only happened after 1929 (in contrast to the late western 
European industrialisers such as Germany, which were late only in comparison to 
England).
Late development has been associated with an increased role of the state or state- 
controlled institutions for direction. As a result, looking into the state entity and state 
structures, as well as into the relations between the state and the national economy and 
society, can provide insights as to why late developers with similar starting points still 
follow different developmental paths and perform unevenly in the world economy 
(Mouzelis 1986).
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The gradual integration of the Greek economy into the world market and the process 
of urbanisation in the late 19th century gave an important role to the state for building 
infrastructures and regulating prices and exports. Industrialisation implied the 
articulation of agriculture with industry, but because this took place in ineffective 
ways the domestic market that emerged was quite limited. Increasing urbanisation, as 
a result, led to rising unemployment for large segments of the population drawn to 
urban centres. These processes coupled with the relatively early development of 
democracy and parliamentary institutions resulted in increasing pressures for those 
segments of urban population to be absorbed in the tertiary sector, particularly public 
bureaucracies, which in turn grew enormously.
The public sector size was augmented and public administration soon became 
complex, fragmented and inefficient. Moreover, politicians operated in ways that 
sought to build their own political capital by granting posts and favours, using 
clientelistic practices, something that resulted in a vicious circle that had further 
impacts on state mechanisms17. In this manner, the state acquired a significantly anti- 
developmental character which prevented Greece from satisfactory industrialisation 
and development (Mouzelis 1995; Tsoukalas 1987).
One aspect of the Greek capitalist model refers to the relationship between the state 
and the state-owned, protected or subsidised industrial enterprises that developed 
some time during the interwar period or after WWII. When industrialisation took off 
in the 1930s, the already established state structures were more potent than a still 
weak industrial sector. This was the historical root of a tendency for the private 
economic sector to operate under the protective mechanisms of the state (e.g. seeking 
increased subsidies or other kinds of favourable treatment), rather than improving its 
own capabilities and building its own momentum (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002). 
Through ‘national champions’ strategies, many firms were protected through high 
tariffs from foreign competition and most continued to enjoy state protection until
17 Clientelism has its roots in the Ottoman rule when local Greek notables (kontsambasides) played the 
role of intermediary between the Ottoman authority and the Greek peasants; after Greek independence 
in 1830 its remained as a practice, albeit modified, with oligarchic families deploying patronage to 
control the voting processes and ensure that their political interests would be served by the elected 
government (Garcia and Karakatsanis 2006, p. 101).
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well into the 1980s (Mouzelis 1986). However, such strategies could only be applied 
in asymmetrical ways between industries or within an industry: the articulation of the 
private sector with the state operated from the beginning through clientelistic relations, 
with certain economic groups enjoying privileged access to public resources.
The Greek model of industrial capitalism that eventually emerged was one where 
economic rationality systematically succumbed to political imperatives and the 
accumulation of political capital through clientelistic relations. In contrast to Western 
Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, Greece’s incomplete industrialisation (based on light 
industry and consumer goods) generated an industrial structure overwhelmingly 
dominated by small firms.
The late and incomplete industrialisation of Greece and the role of the state in 
economic development have also affected the character of civil society, taken to 
denote societal interests, associations and institutions that exist outside of the state 
(following Keane 1988).
State mechanisms had been in place well before industrial capitalist development, 
while the fact that they sprang during the end of the Ottoman Empire brought certain 
authoritarian features. It has been argued that in the absence of truly representative 
workers’ associations, as well as significant civil society organisations (e.g. the 
Church, which has always had close links with the state in Greece), the political 
relationship between the state and civil society in Greece has not followed a universal 
integrative mode, but rather what has been called ‘the incorporative-clientelistic 
mode’ according to which the political rights of the population are determined 
through patron-client networks (Mouzelis 1995). Clientelism has been seen as having 
had a significant impact on civil society, as it potentially draws each citizen in a 
‘vertical’ way towards individual political participation and thus impedes the 
formation of horizontal associations to promote common goals and interests 
(Sotiropoulos 1996).
The Civil War (1946-49) and its aftermath brought about a strong political 
polarisation that cut through the Greek society. The operations of the state for decades
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divided Greek society further by persecuting and systematically discriminating against 
people of left-wing orientation under a heavily anti-communist ideological framework.
In parallel, insufficient industrialisation prevented the development of traditional 
industrial unionism, with much lower rates of unionisation than Western Europe. The 
immaturity of trade unions linked them closely with state interests and locked them in 
corporatist arrangements in which labour representatives were not equal partners in 
policy, as in West European corporatist systems (e.g. Germany), but were in fact 
controlled by the state (Davaki 2001).
The end of the dictatorship (1967-1974) and the advent of the post-1974 era (the 
process of transition to democracy) marked the end of an era of the anti-communist 
discrimination and the restrictions to democratic activity that oppressive political 
powers (Crown, Army and Parliament) had practised since WWII (Featherstone 2005). 
The Greek governments focused on economic development and pursued a strategy of 
Europeanisation with a view to accession to the EU (materialised in 1979), although 
clientelistic practices persisted.
After 1981, when the newly elected PASOK socialist government sought to 
accommodate its voters by creating new posts, clientelism took a new form as it 
moved from personalised relationships to a practice operating through parties 
(Spourdalakis 1998). Populism and short-term practices led to an exacerbation of 
economic indices and of the condition of public enterprises. Trade unions became 
more dependent on the state due to their politically-appointed leaderships, while 
PASOK also exerted great influence on professional associations and civil society 
associations. The conflictual relationships present in party politics were also reflected 
in divisions within the major labour unions (e.g. the private General Confederation of 
Greek Labour GSEE and the Confederation of Civil Servants ADEDY).
The patronage of trade unions and employer associations by the state, the limited 
independence of social movements from state mechanisms, the lack of significant 
voluntary organisations, the close connections between the church and the state, as 
well as the small number of ethnic minorities, all have been taken to compose a 
picture of a weak civil society and underdeveloped social capital.
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The prevalence of clientelism, together with incomplete industrialisation, the lack of 
adequate social citizenship and welfare rights, the weak trade unions and social 
movements, the polarisation engendered by the Civil War, the over-reliance on the 
family and disassociation from broader social collectivities, the appropriating 
behaviour of civil society and the absence of social corporatism, have contributed to 
social heterogeneity and have prevented the development of a universalistic and 
collective culture in Greece (Petmesidou 1996). From the perspective of identity and 
culture, the argument has been promoted that the Greek national identity had already 
developed before certain economic, political and cultural national institutions were 
established. Ideological inclusion thus preceded socio-political inclusion, which in 
any case operated through patronage networks. The identification with the nation has 
as a result taken an abstract and romantic form, rather than a concrete set of beliefs 
and trust in national institutions. This has contributed to the formation of ambivalent 
national identities combining elements of patriotism with a lack of collective spirit, or 
maintaining a romanticised view of ‘Greekness’ as superiority, coupled with a distrust 
towards Greek public institutions (Mouzelis 1995).
3.7.2. State, economy and civil society in Greece: alternative readings
The above historical account is informed by a particular state/society perspective that 
has dominated the socio-political analysis of Greece since the 1970s. This perspective 
has emphasised the overwhelming presence of the state, the undernourished civil 
society, as well as the dominant function of clientelism in defining the state/society 
relationship. This approach has been based on the neo-Marxist writings of Mouzelis 
and Tsoukalas (Mouzelis 1986, Tsoukalas 1987), who have approached the 
relationship as ‘zero-sum’, implying that a strong state goes along with a weak civil 
society and vice versa. A second important tenet is that the civil society has been 
generally evaluated as a positive entity, possibly incorporating the ideal of a ‘good 
society’ (Voulgaris 2006).
Moreover, in this perspective there is an underlying assumption that the Greek state 
has shaped the Greek economy and society, rather than the former evolving in parallel 
and in a dialectic relationship with the latter. The structural characteristics of the
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Greek state, notably the lack of a Weberian type rational and efficient public 
administration and the predominance of clientelistic relations are taken to have caused 
delays and particularities in the Greek society and economy in a deterministic way 
(Kotzias 1993).
Recently, an alternative ‘reading’ of Greek history has been proposed, namely one 
that challenges this particular state/society perspective. On the level of (Greek) 
historiography, the analytical significance of the dimension of clientelism and the 
subsuming of civil society under the state through it have been seriously challenged 
on the basis of two arguments. Firstly, during the 19th and 20th centuries there were 
clear party divisions and party membership was based on strong ideological 
associations (rather than political patronage), therefore parties of the time have to be 
seen as institutions of the civil society. Secondly, the internal economic accumulation 
processes operating at national or local level were much more dynamic than is 
commonly assumed and therefore enjoyed relative autonomy from the state and the 
political system. These two observations indicate that the impact of non-state forces 
on civil society and the resulting potency of the latter have been significant, 
something that has been underestimated in orthodox readings, which tend to 
emphasise the influence of the state (and the importance of clientelism) (Voulgaris 
2006).18
Like Voulgaris, Sotiropoulos has promoted the argument that civil society in Greece 
is not as weak as commonly assumed.19 His argument is that the comparatively
18 For reasons of analytical clarity, we take political parties, generally speaking, to be part of civil 
society (although depending on the circumstances and the complex patronage and clientelistic features 
of the Greek state structures they could be seen as part of the state system), while we see economic 
units (from family enterprises to large firms) as part of the economy, a sphere that we treat as separate 
to civil society. At the same time, we treat representatives of economic groups (employers associations, 
trade unions etc) as part of civil society.
19 The definition of civil society adopted by Sotiropoulos is ‘a wide-ranging set of social interaction 
and collective action taking place in the public space available between the individual household, on 
the one hand, and the state apparatus, on the other’ (2004, p. 10). This definition is complemented by 
Diamond, who defines civil society as ‘a network of formal and informal groups, voluntary, self- 
generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, representing different social, political, 
professional and economic groups. It is distinct from “society” in general, in that it involves citizens 
acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange 
information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the state and hold state officials accountable’ 
(1994, p.6). Intervention in the public sphere with the intention of promoting aggregation,
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limited formal civil society is accompanied by an informal civil society; this 
‘emanates from a flourishing, albeit informal and thus not officially registered, social 
mobilisation which substitutes for the usual, formal civil society found in modem 
Western societies’ (Sotiropoulos 2004, p.8).
Further, according to Sotiropoulos, there are formal civil associations that are very 
strong. The associations of liberal professionals (lawyers, doctors, engineers), for 
instance, enjoy considerable strength, which derives from their high organisational 
density and their consistently high representation among MPs and cabinet ministers, 
regardless of which political party is in power. Sotiropoulos correctly points out that 
these professionals enjoy advantageous social insurance schemes, while their 
contribution to taxation is less than expected due to tax evasion. Crucially, any 
political reforms affecting their interests have always been met with resistance from 
these associations (Sotiropoulos 2004).
Sotiropoulos argues that the trade unions of the wider public sector (unions of state- 
run banking employees, employees of the power corporation and of secondary 
education teachers) have also shown considerable strength. These unions have had a 
long history of strong links with government and political parties, particularly during 
the PASOK period, when public sector employees were generally among the most 
consistent PASOK voters.
However, it is questionable whether these links should be seen as indicative of strong 
civil society, as Sotiropoulos has them, or as an exemplification of state patronisation 
of trade unions, as in the ‘traditional’ reading of Greek history. Given the strong links 
between unions and political parties, it begs the question whether these trade unions 
can be seen as strong and acting independently in the public sphere, or as patronised 
by the state, or dominated by political parties of the opposition which have guided 
them to act against government. The weakness of civil society has been frequently 
attributed to the influence of political parties, e.g. in Italy. In more recent writings, 
Mouzelis has similarly put the weakness of the civil society in Greece down to the
intermediation, or representation of interests is a necessary prerequisite for a group or association to 
belong to civil society (Sotiropoulos 2004).
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extensive role of political parties, departing from his previous emphasis on state 
structures (see the relevant debate in Pelagidis 2005).
Lavdas has explored the impact of party politics on interest representation and has 
argued that the observation that ‘state institutions, political parties and clientelism 
have pre-empted the space for independent activity by interest groups’ often leads to 
misleading generalisations (Lavdas 2005, p.299). His objection derives from the 
realisation that organised business interests have been developed in ways that allowed 
relative independence from the state and the parties and have been more influential 
than traditionally presented. Moreover, he resorts to the early roots of civil society 
developments in Greece, in the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, which 
have seen the emergence of groups with agendas as variant as women’s issues and the 
environment, with the 1909 coup by Venizelos instigating political developments 
including the establishment of the Federation of Greek Industries (SEB) and the 
GSEE in 1918. Further, he stresses that the post-war era saw the growth of state-union 
interactions, trade unions and associations became more prominent and their 
memberships remained relatively high throughout the period. Last, he points out that 
after 1974 and the restoration of democracy there has been an emergence of various 
groups, from women’s groups to parents’ groups and other associations (Lavdas 
2005).
Apart from the relative independence and strength of business associations vis-a-vis 
the state (e.g. SEB and the Union of Shipowners, founded in 1916), the evidence that 
Lavdas provides does not suggest elements of a significant civil society. Eventually,
20 As Lavdas himself acknowledges, some of the early civil society groups (around the 1910s) were 
provisional; up to the beginning of the 20th century there was a syndicalist tradition with unions of 
workers and managers, which was outlawed by the Venizelos government in 1914, followed by the 
formation of GSEE largely by the activities of the government, which subsequently tried to control it; 
unions were dependent on state finance and were systematically repressed after 1920; in the 1950s, an 
attempt was made to introduce corporatist decision-making, but there were extensive legal and political 
state interventions in GSEE, while SEB retained greater institutional autonomy. In any case, the union 
movement in Greece has been characterised by considerable fragmentation, partly because it is 
occupation-based rather than sector-based. This has made collective. action difficult, while it has 
facilitated the development of links between individual unions and the government and other political 
entities, which have operated in parallel with general agreements to secure specific benefits (Lavdas 
2005).
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his argument is that corporatist arrangements in Greece, involving the state, labour 
and business interest groups, particularly after 1974, are characterised by 
fragmentation and political factionalisation of trade unions and at the same time 
weakness of the state vis-a-vis business interests, an overall asymmetric power 
situation that he terms ‘disjointed corporatism’. Thus, a notable absence of ‘social 
corporatism’ able to engage in collective decision-making and negotiate social pacts is
t V iidentified in Greece and is attributed among else to the two civil conflicts of the 20 
century (1916-1917 and 1944-1949), the antagonistic practices and relations between 
political parties and the lack of a culture of elite accommodation. A manifestation of 
this absence has been the deadlock in social dialogue throughout the 1970s and 1980s, 
which has obstructed the Europeanisation strategy (Lavdas 2005).
Based on the above exposition and following Voulgaris (2006), we consider Greek 
civil society as a domain where contradictory rationales and objectives coexist and 
interact with the economy and the state. A crucial question then becomes the extent to 
which the organisational forms, objectives and practices of civil society are informed 
by an ability to pursue universal democratic goals, or rather by an egoistic behaviour 
orientated at the satisfaction of self-interest that contradicts democratic ideals. Both 
motives will co-exist in (any) civil society, but the relative proportion of these two 
contradictory logics can be evaluated within a socio-political democratic framework.
Along these lines, Voulgaris argues that civil society in Greece is characterised by a 
strong orientation towards appropriation and pursuit of self-interest and by a weak 
orientation towards universal democratic goals. Manifestations of the former are the 
ability of civil society to appropriate public functions and resources, together with the 
power to veto state initiatives, as well as the extent of corruption and ‘amoral’ 
corporatism. Expressions of the latter are the frequent myopic and irrational collective 
behaviour, the limited strategic and developmental sightedness of socio-political
Further, it is questionable whether the high membership figures, as well as the increased number of 
strikes, notably after 1974, should be seen as signs of strong unions, due to the influence of parties and 
the state on trade unions, as discussed above. Finally, while Lavdas interprets positively the post-1974 
emergence of various associations, others have seen most of them as state-dependent; in the case of 
women’s groups, for instance, it has been convincingly argued that state patronisation skimmed the 
radical elements from the autonomous feminist movement of the 1970s and early 1980s, reducing them 
to claims that would be introduced as legislative reforms by the leadership of the parties with which 
those women’s associations had been affiliated (Davaki 2001).
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agents, as well as the exaggerated ideological masquing so as to cover up the gap 
between democratic values and particular egoistic practices.
Recent alternative approaches have also argued that the traditional characterisation of 
the Greek state as being dominated by foreign influences in the design of its 
institutions originates from the theories of dependency of the 1960s, which do not 
seem to apply in Greece. Dertilis (2006) claims that although the state has 
systematically imported modem practices from abroad, it has also modified and 
adjusted them to the national circumstances. Further, the fact that the Greek state has 
been more effective vis-a-vis the other south European states in addressing the social 
imperatives of modernisation, as well as in maintaining democratic institutions for a 
long time should not be underestimated.
What seems to have been the case, however, is that the Greek state has shown limited 
capacity to coordinate different social groups under circumstances of modernisation. 
This limited coordinative capacity has been dialectically related to the appropriation 
and self-interest of civil society and to the lack of proper insulation of state decision­
making from civil society interests, a realisation which reminds of the concept of 
‘embedded autonomy’.
Caloghirou, Ioannides et al. (1993) have examined the role of the Greek state in 
economic development before and after the 1970s and have argued that there has been 
a systematic time-lag in relevant policies: until the mid-1970s, when Western 
European governments pursued demand-management and active industrial 
development policies, the Greek state,, albeit interventionist, was relying on the 
private sector and on foreign capital, with minimal public investment in 
manufacturing and the absence of any attempt to promote indigenous processes of 
industrialisation; by contrast, after the mid-1970s, the role of the Greek state became 
active in economic development, but at a time when fiscal crisis was emerging in 
Europe and when such policies were becoming unsustainable.
Caloghirou, Ioannides et al. qualify the traditional view that the Greek state has 
overall lacked a rational, developmental and strategic behaviour and has often 
resorted to ad hoc and fragmented interventions, in response to pressures, rather than
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having a systematic approach to policy. They argue instead that the pursuit of 
unsustainable policies since the mid-1970s was the result of contradictory demands 
that the state had to address during the period. Specifically, on the one hand the 
opening of the national economy to international competition, which was 
accompanied by state policies to defend employment, respond to the decline of private 
investment, maintain existing production structures and subsidise products. On the 
other hand, significant shifts in the political spectrum towards the Left, which 
reflected shifts in socio-economic stratification and necessitated that the state met 
social demands from segments of the population that had been left out in the previous 
period of dictatorship and the overall post-war period.
Other recent theorisations have sought to overcome the limitations of the traditional 
reading by referring to models of capitalist diversity presented in section 3.3.1. 
Gunther, Diamandouros et al. (2006) identify the common structural characteristics of 
a southern European state that has developed historically in Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Greece (notwithstanding the exceptions in each case). These characteristics define a 
distinctive state/society relation, which reflects the particularities of south European 
capitalism and, being dissimilar to state/society relations in northern and western 
Europe, verifies the capitalist diversity argument.
In their approach, Gunther, Diamandouros et al. conceptualise these states as both 
‘heavy’ and ‘weak’. The ‘heaviness’ of the southern European state is associated with 
the great centralisation of state power, which in Greece was introduced by the 
Bavarian monarchy selected by the Great Powers to rule over a peasant population 
that was divided by local rivalries. Centralisation was coupled with the use of 
coercive force against those threatening the establishment and the frequency of 
periods of emergency or dictatorial rule. The interventionist role of the state in the 
economy, an expression of this ‘heaviness’, was very prominent in the 1960s and 
1970s across industrial and service sectors, and included tariff protection, preferential 
treatment, and overall protectionist practices to defend the interests of economic elites.
The ‘weakness’ of the southern European state derives from a number of factors: the
tfi •sustained power challenges from local elites in the second part of 19 century, which 
involved systematic tax evasion and the resulting unjust distribution of state assets, as
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well as insufficient revenues and growing public deficits; the prominence of the 
military establishment, often taking the rule in its hands, something manifested in
i L
Greece from 1821 until the 1860s, and more so in the 20 century; the inadequate, 
almost rudimentary provision of social services, which has been a far cry from the 
universalistic schemes of Western Europe, as well as regressive taxation systems and 
inadequate revenues to support state activities; the ineffectivess in promoting 
economic development, until at least the 1980s or 1990s (in Greece); the fragile 
legitimacy, originating from mistrust in royal authorities, but also partly due to the 
early introduction of parliamentary rule before social and economic development 
(Gunther, Diamandouros et al. 2006).
In addition, state weakness is associated with the southern European model of 
bureaucracy (first visible in the 19th century), the characteristics of which have been 
persistent in Greece in the beginning of the 21st century. First, political clientelism at 
the top level, meaning the political party-mediated appointments at the top levels of 
bureaucracy, as well as promotions and transfers to high civil service. Second, 
political clientelism at the low levels, i.e. selective recruitment at entry-levels jobs in 
public administration.21 Third, the uneven character of the public sector, which is 
characterised by unbalanced distribution of personnel and resources. Fourth, the 
overproduction of laws, as well as the rigid and complicated nature of legal 
frameworks. Fifth, the lack of institutionalised administrative elite with considerable 
political and social stature and a corresponding lack of Weberian bureaucratic culture 
based on rational/legal expertise. Sixth, the systematic administrative inefficiency 
(e.g. in collecting taxes, or allocating resources, or even in routine tasks). Seventh, 
widespread political “petty” corruption, i.e. involving low and middle-ranking 
bureaucrats (e.g. bribes to issue certificates and grant permissions) (Sotiropoulos 
2004, Sotiropoulos 2006, Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002).
Since the 1970s, south European countries have witnessed processes of 
democratisation, Europeanisation and modernisation and have approximated western
21 This has been another dimension of the ‘heaviness’ of the state, as employment was offered both to 
government and the parastatal agencies created, while each change in government meant an additional 
layer of employees added to the public administration.
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and northern Europe in terms of partisan politics and economic change. Nonetheless, 
the southern European state and its patterns of public policy outputs have continued to 
exhibit institutional legacies that impede substantial change (in certain sectors more 
than in others) (Gunther, Diamandouros et al. 2006).
3.7.3. Capturing Greek idiosyncrasies
Building on the above accounts, we seek to avoid economic or political determinism 
in the explanation of the basic characteristics of the Greek socio-economic and 
political formation. Our aim is to escape from explaining Greek modernity in a 
singular way, overemphasising either the role or capacity of the state, or the degree of 
industrialisation of the economy, or the character of the civil society. Having said that, 
it would be inadequate to underestimate the role of incomplete industrialisation, the 
operation of clientelism and the structural deficiencies of public administration. 
Elements of both the traditional and the more recent alternative readings of the 
historically evolved state/society configuration have to be retained.
We therefore opt for a multi-dimensional approach and argue (in summary of the 
above debates) that the combination (or dialectic relationships) of the state, the 
economy and the civil society can indeed provide a more comprehensive and 
historically informed picture of Greece. This physiognomy we believe to be based on 
the following dominant dimensions of Greek politics, economy and society 
crystallised in the period from the 1970s and still present in the beginning of the 21st 
century (Featherstone 2005). These dimensions are treated as expressions of the 
particular state structures and the state/society relation in Greece, in accordance with 
our conceptual framework.
a) Public administration has been systematically subject to abusive interventions by 
successive governments for purposes of bureaucratic clientelism, something which 
has prevented the development of a Weberian bureaucratic culture based on 
rational/legal expertise (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos 2002). 22
22The link between meritocratic recruitment and the cultivation of bureaucracies with shared norms and 
culture is addressed by Evans and Rauch (1999) who argue that meritocratic recruitment and
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b) State/economy relations are characterised by over-regulation and strict legal 
frameworks, while suffering from an unhealthy relationship of mutual dependence 
which involves corruption and patronage in the allocation of favours and contracts.
c) There is a high degree of centralisation of state power, with government in Athens 
determining allocation of resources and setting the rules, regional and local authorities 
depending on the centre, but also resorting to standard practices of micro-corruption 
(e.g. bribery in order to issue certificates).
d) The public policy process is hierarchical, with complex relations between ministers 
and personal advisors often operating across ministries, weak connections with the 
civil service, the absence of think tanks and policy communities and a lack of social 
dialogue ((Ladi 2005).
e) Parties over-determine politics (Pelagidis 2005), while inter-party relations are 
highly conflictual and built on opposing social identities and competing patronage 
systems.
f) Formal civil society (measured in terms of organisations and participation rates) is 
limited and organisations are often dependent on state mechanisms. However, 
informal civil society mechanisms are significant and should be taken into 
consideration. Importantly, interest mediation is characterised by a potent rent-seeking 
behaviour from sectional interests, which reveals a civil society strong in its 
appropriating potential. The state/business/labour industrial relations are characterised 
by a disjointed corporatism, whereby labour unions tend to be patronised by the state 
and the political parties, while the policy capacities of the state regarding business are 
weak, a situation which accounts for the fact that ‘social dialogue in Greece remains 
an exercise with a limited scope’ (Lavdas 2005, p.298).
predictable career development help the creation of a more cohesive bureaucracy that pursues long­
term goals more effectively, including advocating public sector infrastructure investment rather than 
consumption expenditure and other short-term goals.
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g) Political culture shows mistrust of the state, in particular regarding its regulatory 
and redistributive functions, but is accompanied by rent-seeking individualist 
behaviour. It incorporates the ambivalence between patriotism on the one hand and 
individualism and lack of collective spirit on the other (Tsoukalas 1993).
The above characteristics paint a picture of Greece in the beginning of the 21st century 
across the economic, political, social and cultural spectrum. According to our broad 
argument, such characteristics are expected to play a role in shaping the Greek 
information society, as well as in the forms that it might take. Understandably, the 
relative contribution of each of the above factors is not expected to be the same; nor 
can each contribution be singled out in order to produce a direct mapping of historical 
realities and their contemporary replication in the information society in Greece. Last, 
these characteristics can only paint a partial picture of current affairs in Greece.
During the 1990s the ‘modernisation’ project of Prime Minister Costas Simitis (1996-
2004) sought to overcome the ‘anomalies’ of the Greek economy, society and politics. 
This ambitious socio-economic project was centred on the mission of securing the 
position of Greece at the core of EU both in economic and in political terms 
(including incorporation in the core of the Eurozone). It is during the Simitis period 
that a systematic political attempt to promote and implement an information society in 
Greece has taken place for the first time.
In chapter 4 we elaborate on the 1990s modernisation project both because it informs 
the information society rhetoric adopted by the Greek governments and because it can 
serve as a general canvas on which patterns of continuity and change, as well as 
structural constraints can be identified. Subsequently, we examine how these patterns 
and constraints play out in the implementation of the Greek information society 
project in chapter 5. Our interest is to investigate the interaction of the Greek 
state/society relations in emerging IS arrangements (both in their development and in 
their crystallised form). In order to do so and for reasons of feasibility of our research, 
we choose to concentrate only on the dimensions grouped by Featherstone, as outlined 




Following from the literature review, this chapter has laid out the conceptual and 
methodological approach of the thesis.
We started by declaring our intention to maintain a balance between continuity and 
change regarding the IS/KBE paradigm and its relationship with the state and its 
functions. The object of study has been identified in these two questions: firstly, the 
role of the state and the ways in which its forms and functions are transformed with 
respect to the IS/KBE; secondly, the extent to which there are national variations in 
the manifestation of the IS/KBE paradigm in a national context. We have outlined our 
interest in the national aspects of the information society paradigm through our 
argument, linking the development of a national IS/KBE with the translation of 
international policies according to the national state/society dynamics, while stressing 
the role of the state in this process.
In order to address this argument, we have resorted to two conceptual pillars.
Firstly, a high level approach (by Jessop) placing the advent of the IS/KBE in a 
context of a broad post-Fordist societal transformation and linking it with a 
transformed role of the Keynesian welfare state to a Schumpeterian competition state. 
This conceptualisation will be deployed in chapter 5 to provide a lens for analysing 
the activities of the Greek state in view of IS/KBE policies and developments.
Secondly, an eclectic approach to enable us to study the national variations of the 
IS/KBE transformation. We have drawn on well-established models of capitalist 
diversity, which help position a national case. As the Greek case has been identified 
as our empirical domain, the south European context seems an obvious point of 
departure in identifying national characteristics and particularities. Nonetheless, since 
models often obscure as much as they reveal, we have also sought a more profound 
historical state/society approach, borrowed from historical sociology. Within this, we 
have stressed the concept of embedded autonomy (and of state capacity), which 
provides a tool for examining the developmental, or otherwise, role of the state in 
processes of modernisation. This concept will be drawn upon in chapter 5 to provide
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an evaluation of the developmental qualities of the Greek state. In order to dig deeper 
into the construction of the Greek social formation, we have presented a brief 
evolution of the Greek formation drawing both on dominant (or traditional) and 
alternative (or more recent) state/society historical approaches. We have ended this 
conceptualisation of the national context with an eclectic list of historically 
formulated characteristics. These seem to provide an adequate (though incomplete) 
picture of Greece at the present and are used in chapter 5 as signposts that inform the 
analysis of the implementation of contemporary information society policies.
The two conceptual pillars are seen as compatible. Although providing a generic 
conceptual framework which identifies a social transformation, Jessop does not 
position himself with the information society theorists who see it as an ahistorical 
social transformation. On the contrary, he identifies the origins of the information 
society discourses and the strategies in which they have been used to enable the 
establishment of the new paradigm. Moreover, he emphasises the need to study the 
information society in different contexts and anticipates variations by bringing our 
attention to the social relations that are present in the national context, including those 
emanating from or implicating the state. The state/society historical approach indeed 
provides a picture of state structures and state/economy/civil society relations in the 
national frame. It is also compatible with Jessop’s strategic/relational approach to the 
state.
Moving to chapter 4, we present the evolution of IS policy in Greece with the 
intention of identifying its objectives and ideological underpinnings. In doing so, we 
identify its rhetorical antecedents in the relevant policies in the EU. This exercise 
provides a critical background before moving to chapter 5, where the articulation of 
IS policies with the pre-existing economic and socio-political arrangements in Greece 
is analysed through the application of the conceptual framework and the deployment 
of the empirical data gathered in the research process.
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CHAPTER 4: EU AND GREEK POLICY - THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
IN GREECE
4.1. Introduction
Chapter 2 contained a quasi-archaeology of the idea of the information society. It also 
demonstrated to a certain extent how the general preoccupation with IS was made 
possible due to the a priori exposition of social actors (individuals, groups, states) to 
dominant, hegemonic discourses (e.g. neo-liberalism, competitiveness, development, 
etc.) and around the idea of information and ICTs as central in contemporary Western 
capitalist society. These discourses have emanated from a variety of sources 
(intellectuals, universities, politicians, multinational corporations and professionals) 
that have been in a powerful position to shape and guide the subject. Moreover, they 
have been propagated through mass media in their capacity to circulate globally ideas 
and particular interpretations (Stehr 2002).
The search for and formulation of international and national information policies has 
been a significant issue for more than twenty years. These processes are inextricably 
linked with developing notions of the information society, which they use as a starting 
point so as to promote and justify particular policy directions (Duff 2004).
At the European level, in particular, the information society debate has been 
structured around the realisation of the pervasive character of ICTs in a number of 
cultural, economic, political and organisational domains of social life. Moreover, it 
has involved a discursive and power struggle over competing views within established 
political institutions; these views have communicated representations of wider cultural, 
social and economic changes and choices. Goodwin and Spittle speak of a gap 
between how technological, social and cultural change is represented and 
communicated by political actors and the ‘objective’ reality of the situation: ‘Political 
debate over the information society...is firmly rooted in, and oriented to, a set of
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discursive, material and power relations articulated with reference to an historically 
established order of discourse’ (Goodwin and Spittle 2002, p.244). 23
We now turn to the presentation of the information society policy at the EU level, to 
be followed by the evolution of similar policies in the Greek context. The objective is 
to address the first research question by looking into the ways in which the EU 
information society agenda has framed the relevant agenda in Greece. Following that, 
we sketch a preliminary picture of the current situation of the information society in 
Greece based on selective indicators of ICT diffusion coupled with short descriptions 
of ICT use in certain domains. Chapter 5 complements this with a more in-depth 
analysis of the processes towards the establishment of the information society in 
Greece since roughly around the 1990s and with emphasis on the period 2000-2008.
4.2. The evolution of information society policy in the EU
Since the 1970s, when the discourses about state failures emerged, Europe has been 
actively promoting regionalism through common policies and inter-regional 
agreements under the auspices of the Single European Act. During the 1980s the 
objective of creating a common European Market by 1992 became a priority in the 
operations of the European Commission. The process of harmonisation that would 
establish common standards and regulatory frameworks for European products and 
practices was central in the 1992 neo-liberal project. In this, the EU mechanisms 
delegated responsibilities to a number of governmental and non-governmental 
organisations for the implementation of the necessary regulation. However, complete 
standardisation was not possible and there were resistances to the adoption of, as well 
as different interpretations of standards and regulations (Barry 2001).
23 Similar arguments are promoted by Chadwick (2001), who approaches politics at a symbolic level to 
show how ICTs themselves are deployed to communicate specific representations of the information 
society; or Karim (2001), who deploys the work of the French sociologist Jacques Ellul on myth and 




The rapid technological developments in information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) since the late 1980s, coupled with the development of the US 
vision of the ‘information superhighway’ and the neo-liberal orientation of the EU, 
gave rise to a vision of the information society articulated by the EU circles since the 
early 1990s (Dutton 1996; Mansell and Steinmueller 2000). The primary vehicles for 
conceiving of and communicating information society policy have been the European 
Commission and the Information Society Project Office (ISPO), the main advising 
body for ICT policy to the Commission. The vision more or less invokes ‘the idea that 
the information revolution opens a path to new opportunities for sustainable growth 
and development, new potential for social inclusion and representation, and new ways 
to achieve social and cultural expression’ (Mansell and Steinmueller 2000, p.9).
Under the presidency of Jacques Delors, the 1993 European Commission White Paper 
Growth., Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forwards into the 
21st Century was the first influential policy document communicating the information 
society idea. It revealed the importance attached by policy makers to the opportunities 
and challenges involved in its emergence, which it linked with European 
competitiveness and prospects for growth and employment, particularly in skilled jobs 
and the creation of new services. At the same time, however, the risks of 
unemployment, notably for people without skills, and potential social segregations 
were highlighted, as well as the need to be prevented through appropriate policies 
(European Commission 1993).
The White Paper put emphasis on the pervasive character of ICTs and their 
transformative role in production, organisation, management, labour relations, work 
and life patterns. The production and employment opportunities at stake (including 
new forms of partnerships between organisations) should be taken up by European 
countries in order to gain competitive advantage. The idea was that the information 
society provided opportunities to overcome chronic European structural problems, but 
also that social regulation was necessary to tackle the negative effects of progressive 
change (Mansell and Steinmueller 2000). The paper placed emphasis on the 
importance of the ‘network industries’ (telecommunications, energy and transport)
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and called for European-wide activity to develop an information and communication 
infrastructure in the public interest, in the same way as with railways and the 
telegraph a century earlier (Barry 2001).
Subsequently, the so-called Bangemann report24 was produced for the meeting of the 
European Commission in March 1994 in Corfu. The report set out the following 
priorities: a) promoting the use of information technologies; b) providing basic 
services at a European level; c) creating an appropriate regulatory environment; d) 
developing training in the new technologies; e) improving technological and industrial 
performance. The need to be aware of the technological potential presented by ICTs 
across all sectors of society and the economy was emphasised: managers needed 
specific training to become aware of the potential of ICTs and their organisational and 
socio-professional implications; technicians and other workers needed to integrate 
ICT-related aspects into their trade; companies needed to identify the strategic 
objectives, the functions and support to be provided by the system, while students 
should use ICTs to tackle general education and training problems (European 
Commission 1994a).
The report stressed the market-driven character of the information economy and 
suggested ten applications to launch the information society, namely teleworking, 
distance learning, a network for universities and research centres, telematics services 
for SMEs, road traffic management, air traffic control, health-care networks, 
electronic tendering, a trans-European administration network and city-information 
highways (Chadwick and May 2003).
The White Paper and the Bangemann report therefore presented a specific vision of 
the information society, comprising the following elements:
a) ICTs have a transformative role in production, organisation, management, labour 
relations, work and life patterns; they provide opportunities to overcome chronic 
European structural problems; they open a path to new opportunities for sustainable
24 After Martin Bangemann, the chair of the High-Level Group on the Information Society, which 
included nineteen senior members from government and industry.
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growth and development; they offer new potential for social inclusion, representation 
and cultural expression.
b) To be at the forefront of these changes, policies are required in order to create a 
suitable regulatory environment, improve training and education, so that a common 
technical infrastructure is developed and deployed across Europe that will support 
information exchange and the production of new services.
c) Steps need to be taken to mitigate or prevent processes of exclusion that 
accompany these changes, as well as to preserve a European character of the 
information society.
d) Awareness of the scale and importance of the changes involved needs to be raised 
at all levels of society in Europe (Mansell and Steinmueller 2000, pp. 16-17).
The tone of the White Paper and the Bangemann report was quasi-deterministic, in the 
sense that the potential of ICTs to restructure production processes and to lead to new 
goods and services was taken as given. Moreover, the opportunities involved in the 
information society were highlighted, but at the same time the need to adapt to and 
exploit these technological capacities through building new regulatory frameworks 
and new skills was stressed. This was the rationale behind the creation of a common 
(pan-European) information area. This rhetoric clearly involved the dialectic of 
opportunity and threat: immediate action was required to reap significant benefits, 
while inertia would mean missing out on potential competitive advantage vis-a-vis the 
US, Japan and other major players. It is worth noting that the EU IS policy until the 
early 1990s was written by industrialists and this was reflected in its techno-economic 
spirit (Antirroiko 2001).
The idea of the network was also central in this IS vision: new ICTs were expected to 
bring about monumental changes in political and personal life, challenging traditional 
hierarchical authorities and promoting decentralisation and interactivity. Furthermore, 
networks were considered instrumental in realising a distinctive European information 
society by strengthening European culture, producing more active and participating 
European citizens and respecting and protecting cultural diversity in a somewhat 
mechanistic way (Barry 2001).
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These proposals were followed in the action plan ‘Europe towards the information 
society’ designed by the Commission in July 1994. It contained four action lines: a) 
the adaptation of the regulatory framework for telecommunications to facilitate 
infrastructure liberalisation (54 actions); b) the promotion of network, basic services, 
applications and content (27 actions); c) the harnessing of the social and cultural 
impacts of the information society (5 actions); d) concrete activities to promote the 
information society (11 actions) (European Commission 1994b, Sancho 2002). The 
main target was the legal and regulatory framework, with emphasis on areas where 
the economic aspects were central: competition, standardisation, interoperability, 
tariffs, intellectual property rights, media ownership. The social and cultural 
dimensions included issues of the flexible firm, the language industries, or regional 
cooperation, i.e. considerations that were not significantly linked with social and 
cultural aspects. This plan was updated in the 1996 Rolling Action Plan, in which 
‘People at the Centre’ was a significant motto; in practice, the change was reduced to 
shifting actions from the regulatory and legal framework pillar to the ‘People at the 
Centre’ pillar (European Commission 1996), although these actions were really about 
creating the appropriate business environment (Berleur and Galand 2005). When 
applied, these plans were not attentive to stimulating demand for new applications and 
services and as a result policies promoting universal services, training and building 
infrastructures were not so pronounced (Jordana 2002).
The Bangemann report is considered very influential in framing the EU policy agenda 
for the information society as business-oriented and market-driven (Antirroiko 2001), 
excluding civil society forces (social movements, trade unions, academic institutions, 
professional associations) from participation in the formation of policy (Chadwick 
and May 2003). Despite the obvious relevance of the state in the implementation of 
certain dimensions of the vision (education and training programmes and prevention 
of new forces of exclusion and geographical disparities, or promotion of institutional 
changes for the adoption of ICTs), the role of the state was not stressed enough in this 
early vision; on the contrary, it was the market that was given a prominent position to 
drive the process. Furthermore, although citizens’ rights featured in the Bangemann 
document, citizens were often referred to as ‘consumers’, their rights were rights of 
choice in the consumption of products and services and their quality of life was 
synonymous with universal access to new commodities through new technologies.
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Other alternative voices operating in EU mechanisms (e.g. in the Directorate General 
for Science, Research and Development, DGXII) communicated at the time the idea 
of bringing the social and technological aspects of the EU project together. Members 
of the Commission emphasising diversity stressed the imperative to address socio­
cultural needs in technology policy: ‘The ideal of a common policy was not 
sufficiently sensitive to the fact that policies and instruments had to be adjusted, to 
take account of the diversity of different regions and actors, and their autonomy, and 
to value it’ (Barry 2001, p.98). These voices were, however, confronted by 
institutional and technological legacies in science and technology policy anchored in 
traditional ways of thinking and the celebration of advanced technology, technological 
innovation and competitiveness.
In parallel, and in response to the 1994 Action Plan, the Commission set up in May 
1995 a High-Level Expert Group so as to address the social aspects of the information 
society. 25 This group, which involved a number of prominent academics and experts 
in ICTs challenged the dogma of technological determinism and by April 1997 
prepared a report which approached technology as a social process, stressing its 
organisational, social and cultural embeddedness and moving away from the 
imperatives of deregulation that were ostensibly imposed by the dynamic 
technological properties of ICTs. The development of technological capabilities in 
Europe was highlighted, but it was seen as an endogenous process, ‘negotiated and 
mediated both within organisations and at the level of society at large’ which meant 
that policies ‘cannot and should not be limited to addressing the economic integration 
of technological change, but must include all aspects of its broader social integration’ 
(European Commission 1997, p.20). Simplistic adaptation to the imperatives of 
technology was rejected, while participation to the opportunities presented by 
technology and the shaping of the future was advocated.
The role of the public sector was defined as ‘the guardian of competition’; developing 
a proper regulatory framework was seen as a central element of the role of
25 The group was set up by Padraig Flynn, the then Commissioner for the Directorate General for 
Employment and Social Affairs.
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government and as a necessary economic imperative for the information society. 
Nevertheless, the prospect of limiting the involvement of the public sector to ‘an 
economic enabling function’ entailed ‘to grossly underestimate the role and 
importance of public agencies and services as information providers and processors’ 
(p.28). The public sector was taken to be one of the most important engines of growth 
in the European IS, a main point of differentiation from the US IS policy.
Further, the report stressed the ‘need for a clearly agreed common minimum social 
framework in Europe’ and warned that ‘failure to achieve agreement on a set of 
common minimum social policy standards will ultimately bring about the erosion of 
the various social welfare systems in Europe’ (p.52). The issue of regional cohesion 
was given prominence and universal access to telecommunications infrastructures 
featured as a central question, along with concerns that liberalisation would entail 
investment in commercial opportunities at the expense of regional and peripheral 
development. Finally, the report emphasised the challenge of achieving 
competitiveness on the basis of cultural, educational and social variety.
Another parallel initiative was the Information Society Forum, set up in 1995 and 
made up of 128 members from industry, public services, SMEs, academics, trade 
unionists, regional and city representatives, publishers, authors, film and TV 
producers, software and information service providers, telecommunications 
employees, members of EU institutions; half of them were nominated by the member 
states and the other were selected by the Commission. The purpose of the Forum was 
to provide to different social partners the opportunity to take part in the debate about 
the challenges towards the information society, including the societal aspects and to 
raise public awareness regarding these issues. It published three reports (1996, 1997, 
1999) and made recommendations regarding access, public administration and 
services, democracy and rights, European culture, job creation, teleworking, 
sustainable development and regulatory framework (Information Society Forum 
1996). Significantly, it proposed a distinctive European way, based on the search for 
balancing dynamically competing goals and concerns (Berleur and Galand 2005).
The Green Paper ‘Living and Working in the Information Society: People First’ was 
introduced by the Commission in 1996 so as to ‘promote wide discussion and
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awareness of the social and societal issues involved’ and contribute to the 
participation of a variety of actors in order to ‘come to terms with the new challenges 
and choices’ (European Commission 1996b, p.7). In the last section, the paper 
addressed the idea of a ‘European way’ to the information society: ‘The European 
social model is built both on competition between enterprises and solidarity between 
citizens and member states. The European information society must draw strongly 
from this economic, social and cultural strength, linking technological, economic and 
social aspects together in the creation of new opportunities for all its citizens’; finally, 
the invitation was extended to all interested parties ‘to reflect on the possibility of 
formulating a set of common Community principles for the development of the 
European information society’ (European Commission 1996b, p.32).
Nevertheless, despite these alternative, more socially conscious initiatives, the early 
debate over the information society in Europe was overall structured in terms of a 
series of discourses that privileged the economic at the expense of social and cultural 
factors, with resulting implications for the type of information society to be 
implemented. These derived from an institutional context that was not putting its 
emphasis on the social sustainability of the information society and should be seen as 
part of the overall character of the EU integration processes (Goodwin and Spittle 
2002).
4.2.2. Telecommunications liberalisation
The liberalisation of telecommunications was a very prominent feature in the 
Bangemann report, as it was considered instrumental in the evolution of the 
information society. Nicholas Gamham identifies a range of policy approaches that 
drove liberalisation, involving different economic models and different definitions of 
the problems at stake. Firstly, the view (held by both national governments and the 
European Commission) that network infrastructures and services were inadequate at 
the national level, together with the concern about the monopsonistic relationship 
between national telecoms operators and respective equipment suppliers and the 
fragmentation of the European equipment manufacturing industry, which was seen as 
the reason of US and Japanese domination in equipment. Secondly, the approach 
viewing telecoms networks as necessary infrastructure for business, resulting from
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pressures from the corporate sector, notably multinationals, for competitive (as 
opposed to monopolistic) supply of networks and services, and aiming at facilitating 
cross-border flows with harmonised regulation. Thirdly, the view regarding 
telecommunications as necessary for the development of the ICT sector. Fourthly, the 
EU view that the national nature of telecoms prevented the realisation of unification 
and efficiencies at a cross-national level. Fifthly, the perspective that emphasised 
telecoms as a vehicle for social and economic development, which subsequently gave 
rise to the information society vision with telecoms as the infrastructure of the 
knowledge-based society (Gamham 2004).
In addition, two techno-economic trends also played a major role: firstly, the growth 
of multinational corporations, which generated demand for global telecommunication 
services (which the existing national monopolies could not meet); secondly, 
technological convergence between telecommunications and computing (and 
corresponding industries), which led to low costs and removed the barriers to entry in 
the telecoms market (Schneider 2002).
The above perspectives and developments informed the actions of a network of 
mainly business actors who set out to effect changes on the existing regulatory 
frameworks. National governments used the European directives to build coalitions to 
change their national telecommunication arrangements and the role of the state in 
them (Jordana 2002). Private initiatives were seen as a central source of 
communication infrastructure funding.
The period from the mid-1990s indeed witnessed a decline in state ownership and a 
shift in the role of the state in ICT policy through the liberalisation of traditionally 
state-protected national telecommunication sectors under continuous pressures from 
the private sector (the main driver behind ICT diffusion in Europe), as well as from 
European Community authorities, during cycles of negotiation and strong contestation. 
The role of broader international organisations, notably the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), was also instrumental. In the 1997 WTO negotiations on basic 
telecommunications, the European Community committed to complete liberalisation 
of basic telecom services (local, long-distance and international), as well as all mobile
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communications and satellite networks and services, across the Community with a 
few exceptions (mainly voice telephony in south Europe).
These liberalisation, deregulation, and privatisation processes in Europe were placed 
in a framework of neoliberal thinking emphasising the inadequacy of the public sector 
to deal with new technological necessities and the need to introduce competition and 
let the market forces operate under independent regulatory authorities. The relevant 
policies were legitimised by use of the neo-classical model according to which 
deregulation and re-regulation should facilitate market entry and price competition 
would increase consumer welfare. They were also informed by the Hayekian model, of 
the market as a mechanism guiding choices (through prices) in circumstances of 
uncertainty and more significantly by the Schumpeterian competition model, which 
placed innovation at the centre of profit and monopoly rents (Gamham 2004).
4.2.3. The Lisbon Strategy and the eEurope initiatives
The EU Lisbon summit in March 2000 can be seen as a turning point, in the sense that 
it placed the information society and the knowledge-based economy high on the 
European agenda. It emphasised that Europe faced the challenges of a transition to a 
knowledge society and the need to set up a competitive platform, but also stressed the 
need to sustain the European social model, maintaining social cohesion and cultural 
diversity. According to the conclusions of the summit, the Union sought ‘to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ 
(Council of the European Union 2000). Economic development remained at the centre 
of IS policy, the promotion of the information society being one of the key vehicles 
for achieving the economic development goals set in Lisbon until 2010 (Alabau 2004). 
The challenge has been ‘to be able to catch up with the US and Japan in areas 
concerning the knowledge society, as well as to reconcile the economic and social 
logics in new forms of economic competitiveness and social justice’ (Telo 2002, 
p.257).
The Lisbon strategy has aimed to achieve deeper economic and societal convergence 
in Europe, beyond the monetary criteria of the European Monetary Union. A new
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open method of inter-state coordination for the acceleration of the translation of 
European goals into national policies has been adopted: ‘This method combines 
European coherence and respect for national diversity. It defines the required 
European guidelines in each policy domain, subsequently identifying best practices 
and reference indicators and, finally, materialising in national plans consisting of 
concrete targets and measures fitting each nation’s case. Its purpose is to set up a vast 
process of innovation, learning and emulation between European countries, in which 
the European Commission may play a new role as catalyst’ (Rodrigues 2003, pp. 18- 
19). Although diversity is promoted, the concept of coordination is seen as stricter 
than previous arrangements which were based on inter-state cooperation.
The open method operates on the principle of subsidiarity, established during the 
Maastricht Treaty, according to which the European bodies should engage only with 
projects that could be carried out by the member states acting alone. To many this is a 
state-centric view emphasising the centrality of the nation-state in the European 
system. A decentralised approach in policy implementation has been adopted, 
involving actively the member states, the regional and local actors, as well as social 
partners and civil society and NGOs in various forms of partnerships. Developing new
modes of governance based on social partnerships and not only on market forces is
0  ( \seen also as a departure from previous policy. The Commission has been assigned 
multiple important roles, namely expertise and consultancy, but also preparation and 
periodical examination of national policies, as well as proposals of recommendations 
to the Council and to the member states. Overall, a culture of evaluation and exchange 
of best practices has established itself in the EU (Telo 2002).
The open method has been applied to a number of policy domains, including 
information society policies in the context of the ‘eEurope 2002: An Information 
Society for All’ initiative, launched in December 1999 by the new Directorate General 
‘Information Society’, directed by Erkki Liikanen. The eEurope initiative purported to
26 The method is called ‘open’ because: a) European guidelines can be adapted to the national level; b) 
best practices should be evaluated and adapted to the national and local context; c) there is a distinction 
between reference indicators set up at the European level and concrete targets set by each member state 
for each indicator, in accordance with their point of departure; d) monitoring and evaluation takes the 
national context into consideration; e) the development of the method is open to the participation of 
civil society actors (national, subnational, supranational or transnational) (Telo 2002).
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promote an information society with specific European values and principles; its 
objectives were a) to bring every individual, household, enterprise and administration 
into the digital age; b) to create a digitally literate Europe with an entrepreneurial 
culture; c) to ensure social inclusion and social cohesion and build consumer trust 
(Berleur and Galand 2005). The social aspects were incorporated to achieve critical 
mass for consumption and eGovemment: ‘European citizens are usually referred to as 
workers who should learn new skills and become more efficient in their work, or 
consumers or service users fulfilling their duties in consuming multimedia products 
and using electronic services effectively, thus creating critical mass for market-driven 
policy development’ (Antirroiko 2001, p.33).
The initial document was written by three executives of the new Directorate General 
and set out ten priority areas for joint action by the Commission, the member states, 
industry and citizens. These can be compared to the ten applications of the 
Bangemann Report and included:
1) Bringing the Internet and multimedia to schools
2) Increasing competition to reduce prices and increase consumer choice
3) Advancing the necessary legal framework and expand the use of e-commerce
4) Ensuring high-speed Internet access
5) Facilitating the establishment of a European-wide infrastructure
6) Promoting the availability of risk capital for high-tech SMEs
7) Address the needs of the disabled in the information society
8) Maximising the use of ICTs for health monitoring, information access and care
9) Establishing safer and more efficient transport
10) Ensuring online citizen access to government information, services and decision­
making processes (European Commission 2002).
After the Lisbon summit and the informal ministerial conference on the Information 
and Knowledge Society a month later, the eEurope priorities were clustered around 
three main aims: a cheaper, faster and secure Internet; b) investment in people and 
skills; c) stimulation of the deployment of the Internet. An Action Plan was prepared 
afterwards by the Commission and was endorsed at the Feira Summit in June 2000, 
setting specific targets to be reached by specific deadlines by the public
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administration and the private sector in member states. The objectives of the original 
eEurope document were superficially modified and acquired the e-prefix: eWorking, 
eLearning and so on. The actors for each action line were identified, the time frame 
was set to 2002 (eEurope 2002) and the resulting document was more concrete; a list 
of indicators was defined to assess the impact of the initiative. In order to achieve the 
goals, three methods were adopted: building a legislative framework, supporting 
selected new services and infrastructures, and benchmarking state performances.
The final evaluation of eEurope 2002 took place in February 2003, with high points 
the increasing Internet connectivity (of individuals, schools and businesses), the 
establishment of the fastest research network in the world (GEANT) and the 
availability of basic eGovemment services in the member states; weak points were 
considered the access gaps between member states and between social groups, the 
limited used of ICTs by SMEs and the limited digital literacy (Berleur and Galand
2005).
At the end of May 2002, the European Commission released a Communication 
entitled, 'eEurope 2005: An Information Society for AH'. This initiative aimed at 
providing favourable conditions for private investment, job creation, increased 
productivity, modernised public services, as well as circumstances for inclusion of 
firms and citizens in the global information society. In order to achieve this, the plan 
included two groups of actions: firstly, to stimulate Internet services, applications and 
content so that by 2005 Europe had modem online public services (e-govemment, e- 
leaming, e-health), as well as a dynamic e-business environment; secondly, to enable 
these by improving the underlying infrastructure through the promotion of broadband 
access at competitive prices and a secure information infrastructure and increased 
awareness of security matters. The eEurope 2005 action plan also stressed the need to 
promote ICT skills and ICT-based opportunities, something that has been termed ‘e- 
inclusion’ (European Commission 2002).
To achieve these goals the plan outlined four main tools:
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a) Policy measures: to review and adapt legislation, to strengthen competition and 
interoperability, to improve access to a variety of networks and to demonstrate 
political leadership.
b) Exchange of experience, of good practices and demonstration projects to promote 
leading edge applications and infrastructure.
c) Monitoring and benchmarking instruments for comparing the performance of each 
country against the best practices observed across the EU.
d) Co-ordination of existing policies to ensure satisfactory information exchange 
between national and European policy makers and the private sector (European 
Commission 2002)
As in 1993 the EU proposals aimed at pushing liberalisation and the introduction of 
competition in telecommunications so as to promote economic development, in an 
analogous way the eEurope plans assumed that the development of the information 
society would boost the telecommunications industry, not least with the development 
of broadband infrastructures: ‘It is worth recalling again that the European Union 
Policy for the Information Society has been and continues to be an instrument with 
multiple goals, in particular economic development and development of the 
telecommunications sector’ (Alabau 2004, p.32).
More recently, the European Commission adopted the i2010 strategy, which intends 
to bring about the necessary regulatory framework for the promotion of ICTs, as well 
as boosting innovation and development. More specifically, it aims at promoting a 
borderless information area and an open and competitive internal market for 
electronic communication and digital services, stimulating innovation and investment 
in R&D in order to improve competitiveness, as well as deployment of ICTs, and 
achieving an inclusive European information society with better public services and 
quality of life. The strategy places great emphasis on public/private partnerships for 
innovation in ICTs (European Commission 2005).
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4.2.4. Discussion
Despite the apparent enthusiasm at the EU level regarding the realisation of an 
information society in Europe, sceptical voices have expressed concern on a number 
of levels. Gamham, one of the most vehement critics, analyses the evolution of EU 
policy from liberalisation, to convergence and eventually to information society, 
progressing ‘from aims of shaping a competitive telecommunications market to 
bringing into existence a new social order, or at least a new economic order’ 
(Gamham 2004, p.7), namely the Lisbon goal of making Europe the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-based economy. Gamham attacks what he calls ‘the 
consensual vision’ of the development of the European information society and 
knowledge-based economy which will bring social and economic benefits to all: ‘the 
model or concept of the Information Society is at present the dominant way of 
thinking among academics but also within the corporate and political areas .... It is a 
model now widely mobilised not just to understand the world but also to change it’ 
(Gamham 2001b, p.l). Likewise, for Duff ‘information society policy’ is a term 
‘which is being used as an astute political device for pushing through far-reaching 
policies covering the whole societal range of economy, culture and polity’ (Duff 2004,
p.80).
Overall, Gamham sees the EU information society policy as a label for the 
continuation of the largely failed earlier telecoms industrial policy and as a 
legitimation of the EU budgets involved. In his opinion, the problems that the 
information society policies have purported to solve and their relative importance 
have been far from clear, directed by different interests, different definitions of the 
problem, ill-selected economic models, methods and theories deployed, the result 
being a set of conflicting and contradictory policies. He identifies certain points of 
contention. Firstly, the deployment of competitiveness vis-a-vis the US (and Japan) as 
the primary rationale behind the development of the overall policy, which he sees as 
problematic both in terms of measurement and in terms of antagonism in the 
international arena. Secondly, the centrality of entrepreneurial innovation in the policy 
rhetoric and the fluctuation of policy between the need to promote innovation in 
networks and services and the need to advance consumer welfare, which leads to 
contradictory regulatory structures. Thirdly, the reification of information and
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knowledge as a vehicle for productivity, quality of services and market growth, 
something that is controversial (more information might simply express increased 
overheads); this he sees as an inflection from the original theory of the post-industrial 
society (Bell 1973), the latter placing emphasis on human capital as the key source of 
growth in the service economy (Gamham 2004).
Likewise, Golding sees information society policy at the European level as an 
expression of the ‘obsession to see off competition against Japan and the United 
States, but with a wholly contradictory double focus on, on the one hand, the need to 
protect and foster a presumed European culture and, on the other, the need to enhance 
European industrial and economic progress in the ICT sector’. His realisation is that, 
eventually, the latter goal predominates, ‘as the emergence of the information society 
is embodied in the imposition of commercial need and corporate strategy onto the 
remnants of cultural and social policy in the communications field’ (Golding 2000, 
p. 170). Golding concludes that EU policy is informed by the US economic libertarian 
rhetoric, according to which private ownership is celebrated and ICT evolution is 
coupled with the expansion of the free market.
Overall, the EU information society policy has been mostly market-driven, with 
emphasis on the economy and competitiveness and limited appreciation of the non­
economic aspects (as illustrated by the under-representation of social indicators) 
(Martin 2005). The regulatory frameworks established have aimed mostly to protect 
investors (providers of products and services). It has been claimed that the 1993 
White Paper was instrumental in the direction of the information society in Europe, 
the reason being that it identified regulation and protection of the labour market as the 
cause of Europe’s limited competitiveness and pointed towards the direction of 
liberalisation that dominated the agenda afterwards. Alternative approaches, including 
the ‘people at the centre’ rhetoric, seem to have become linguistic exercises, rather 
than substantial policies.
Moreover, although the European model of the information society with social 
cohesion and cultural distinctiveness was often invoked in the eEurope context, the 
actual indicators chosen for benchmarking, as well as and expressions such as ‘critical 
mass’, revealed a mechanistic emphasis on the quantitative, rather than a concern
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about genuine societal aspects and changes. It seems that the dominant approach 
(communicated throughout by the Commission) has not been significantly challenged, 
although national and other influences should not be disregarded. The eEurope plans 
were linked with the Lisbon agenda, rather than initiating a democratic and citizen- or 
society-based strategy (Berleur and Galand 2005). Although the techno-economic 
approach includes expressions such as ‘participation’ and ‘democracy’, Europeans are 
seen mostly as consumers and Europe seems to be falling behind in democratic 
governance (Antirroiko 2001).
The i2010 continues the previous EU policies based on the Lisbon agenda and the 
eEurope initiatives. Significantly, it has been based on narrowly conceptualised 
documents and has been overall seen as an opportunistic mechanism for co-opting and 
budgeting. It also reveals the continuing influence of various industrial stakeholders 
(telecoms, IT, service providers), whose business plans have provided the background 
for a narrow contextualisation of the strategy.
The emphasis on the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector in the 1990s 
resulted in other issues being overlooked. An explanation for this is that as IS 
discourses and policies in the 1990s operated in a background of restructuring of the 
telecommunications landscape, the Commission and the other main actors (in most 
cases networks of public telecoms operators and related industrial groups) were 
mostly concerned to reposition themselves in the new arrangements. It was only 
around the end of the 1990s that a policy network of public and private actors more 
directly involved in IS emerged and promoted the fostering of the information society 
in the EU (Jordana 2002).
Overall, ‘The European Commission’s position in the area of Telecommunications 
and the Information Society has been ... ambivalent, naturally to the detriment of the 
Information Society. We must confess that we have never been clear on whether the 
Information Society development policy has an end in itself or whether it has 
primarily been considered a means to spur the development of telecommunications, 
fill networks with content and thus contribute to the consolidation of this sector that 
was just becoming open to competition. Indeed, the fact that both responsibilities are
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in the same Directorate-General and under the authority of the same Commissioner 
has only served to favour this’ (Alabau 2004, p.64).
In broader terms, the information society EU policy has been compatible with the 
overall market-driven approach to the European project, which has consistently 
sought economic rather than political integration (Bourdieu 2003). The debate around 
the information society in Europe has been structured in terms of a series of 
discourses that guide the EU project at large, which are taken to be of neoliberal 
orientation and privilege the economic at the expense of social and cultural factors, 
with resulting implications for the type of information society that will be achieved 
(Goodwin and Spittle 2002). What remains to be seen is the extent to which the 
dominant information society vision has been qualified in national strategies and has 
been challenged by national outcomes.
4.3. From the EU to the national context
In the case of telecommunications, for many there has been a Europeanisation of 
policy which has exerted pressures on national actors and has resulted in similar 
telecommunication landscapes (Schneider 2002). For others, however, member states 
have applied European directives in accordance with their own national goals and 
policy objectives and national circumstances, although the resulting 
telecommunication markets bear similar characteristics. The establishment of new 
regulatory authorities to regulate prices and interconnection charges and to promote 
competition, for instance, has been a common element; however, their different 
methods indicate that they have had varying influence in different national markets, 
an element of variation (Cave 2002). This is the reason why many analysts argue that 
national governments have retained considerable scope for manoeuvre (Thatcher 
2002), including the process through which the former public telecommunication 
operator has been privatised, the form of the regulatory authorities, and other 
regulatory instruments (Jordana 2002).
Regarding the time-frame of changes, in particular, there have been different 
experiences between west Europe and southern Europe, where reservations about 
privatisation were higher, not least because of different institutional and statist
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traditions. The recent democratisation and processes of economic modernisation in 
these countries created tensions that often contributed to different paths to 
telecommunication liberalisation, though not necessarily different overall outcomes 
(e.g. the case of the public telecommunications operator OTE in the Greek context to 
be discussed in chapter 5). Importantly, there seems to have been a correlation 
between the readiness of liberalisation of the national market and the subsequent 
adoption of IS policies, a dimension that is also revealing of national variations 
(Alabau 2002).
It is also true that the information society has been attractive to national and local 
policymakers who have seen it as an opportunity for economic and social 
development. Expectations have included the potential for local businesses and 
populations to enter new markets and have access to new sources of information and 
new services, improve access to education and health care in peripheral regions, and 
reduce social disparities and social isolation (Gibbs 2001).
The EU information society programmes, particularly after the Prodi Commission 
eEurope initiative of 1999, have indeed mobilised the formulation and introduction of 
strategic national programmes in almost all the member states (including the new 
Accession countries). These have included collaboration between business and society, 
as well as across different governmental departments (Jordana 2002). The EU sixth 
Framework Programme, with its Information Society Technologies programme 
(budget around 4 billion Euros) was devoted to the implementation of the eEurope 
Action Plan, with larger emphasis on social aspects (e.g. social cohesion). Moreover, 
the development of a complete legislative/regulatory framework (including EU 
directives on access, authorisation, privacy, universal service and others) has ensured 
the smooth transportation of policies across the different member states (Berleur and 
Galand 2005).
As a result, recently there have been certain degrees of convergence with regard to the 
tone and content of the information society policies adopted, more or less reflecting 
the common eEurope objectives and priorities; this suggests that structures at a 
supranational level (mainly the EU, but indirectly political forces and ideologies 
going beyond the EU level, e.g. the WTO General Agreement on Trade and Services)
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have influenced significantly national policy directions regarding the information 
society. In parallel, the expansion of European professionals exchanging national 
examples and best practices has led to adoption, avoidance or modification of certain 
policies in accordance with the international experience.
Placed under the open method of coordination, the eEurope initiatives have been 
operating under state consensus, i.e. acceptance on the part of the member states of 
the political commitment to implement it, in cooperation with other states, the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, the private sector and other actors, 
according to predetermined schedules and national priorities (Sancho 2002; 
Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004). For many, the open method has established a 
reinforced and flexible role for the national government, which can now function 
through intervention, regulation, enforcement, or as facilitator in new and indirect 
ways in the context of EU governance arrangements involving national, subnational 
and transnational entities. For others, it is a liberal form of rule which structures, 
shapes and evaluates states strategies (Haahr 2004). Indeed, the Lisbon agenda has 
called for a double transformation of the state: firstly, governmental actors are 
expected to work with one another in common institutions and operate in a framework 
of reciprocal learning (and be judged in the process), with a view to greater 
convergence and interpenetration of governments and public administrations; 
secondly, states are expected to reorganise internally and achieve greater strategic 
coordination between their various ministries (Telo 2002).
Still, the implementation of policies rests with the authority and power of the member 
states. Hay and Rosamond (2002) speak of the ‘distinctiveness of the strategic 
contexts within which rhetorics of globalisation and European integration are 
deployed’ (p. 163). Generally speaking, differentiations in the information society are 
expected, owing to the degree of economic development, the aspirations of different 
actors involved and the perceptions of the population, the politics, tensions and 
conflicts involved in the implementation, as well as the overall interaction between 
market demands and public policies. Moreover, similar frameworks might lead to 
different translations according to the different state/society traditions in different 
member states of the EU (Perrons 2004).
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4.4. The evolution of information society policy in Greece
4.4.1. Early visions and initiatives
The seeds of an Greek information society agenda in the making can be said to have 
firstly emerged in the 1980s, when the so-called ‘Mediterranean Integrated 
Programmes’ (1983-1993) were at the time the tool for IT funding. In this context, 25 
billion drachmas were invested with the intention of ‘jumping on’ the IT bandwagon.
During this period, mainly universities and research centres but also to some extent 
the public sector, as well as SMEs became aware of the new technologies. 
Nevertheless, the narrow conception of most projects as simply procurement of 
hardware equipment and the overlooking of software applications and of educational 
needs led to many failures or in any case unsatisfactory outcomes. At the same time, it 
has been claimed that this short-sighted attitude vis-a-vis the new technologies 
formulated at this early stage the dynamics of the IT sector mainly towards assembly 
or retail activities, which in retrospect has been regarded as a missed opportunity in 
terms of the potential of software development in Greece. Having said that, the 
initiatives succeeded in introducing IT in key public sectors, namely education, 
transport, utilities, as well as the stock market and private firms (Papakonstantinou
2005).
4.4.2. Modernisation, Europeanisation and public sector reform in the 1990s
If the imperative of the 1980s in Greece was “democratisation” and the anticipation of 
a more democratic operation of the public administration under the new PASOK 
government, the 1990s were characterised by a rhetoric (and practice) of public sector 
reform in economic terms.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 1990s have been dominated by the modernisation 
project of C. Simitis, who served as leader of PASOK and Prime Minister in the 
period 1996-2004). Simitis promoted a departure from the previous periods of 
PASOK governance (1981-1989 and 1993-1996) which had sought to incorporate the 
segments of the Greek population that had been excluded in the aftermath of the Civil
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War, had followed redistributive policies, but had also been held responsible for 
augmenting public deficits.
Modernisation is of course a very contentious term and one with varying uses and 
meanings. In Greece, the term has since at least the 1980s become a focal point of
97discussions of theorists of centre-left orientation. The general criticism of the 
discourses of modernisation is that there has been in them an attempt to locate in the 
Greek social formation a modernisation deficit that is overstressed and an imperative 
need to overcome it so that Greece evolves as a national society. A first problem is 
that Greece is seen as a deviation from a ideal-typical model with which it should 
converge. A second problem is that there seems to be confusion between the
27 According to Charalambis, for instance, modernisation is taken to mean the capacity to organise a 
(capitalist/labour) contractual consensus according to rationalist rules within a structured and 
institutionalised political system (Charalambis 1990). The criticism o f this position has been that the 
aspired rationalism is one that serves the imperatives of the capitalist system concealing social tensions 
and that a pure rationalist state of affairs is an imaginative construction that underestimates the 
complexity of social and economic life (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004).
From another angle, Tsoukalas argues that certain dimensions in the Greek social formation have 
constituted deviations from an ideal-type of a capitalist system, namely the initial formation of the 
Greek bourgeoisie abroad (during the Ottoman rule), the overwhelming presence of the state and the 
ambiguous social and class identity of individuals, which has prevented the formation of clear-cut 
social classes and social practices. A central position of Tsoukalas is that there is an underdevelopment 
of collective rational practices, i.e. of collective values and state practices and a parallel development of 
individualistic practices targeting state mechanisms for individual gains, a reality which makes 
modernisation hard to succeed (Tsoukalas 1993). Tsoukalas proposes the restoration of objective 
capitalist rationalities similar to those encountered in western Europe and paradoxically, claims that 
this is a prerequisite for a subsequent articulation of an anti-capitalist agenda.
In not dissimilar terms, Mouzelis argues that it is in the interests of the working class to follow the 
capitalist restructuring taking place internationally. He also identifies a reality o f incomplete capitalism 
in Greece, perpetuated by trade union practices which obstruct capitalist imperatives (Mouzelis 1978). 
Criticism of these positions has claimed firstly that the logic underpinning the argument of Tsoukalas 
and Mouzelis is one which believes in ideal-types of historical evolution and treats deviations as 
examples of failure or incompleteness (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004).
Panagiotopoulou also speaks of a ‘capitalist rationality deficit’ in Greek society, which emanates from 
the fact that due to the strong presence of the family the individual cannot successfully become the 
bearer of individual rights; as a result, there is a lack of objective values and formal and always 
applicable rules guiding individual and collective action. On the contrary, rules are used ad hoc to serve 
temporary individual interests, a fact which on a large scale impedes long-term strategic goals, as well 
as generating distrust against institutions and politics (Panagiotopoulou 1996).
From a different perspective, Diamandouros (2000) argues that Greece has been characterised by a 
clash between two cultures. An ‘underdog political culture’, expressed by low middle class, working 
class and agricultural segments of the population, advocates state protectionism and redistributive 
rather than productive mechanisms, and adopts usually a logic of individual appropriation vis-^-vis 
social benefits. On the opposite side, a culture of modernisation believes in the operation of market 
principles and a strategic role for the state to increase competitiveness.
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antiquated or traditional and the modem, with certain modem institutions, such as the 
welfare state, being seen as obsolete. The traditional/modem schema seems overall to 
be an oversimplification of more complex structures, ideologies and practices. A 
further problem is that the particular modernisation advocated has targeted the low- 
income strata of the population who bear the sacrifice of the need to modernise and 
rationalise (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004).
Simitis has himself written extensively (since the early 1990s) on the issue of 
modernisation, which he subsequently pursued as a political project. To him 
modernisation involves overcoming both populism and corporatism, going beyond the 
logic of protectionism and pursuing competitiveness with a new role for the state and 
the introduction of independent state mechanisms, rationalising welfare structures, 
departing from the logic of universal access and leaning towards means-tested 
benefits. Breaking with previous ideological tenets of his party (PASOK), he has 
presented participation in international political and economic processes (notably the 
Eurozone) as a national imperative for Greece under conditions of globalisation. In 
this respect, modernisation is defined as the possibility of progressive democratic 
governance with (at least some) social protection in an international environment 
posing a set of inescapable and deterministic conditions (Simitis 1995, 2005; 
Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2004).
Building on the modernisation doctrine, a number of reforms were attempted in the 
economy and the public sector in the 1990s. Privatisation policies were pursued, 
notably in the banking sector. Public corporations, which had been functioning as 
units of absorption of labour, appointed through patronage relations in exchange for 
votes and political capital were included in the debate about introducing more rational 
operation using private sector criteria and providing services of higher quality at 
lower cost. As a result, state intervention was reduced to some extent, while more 
rational, new public management criteria were introduced, e.g. regarding recruitment 
and assessment. Nonetheless, government control remained in most public 
corporations. Such reforms involved a number of social partners, including executives 
of the firms in question, employees and trade unions, governments and political 
parties, external consultants, suppliers and the general public. And they often yielded 
less than satisfactory results, due to lack of leadership and political initiative,
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inflexible operating legal frameworks, unsatisfactory proposals, conflictual positions, 
as well as inadequate social support (Papoulias and Tsoukas 1998).
Decentralisation reforms, informed by the rhetoric of a ‘lean’ state contributed to a 
redistribution of power between central and local government, with second-tier 
(prefecture) local government replacing the prefects (which were politically appointed 
by central government), as well as the compulsory merger at the first-tier of local 
government (municipalities), which used to be fragmented and powerless. Further, a 
number of independent authorities were created, including the Ombudsman (1997), 
the National Broadcasting Council (1989) and the Independent Authority for the 
Selection of Personnel (1994). Other authorities were created to regulate the 
liberalised utilities markets (energy, telecommunications). These were the result of 
the implementation of EU policies, were informed by the new public management 
doctrine and were seen as a solution to bureaucratic problems. Significantly, these 
authorities have not attacked the Greek bureaucracy, but have rather operated in 
parallel, with more flexibility, autonomy, resources and modem management methods 
(Spanou 2008).
4.4.3. Liberalisation of telecommunications
Under these circumstances, the main development related to ICTs in the 1990s in 
Greece (as in most EU countries) and the first major step towards the implementation 
of the information society was the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector. 
Until the late 1980s the telecommunication sector had been based on a state monopoly 
in the provision of telephone and telecommunication services. In the wake of the early 
EU information society documents, where ICTs were articulated as providing new 
opportunities for growth and investment, as well as the general realisation of the poor 
performance of the public telecommunication operator (OTE), the Greek governments 
engaged in the gradual liberalisation of the sector.
The deregulation of value-added services and mobile telephony services was enacted 
by Law 1892 in 1990. Subsequently, Law 2075 of 1992 served as a framework for the 
partial opening of the market, since it determined the provision of mobile telephone 
services by private operators (OTE was excluded). Following a public tender, two
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mobile telephony licenses were granted to STET Hellas S.A. and to Panafon S.A. Law 
2075/92 also established the Hellenic Telecommunications Commission (EET), an 
independent regulatory authority intended to supervise and regulate the liberalised 
telecommunications market (which started operating in the summer of 1995).
In 1994, Law 2246/94 replaced Law 2075/92 and initiated the liberalisation of all 
telecommunication services, apart from voice telephony and provision of the 
telecommunication infrastructure, both of which remained with OTE.28 Furthermore, 
this law enacted the full liberalisation of mobile telephony, allowing OTE to compete
90as well , while it also determined the responsibilities of the ministry of transport and 
communications (OECD 2001).
Since the adoption of Law 2668/98, providing for the organisation and operation of 
the postal services sector, EET was also allocated the supervision and regulation of 
the postal services market and was renamed Hellenic Telecommunications & Post 
Commission (EETT). EETT is an independent and self-funded institution aiming at 
promoting the development of the two sectors, safeguarding competition in the 
relevant markets and protecting the interests of the end users.
Subsequently, a new telecoms Law (2860/2000), replacing Law 2246 was passed by 
the Greek Parliament in December 2000. This new Law had five objectives: a) to 
protect the consumer b) to safeguard competition c) to safeguard personal information 
d) to ensure provision of universal service e) to ensure the growth of 
telecommunications (OECD 2001). EETT's supervising and regulatory role was 
further enforced by Law 2867/2000.
28 While the EU deadline for full liberalisation in the provision o f voice telephony and the associated 
network infrastructure was 1 January 1998, in 1996 the Greek government together with OTE 
requested an extension until 1 January 2003 on the basis of the need of OTE to complete its 
modernisation programme. This request can be seen in the national modernisation policies mentioned 
above. An extension was granted until 31 December 2000; after that date all restrictions on the 
provision of voice telephony and the network infrastructure were removed.
29 OTE indeed entered the mobile telephony market in April 1998 with its subsidiary company 
COSMOTE.
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4.4.4. The 1995 White Paper
The first policy document regarding the information society in Greece was a White 
Paper titled ‘The Greek Strategy for an Information Society: A Tool for Employment, 
Development and Quality of Life’ (1995), which was presented in 1995 by the then 
Minister for Industry, Research and Technology (Simitis himself at the time) and 
raised four goals to be pursued within the following 10-15 years. Specifically:
a) to limit the gap between Greece and the other EU countries in the use of advanced 
ICT infrastructure within 10 years
b) to ensure that a considerable proportion of Greek firms would have access to 
markets associated with the information infrastructure within 15 years
c) to ensure that family units increasingly have access to the information 
infrastructure within 15 years
d) to see that the greatest part of transactions with the state be carried out 
electronically within the following 15 years (Hellenic Republic 1995).
This first document served as a means of setting the information society agenda in the 
Greek context. It echoed the discourse of opportunity associated with the new 
technology, as well as the dangers of being left behind, and it presented the whole 
issue as a great challenge for Greece.
The 1995 White Paper was mainly concerned with the inadequate national 
infrastructure, which limited electronic transactions and access to new products and 
services both for firms and for households in comparison with the other EU countries. 
In this respect, it was mainly orientated towards limiting the technological gap, rather 
than being preoccupied with elaborating the social and cultural implications of the 
information society (Constantelou 2001). A number of actions were proposed to 
pursue these goals, namely the development of a national infrastructure backbone, the 
establishment of a parliamentary committee to deal with the information society, the 
development of information networks for firms, the introduction of electronic 
transactions in public administration.
Most of the actions were funded by the 2nd Community Support Framework (CSF). 
The operational programme Kleisthenis (1994-2000) run by the Ministry of Interiors,
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Public Administration and Decentralisation and with a total budget of 100 billion 
drachmas was the main information society initiative. The central aim of the 
programme was the modernisation of public administration (both in terms of hardware 
procurement and regarding services and training of employees), under the auspices of 
the Ministry of Interiors, Public Administration and Decentralisation and that of 
Economics. The programme adopted an integrated approach to IT, including 
development of infrastructures, applications and training in the design and 
implementation of each separate project. In the case of large projects, project 
management was supported by large consultancy firms. Information systems for 
municipalities, fiscal administration (the TAXIS project), the stock market, customs, 
as well as training of public administrators were some of the basic initiatives.
In parallel, the digitisation of the OTE network, something that had been on the 
agenda since 1977 and had been finally decided in 1990, the development of certain 
fibre optic rings and the creation of the national network for research and technology 
EDET were important initiatives at the level of telecommunications infrastructure. 
During this period a small number of IT firms of significant size developed, the IT 
sector was consolidated and entered the Athens stock market in the end of the 1990s 
(Papakonstantinou 2005). Overall, it is important to note that there was early on a 
recognised need to introduce IT in the public sector, though some aspects of it were 
overambitious at the time (e.g. the prospect of manufacturing hardware in Greece).
4.4.5. The 1999 White Paper
In April 1999, with Simitis as prime minister, a second White Paper was prepared by 
a group comprising ten academics, policy experts, experts from the private sector and 
public administrators, some of whom had been involved in the operational programme
30 EDET is a national infrastructure linking universities, technological institutes and public research 
institutes, which involves knowledgeable university groups and is supported by the General Secretariat 
of Research and Technology of the Ministry of Industry, Research and Technology. EDET is also the 
relevant SA, with the Greek state as its sole shareholder, having as a mission the provision of fast 
Internet to the Greek academic and research community, as well as the promotion of ICTs in Greek 
society and in SMEs in particular. It comprises a department that manages e-business projects 
(provision and development of services for electronic business activity) and a second department that 
deals with research and development of infrastructures. It takes part in European projects, with a 
particular emphasis on the Balkans and southeastern Europe (SS 2005).
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Kleisthenis , based on international experience and feedback from the ministries 
regarding the actions and steps that had been taken vis-a-vis the information society. 
This was more strategic and comprehensive and was titled Greece in the Information 
Society: Strategy and Actions. It declared the following:
‘Information and telecommunication technologies change rapidly the way we work, 
play, communicate, and transform the bases of economic competition. They constitute 
a tool for the modernisation of the state and the competitiveness of enterprises, while 
creating new ways of work, new skills, and the need for continuing learning and 
adaptation of the education system. At the same time they allow the provision of 
better health, welfare, and environmental services, and contribute to the promotion of 
our cultural heritage and the Greek language. The government’s concern is to ensure 
that the emerging Information Society will be a society for all, without discrimination 
between information haves and have-nots, and while safeguarding citizens’ rights and 
the freedom of expression and information. The overall government strategy for the 
Information Society is based on some basic principles: equal opportunities and access 
for all, the creation of an environment that is conducive to entrepreneurship and 
innovation, and safeguarding of personal freedoms and of the operation of democratic 
institutions’ (Hellenic Republic 1999, p.5).
From the outset, the rhetoric celebrating the potential of ICTs for competitiveness and 
better public services, present in the early EU documents, was prominent, together 
with the requirement of building human skills to take advantage of these opportunities. 
The imperative of universal access and the prevention of new types of social 
exclusion, reminiscent of similar concerns in EU documents, were also emphasised. 
In parallel, a particular character of the Greek information society was envisaged, one 
involving the promotion of Greek culture and language.
31 The Kleisthenis experience fed the 1999 White Paper. For instance, a report about processes in the 
public sector that demanded interoperability and cooperation informed a survey, through which the 
sources of information that could be digitised in an interoperable way were identified and incorporated 
in the White Paper. As the president of the programme recalled, an important fact was that the then 
Finance Minister was interested ,in the experiment, though he did not understand the technology (SP 
2006).
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The requirement to adapt to new imperatives by advancing regulatory reform and 
broad institutional changes was time and again stressed in the White Paper: ‘The 
changes that technology brings with it put to the test the adequacy of existing laws 
and impose their re-orientation from the institutions of the industrial society to those 
of the Information Society’ (ibid., p.7). Again, the rhetoric of radical, qualitative shift 
to a new epoch reminded of the deterministic tone of the early EU documents, as well 
as the inadequacies of existing institutions to accommodate these transformative 
effects of new technologies. However, new technologies were also referred to as a 
‘tool’ to achieve certain objectives.
The information society was defined in a way to highlight the potential benefits for 
Greece:
a) in terms of transparency and democracy, which presented opportunities for 
modernisation of the public administration
b) in terms of the increasing reliance of the economy on the generation, distribution 
and use of knowledge and information, something that provided opportunities for 
equal participation in the global marketplace for smaller countries
c) in terms of new types of employment, new skills, flexible employment structures, 
lifelong learning and education, something that could suit to the long-standing 
education ambitions traditionally encountered in the Greek family
d) in terms of quality of life, including better health and welfare services, better and 
safer transportation, conservation of the environment, preservation of cultural 
heritage, all domains in which Greece had to a smaller or larger extent 
traditionally suffered.
In parallel, certain aspects of the Greek society and culture that could contribute to the 
passage to an information society were also to be taken advantage of: resourcefulness 
and willingness to take risks, finding solutions through experimentation, or deploying 
young people enthusiastic about technology within the family in order to overcome 
the technophobia of the older generation.
The bottom line was that ‘In the emerging Information Society, Greece has a unique 
opportunity to upgrade its position in the global economy and to improve the quality 
of life of its citizens’ (ibid., p.8) and that ‘the largest benefits will go to societies that
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will be first in putting the new production tools to use for improving the quality of life 
of their citizens and their position in the international economic and political 
environment’ (ibid., p. 10).
On the other hand, the opportunities presented were accompanied by great challenges 
to which the Greek state had to respond in order for benefits to be materialised:
a) modernisation of the economy, largely focused on traditional manufacturing and 
services, with notable lack of research and investment in new products and 
process innovation, low rates of technology diffusion and a small ICT sector, 
single-product industries in many sectors and geographical fragmentation, all of 
which were taken to inhibit development
b) more dynamic macroeconomic policy and structural interventions in the capital, 
labour and product and service markets so as to enhance investment, growth and 
employment in new technologies
c) initiatives to reform the operation of public administration, seen as a major 
impediment to the implementation of the information society, since obsolete 
structures, bureaucracy, lack of planning and staff, lack of feedback mechanisms 
prevented the assimilation of ICTs and the improvement of service provision
d) acceleration of the creation of appropriate telecommunication infrastructures 
under conditions of deregulation and a flexible regulatory framework supervised 
by the state
e) state interventions in the domain of education and vocational training in order to 
supply both material infrastructures and suitably qualified human resources with 
new skills and adaptability
The role of the state was consequently given prominence, in contrast to the EU 
documents. The role of the private sector was also considered very important in terms 
of investment in new products and services and in the generation of growth and 
employment. As a result, the provision of a suitable environment for entrepreneurial 
activity was of capital significance. The implementation of the information society 
measures required co-operation between the public and the private sector, firms and 
professionals active in the domain; it also proclaimed that the shape of the information 
society would depend on how actively citizens participate in its formation. For the
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implementation of the strategy, interventions were foreseen at the organisational level 
(restructuring of IT services in the public sector, improvement of the legal framework 
for public IT projects), the regulatory level (reinforcement of regulatory bodies, 
reviewing of support mechanisms, improvement of evaluation procedures), as well as 
the executive planning and follow-up (Governmental Committee for the Information 
Society under the Prime Minister and the establishment of an Informatics Board made 
up of public and private sector representatives). Finally, the establishment of an 
Observatory for the Information Society was foreseen so as to transfer relevant 
knowledge and practices from international experience.
The 1999 White Paper set out a multitude of information society goals (Table 4.1). 
The paper was a quite broad policy document, without specific focus on certain 
actions. Its main influences were the French and the Portuguese strategies, the latter 
because of the south European similarities between Portugal and Greece. Moreover, 
while it echoed some aspects of the early EU documents, it reflected a wider concern 
about social implications and was relatively tuned into the Greek reality, rather than 
merely repeating generalisations about the information society. It also echoed the 
political will from Simitis to push IS issues, despite the overall limited awareness of 
such issues at the time. Still, it took a whole year for it to be approved by a 
government committee. Although political will was present, the information society 
was not a high priority at the time, and kept being put behind (GP 2007). In any case, 
the advent of the 3rd CSF and the launch of the eEurope initiative at the end of 1999 
enabled the design of a more detailed information society approach.
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Open and effective government
Modernisation of public administration and improvement of state-citizen and state-firm relations 
through the extension of present and the implementation of new IT systems; digitalisation of 
information, creation of databases, electronic information exchange, creation of a networking 
environment in public administration, common standards in implementation procedures.
Education
Changes in education to accommodate the requirements of a 21st century knowledge-based society; 
familiarisation of students with computers and multimedia at all levels, teacher training in ICTs, 
creation of local IT labs, connections of schools to the Internet, production of digital education 
packages, improvement in infrastructure connecting universities and research centres.
Economic development and competitiveness
Taking advantage of the ICT potential in the economy: interventions in the product, labour and capital 
markets, initiatives for the upgrading of the IT industry, support for SMEs; establishment of an 
appropriate regulatory framework for e-commerce to create a climate of trust and protection for 
consumers; measures to promote e-commerce applications in the private sector; support for industrial 
innovation through cooperation incentives to enterprises and research entities.
New jobs, new skills, new work arrangements
Government initiatives to facilitate employment opportunities in emerging sectors and to address the 
decline of job opportunities in specific sectors/professions through redeployment programs and revival 
of stagnating sectors; life-long training programmes for young people; promotion of new work 
arrangements such as teleworking through diffusion of best practice, amendments of the legislative 
framework, promotion of pilot projects in the private and public sector, development of tele-centres in 
remote areas.
Better quality of life: health, welfare, the environment, transport
Introduction of IT systems in hospitals, training of health personnel in new technologies, introduction 
of tele-medicine applications (including measures for the safety, confidentiality and reliability of tele­
medicine services), development of unified electronic patient files; application of telematic services for 
the documentation and protection of the natural environment; better management of traffic systems, 
development of a unified online electronic reservation system for coastal navigation.
Greek culture
Taking advantage of the capabilities of ICTs and multimedia for protecting Greek cultural heritage, 
promoting Greek cultural content, supporting artistic creation through ICTs, reinforcing the Greek 
language, cultivating contacts with Greek communities abroad, preserving Greek identity.
Mass media
Creation of an appropriate regulatory framework to take account of the changes in communication 
brought about by digital cable TV, the Internet, electronic printing; encouragement of entrepreneurial 
activity, provision of subscription-based TV, protection of freedom of expression and citizens’ rights, 
reinforcement of the role of regulatory entities.
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Equal participation of the regions
Strengthening the communication infrastructure throughout the country in order to grant universal 
telecoms service and broadcasting coverage; promotion of new tele-services (for work, medicine, 
education, transactions), promotion of local firms in information science, telecommunications, 
education, development of on-site services to the public (electronic service centres); local 
implementation of centrally designed initiatives (e.g. land use register, property register); support and 
participation of local communities throughout and respect for local particularities.
National telecommunications infrastructure
Development of a national telecommunications infrastructure for widespread provision of advanced 
telecommunication and audio-visual services by the public and private sector at low cost; design of a 
regulatory framework, initiatives for the establishment of costing arrangements, the financing and 
implementation of universal service, the formulation of competition rules (as to interconnection, 
numbering, licensing and spectrum management) and the supervision of their implementation. . 
Protecting the rights of citizens
Legislative and regulatory initiatives for the protection of the rights of citizens (access to information, 
protection of private information), the protection of consumer rights, intellectual property issues 
(copyright, digital exploitation), legal aspects of electronic transactions (validity, identification of 
digital signature, encoding); labour and insurance legislation for tele-work; criminal activity in 
cyberspace, unlawful and unethical Internet content.
Table 4.1: Aims and objectives of the Greek information society 
Source: Hellenic Republic 1999
4.4.6. The Operational Programme for the Information Society
Following from the White Paper, through the eEurope initiative and the Feira Summit 
of June 2000, the Greek government proposed a systematic Operational Programme 
for the Information Society (OPIS), linking it to the structural funds within the 3rd 
European CSF32. This was an innovative horizontal programme, with a budget of 2.8 
billion Euros, of which 2.27 billion was public funds (about 25% national and 75% 
from the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund) and 
the rest came from private funding.33 The OPIS was approved and launched in spring
32 The CSF Programme for Greece consisted of seven operational programmes, namely Improvement 
of Human Potential, Transport, Competitiveness, Agricultural Economy and Fishery, Quality of Life, 
Information Society, Regional Development. These were funded at 75% from national and EU funds. 
The OPIS developed synergies with actions of other programmes.
33 IS was presented as one of the basic policy pillars, rather than as part of other large policy areas; this 
is the reason why it attracted so much funding.
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2001 with an implementation time-frame until 2008 (Caloghirou and Constantelou 
2006). It operated across ministries, involving a number of government departments, 
but also educational institutes, firms and other actors, and aiming to implement the 
essential features of the White Paper.34 Overall, its objective was to create a ‘critical 
mass’ of networks, information systems, services, digital content and human resources 
related to the information society, which would have multiplying effects in the 
economy and society by increasing the demand for ICT services (YC 2008). The first 
IS Secretary, who was also the head of the team designing the OPIS, recalled: “Our 
programme was very ambitious and unique in Europe in terms o f  the scale offunding; 
I  used to go and present it around Europe as a case study o f how you can prepare 
something ambitious in order to push something that you consider o f prime 
importance. Operationally and politically it was used as a model and this was 
acknowledged by the European Commission which supported us very much” (GP
2006).
The OPIS aimed to achieve two main targets over the period 2000-2006: a) to provide 
better services to the citizen and improve the quality of life through the deployment of 
ICTs in public administration, health and welfare, transport and the environment; b) to 
promote development and build human potential through actions to increase 
competitiveness and employment and to put into place a suitable educational system 
(Constantelou 2001). To do so, it set out the following five lines of action (shown 
with the corresponding shares of the total national and EU funding):
• Education and Culture (17%)
• Citizens and Quality of Life (37%)
• The Digital Economy and Employment (24%)
• Communication Infrastructures and Services (19%)
• Technical Assistance (3%)
34 The White Paper included one last chapter which referred to implementation issues; this comprised a 
series of specific policy proposals of operational nature, which dealt with how the programme would 
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Figure 4.1: Funding and structure of the OPIS 
Source: Caloghirou 2003
More specifically, the breakdown for each action line was as follows:
Education and culture
• Equipping all schools with the necessary IT, network and audio-visual equipment, 
creating or upgrading IT labs in universities and colleges.
• Establishing access to the Internet and multimedia resources by all Greek schools by 
the end of 2001 and a complete Intranet for the education system by 2006.
• Infrastructure development for tele-education for teachers and students throughout 
the country.
• Training of all teachers in the use of Internet and multimedia resources as an 
educational tool
• Creation of public Internet access points to ensure the access of youth to the Internet 
in less favoured areas.
• Administrative documentation and management of Greek cultural heritage, 
development of digital content and Internet resources with Greek cultural content
• Support of new forms of cultural expression that use IT-based media.
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Citizens and quality of life
• Improved quality services to citizens and firms by the central, regional and local 
public administration
• Development of on-line applications, as well as use of ICTs to streamline and re­
engineer procedures and communication within and between government 
departments, covering all of public administration (notably the fiscal, finance, social 
insurance, justice, regional development and emergency services domains)
• Use of ICTs in view of public sector modernisation; training of public sector 
employees in new technologies and organisational methods
• Creation of geographical and environmental mapping and management information 
systems, linking central to regional and local government
• Use of ICTs to implement a comprehensive strategy for higher quality health and 
welfare services provision to all citizens and for the reform of the management of the 
health sector
• Introduction of telematics applications in land, sea and air transport
The Digital Economy and Employment
• Encouragement of the use of ICT applications by SMEs (in the primary, secondary 
and tertiary sector) in order to increase their productivity and competitiveness
• Developing infrastructure support for e-businesses (providing certification, 
prototyping, networking and information services)
• Improving conditions for high-tech business startups through the development of 
venture capital, incubators and other mechanisms
• Improvement of university-industry links through the support of partnerships 
between research and private sector entities
• Creation and dissemination of digital content and information (databases, libraries 
and so forth) relating to research needs
• Development of basic IT skills for the wider population, especially for socially 
disadvantaged groups, in connection with re-employment programmes
• Reduction of the existing gap between supply and demand of highly skilled 
professionals in the ICT field
• Promotion of employment by combined training and employment actions 
concerning the acquisition of working experience in ICT firms (trainees)
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• Support of tele-work and tele-training pilot applications, especially in 
geographically remote areas
Communication Infrastructure and Services
• Measures to enhance the liberalisation process in the telecommunications market
(e.g. spaces for antennas, equipment for frequency spectrum management)
• Development of local-access network infrastructure in accordance with local needs 
in small towns and remote areas
• Support of the development of broadband services for the public sector combined 
with special actions for the elderly and the disadvantaged
• Provision of access to people in less-favoured regions by using the existing postal
agencies in remote areas as ICT access points
(Ministry of Economy and Finance 2000).
The White Paper and subsequently the OPIS took into consideration the international 
and European developments and tendencies, together with the requirements at the 
level of policy of different ministries. The basic actors were and have since been more 
or less the same: two ministries, namely the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (subsequently Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration and Decentralisation), have been mainly allocated the responsibility of 
the running and supervision of the programme, in accordance with the guidelines of 
the eEurope initiative and the eEurope Action Plan of the Feira Summit. The Ministry 
of Development and the Ministry of Education were also involved, and to a lesser 
degree the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture and the other ministries.
It is important to note that the OPIS assumed a significant role for the state in the 
implementation of the information society policy. The state was seen as a major user 
of ICTs, notably in the development of infrastructures and the provision of services to 
citizens, including education, health and public administration. At the same time, it 
was considered responsible for the development of the necessary institutional 
framework and the promotion of the information society project in the Greek 
economy and society (Leandros and Iosifidis 2003).
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4.4.7. The “Digital Promise” proposal
In 2004 a new information society proposal was submitted by the Special Secretariat 
for the Information Society so as to revisit and update the initial 1999 White Paper. 
This proposal, entitled “Digital Promise”, aimed at capturing the experience of the 
preceding 5-year period and setting the priorities for the information society strategy 
for the period 2004-2008. In a nutshell, it reflected the conviction of the OPIS 
authorities (particularly after 2002) that IS policy should aspire to digital convergence 
as a vehicle for real convergence with other EU countries (YC 2008).
The opening paragraph of the executive summary of the “Digital Promise” document 
reads: ‘Our vision is development with employment and welfare for all. It is to create 
the conditions for all to take advantage of the opportunities in the new Greece that we 
together are creating and to contribute to the elimination of insecurity in citizens, and 
particularly those who are weaker financially, the socially excluded. Development for 
all, with social cohesion and respect to the environment’ (Special Secretariat for the 
Information Society 2004, p.4).
Notwithstanding the quasi-partisan political rhetoric, it is clear from the beginning 
that social issues and social cohesion were, at least in language, quite high on the 
agenda. This reflects the Lisbon Agenda as far as the keywords used are concerned 
(development, employment, social cohesion), but the social issues here seem to be 
elevated at a higher level. The second paragraph reinforces this impression by 
stressing that ‘Information Society is primarily society’, which derives from the 
experienced contemporary social transformation with ICTs as the ‘motor’ of change. 
Here a slip to the language of technological determinism can be observed; this is then 
followed in the third paragraph by the assertion that digital convergence is a 
prerequisite for economic convergence in the Greek society, a statement with echoes 
of technological determinism, but with social concerns at the same time. From this, a 
call for political parties, but also institutions overall and sectors is launched to take 
part in a long-term ‘summon’ (p.4).
Essential factors for the success of this social transformation taking place in society 
are listed as follows: commitment at the highest level of decision-making and
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administration in the context of a well-defined strategy, the formation of human 
networks and knowledge clusters, as well as the necessary administrative and 
organisational adaptations.
A declared basic principle of the “Digital Promise” is that when the information 
society is accompanied by ‘digital solidarity’ and ‘universal participation’, it is a 
crucial factor for growth and the stability of the welfare state. The influence of the 
work of Castells and Himanen (2002) on the relationship between the information 
society and the welfare state in the Finnish case is clear, though this relationship is not 
as uncontroversial as presented in this work (Patomaki 2003). What is more important, 
though, is the emphasis placed on universal participation, through the development of 
infrastructure, services and applications, which will augment development, 
employment and education and will ensure a ‘twofold role for the citizen: social and 
economic mobilisation and active participation in the implementation of the 
Information Society for All’ (p.5). The influence of the eEurope documents is obvious 
in the language, but again there is a twist in the stress placed on citizen contribution, 
possibly with bottom-up procedures in mind and through the use of open-source 
software, which was becoming important at the time in the circles of the designers of 
the proposal (TP 2005).
The need for a ‘critical mass’ is subsequently invoked in this context, echoing again 
the language of eEurope. This includes broadband infrastructures: a goal is indeed 
broadband access for all (language of universality) schools, hospitals, libraries, 
municipalities and public administration until 2008, so that citizens have quick and 
cheap Internet (the emphasis on broadband reflecting the eEurope 2005 priorities). 
Following from this, the reference to services and content reiterates the vision of a 
human-centred information society, with equitable access to basic services and 
operational structures (education, employment, health, entertainment). Then the text 
makes reference to public administration, where the imperatives are the promotion of 
democratic functioning and transparency, as well as the improvement of services to 
citizens and firms.
Next, the discussion switches to firms, innovation and development, which is taken to 
mean not only a process of quantitative growth, but a ‘broader process of
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enhancement of citizens liberties and rights, including access to information’ (p.6). 
The rhetoric of modernisation creeps in at the point where ICTs are said to provide 
new investment opportunities and to offer flexibility in the organisation of 
employment and thus strengthen the productivity of businesses. However, it seems 
that the issue discussed (p.7) is innovation (including new products and services, new 
markets and new employment places) and innovation policies aimed at contributing to 
productivity and improvement in the quality of citizens life (a reference to the goals of 
the 1999 White Paper). Significantly, the participation of citizens is invoked again in 
the context of a dialogue to strengthen multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Greece and its 
contribution to international information networks.
Incorporating the unavoidable language of the centrality of ICTs, the discourse of 
opportunity of the information society, and the challenges of reform, education and 
adjustment, but also going beyond them and clearly indicating a preoccupation with 
goals with certain social and societal content, the “Digital Promise” was overall a 
more mature proposal than any text preceding it. Moreover, it was more citizen- 
oriented than similar documents at the European (and Greek) level, both in terms of 
opportunities for all, and in terms of active citizen participation in the evolution of the 
Greek IS. A phrase that perhaps conveys its philosophy is the following: ‘Many of 
the choices in the context of the Information Society are to all intents and purposes of 
political nature and are not technologically determined. These decisions are 
consequently taken more solidly by citizens familiar with the use of new 
technologies’ (p.8).
4.4.8. The 2006-2013 Digital Strategy
The “Digital Promise” proposal did not have the opportunity to get parliamentary 
approval, as the March 2004 elections brought in power a new conservative 
government, which at least in appearance placed the information society high in the 
political agenda. In June 2004 an IT Committee was set up and in July 2005, a new 
strategy was introduced for the period 2006-2013, namely the “Digital Strategy”, 
which purported to push the information society agenda further. The Digital Strategy 
was a collaborative effort involving various user groups, public sector agencies, 
experts, directors and high-rank officers of ICT firms, and associations such as SEPE
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(YL 2005). Its declared aims were citizen and business mobilisation so as to take 
advantage of their potential, as well as reinforcement of social structures and 
provision of new opportunities in education, health, entrepreneurship, employment 
and culture (Observatory 2008a).
This new strategy has been linked to the new operational programme “Digital 
Convergence”. The strategy and the operational programme comprise nine so-called 
“threads”: 1) digital knowledge, which involves actions to improve knowledge 
accessibility, digitisation, and availability; 2) digital consumption of public and 
private electronic products and services by citizens; 3) digital protection of the natural 
environment and energy-saving actions; 4) digital security and improvement of 
citizens’ trust in digital products; 5) digital job-seeking services and enhancement of 
employment through new technologies; 6) digital services for quality of life, including 
entertainment, culture, sports and health; 7) digital participation of under-privileged or 
excluded groups; 8) support of extrovert entrepreneurial activity outside Greek 
borders; 9) specialised technological activities to highlight local characteristics that 
constitute particularities or advantages of a region (Ministry of Economy and Finance 
2005).
Although purporting in rhetoric to produce a radical change, the new strategy and the 
associated operational programme seem just to have rephrased, without significantly 
changing, the orientation of the information society in Greece. As the results of 
“Digital Convergence” can only be assessed in the next few years, this thesis focuses 
on the OPIS as the main tool for promoting the information society in Greece and for 
which an assessment is now possible after the end of its implementation time-frame in 
2008.
4.5. The evolution of basic information society indicators in Greece 2000-2008
A number of limitations in using information metrics have frequently been 
documented: they are based on a separation between what is informational arid what is 
not and between the online and offline activity, something which in reality is much 
more blurred; they are not underpinned by a theoretical background addressing the 
qualitative differences that cannot be captured by simple information indicators; they
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are based on the aggregation of large geographical areas, e.g. at the national level, 
something that conceals significant differences between regions and groups; they are 
centred around the individual (and not a group), something which misses the 
implications of individual usage for the group where the individual belongs; last, but 
not least, they are produced by and target the techno-political and policy-making elites, 
and possibly certain academic and civil society representatives, while the citizens just 
fill in questionnaires and continue to have limited understanding of ICT developments 
(Menou and Taylor 2006).
Keeping in mind these limitations, in what follows, we present a snapshot of the 
information society in Greece by drawing on a set of metrics with the intention of 
getting a rough idea of the current IS situation in Greece and compare it to the EU 
average. To the extent possible, we back these indicators up with non-numerical 
information regarding ICTs in key sectors of the economy and the society. 
Nonetheless, this sketch is only intended as context for the in-depth qualitative 
evidence and its analysis, presented in chapter 5.
4.5.1. Individuals and Households
Table 4.2 shows a series of indicators of ICT diffusion in Greece in 2000, when the 
OPIS had just begun; Greece was significantly behind the EU average in ICT 
infrastructure and use, with the exception of fixed and mobile telephones.
Indicator Greece EU-15
Telephone lines per 100 inhabitants 54 54
cellular mobile subscriptions per 100 inhabitants 56 63
personal computers per 100 inhabitants 7.1 28
Internet users per 100 inhabitants 9.5 24.6
personal computers per 100 teachers* 61 134
personal computers per 100 students* 8 11
* January 2002
Table 4.2: Some measures of ICT diffusion, Greece and EU-15 (2000) 
Source: Eurostat 2003
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Table 4.3 shows an increase in PC and Internet usage for individuals and PC and 
Internet possession for households between 2001 and 2003, but this increase cannot 
be characterised as a take-off; on the contrary, falling rates were observed between 
2003 and 2004 and household intentions to buy a PC and to connect to the Internet 
were dropping significantly. Moreover, the 2004 Internet usage (roughly 20%) was 
still far behind the 2004 average for the EU-15 (50%) or even for the EU-25 (47%).
After 2004, there is a stable increase in most of the indicators of the table, but this has 
to be seen as a ‘natural’ evolution, also assisted by the large operational programme 
which has overcome the costs of its initialisation period and has begun to bring about 
results.
Indicator 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006
% population 16-74 using PC 20.8 27.1 25.9 35.4 38
% population 16-74 using Internet 10.6 19.9 19.7 23.2 29
% population 16-74 using Internet weekly - - - 17.9 23
% population 16-74 using Internet to interact with 
public authorities
3.5* 6.1 7.2 4.7 9
% households having PC 23.3 30.5 29.9 39.4 41.7
% households having Internet access 12.4* 15.2 17.1 22 23
% households having broadband connection - 1 1 1 4
% population having mobile phone 49.5 64.7 69.4 85.6 -
♦in 2002
Table 4.3: Evolution of basic IS indicators in Greece 2001-2006 
Source: EDET 2004a, Eurostat 2007, Observatory 2008a
In 2006, the final year of the 3rd CSF, Greece presented the lowest percentages in the 
EU-25 (including the new EU accession countries) in Internet usage at least once a 
week by individuals (23% compared to 47% for EU-25) (Figure 4.2) and Internet 








Figure 4.2: Share of individuals regularly (once a week) using the Internet (2006) 
Source: Eurostat 2007
Figure 4.3: Share of households having Internet access (2006) 
Source: Eurostat 2007
Although the support of investment towards broadband infrastructures was one of the 
fundamental priorities of the OPIS, in 2004 less than 1% of households were 
connected with broadband, by far the lowest percentage in the EU-15 and among the 
lowest even in the EU-25. In 2006 broadband Internet access by households was 4%, 
the lowest percentage even in the EU-27 (i.e. including Romania and Bulgaria), while 
the EU-27 average moved from 23% in 2005 to 30% in 2006 (Eurostat 2007).
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After 2006 there has been a stable increase in the basic indicators. However, this has 
to be seen in comparative perspective, i.e. regarding other EU countries. Table 4.4 
shows some basic indicators for the years 2006-2008. In almost all of them, the 
increase rate for Greece is slightly lower than the equivalent increase rate for the EU- 
27; this is significant, as it suggests that Greece is not yet on the way to digital 
convergence with the EU countries. Broadband availability in households shows 
improvement from the very low figure of 2006 (4%) to that of 2008 (13.4%), which is 
attributed to the implementation of the electronic communications legal framework 
(including the strict imposition by EETT of the regulation for the unbundling of the 
local loop) and the “Broadband Action Plan” that used structural funds to extend 
coverage (total DSL coverage increased from 9% in 2004 to 88% of the population in 
2008 and in rural areas from 0 to 55%) (Eurostat 2009). Nevertheless, household 
broadband connections are still low compared to the EU average.
Further, certain indicators (e.g. interaction with public authorities, weekly and daily 
Internet usage) are consistently the lowest in the EU-25 in the period 2006-8; 
likewise, the ‘never used Internet’ indicator has consistently been the highest in the 













% population 16-74 using PC 59 38 63 40 - -
% population 16-74 using Internet 
almost daily
31 13 38 19 43 23
% population 16-74 using Internet 
weekly
45 23 51 28 56 33
% population 16-74 using Internet 
to interact with public authorities
24 9 30 12 28 10
% population 16-74 never used 
Internet
42 65 37 62 33 56
% households with broadband 30 4 42 7 49 13.4
Table 4.4: Evolution of basic IS indicators in the EU-27 and Greece 2006-2008 
Source: Eurostat 2009, Observatory 2008a
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Furthermore, in 2007 the overall Internet use in the Greek population presented 
certain digital divide patterns in terms of sex, age, educational level and geographical 
location:
i) The 36.1% for men was contrasted with 24.4% for women.
ii) Very low use was observed in the 46-55 age group (20.4%), the 56-65 group (8%) 
and the 66-74 group (2.5%) compared to 73.3% in the 16-25 group.
iii) Only 2.1% of men and women with primary education, and 31.7% with secondary 
education were connected, compared to 68.4% of the population with higher 
education.
iv) The very low usage recorded in the regions of Western Greece (20.9%), Thessaly 
(21.3%), Sterea Ellada (21.4%) and the Peloponnese (21.6%) was starkly contrasted 
with that of the Attika region (41.2%) (Observatory 2008a).
Moreover, all the percentages by category in terms of sex and age were the lowest in 
the EU-25.
4.5.2. Enterprises
One of the OPIS aims was to improve the competitiveness of Greek firms, particularly 
small and medium enterprises which comprise 98% of all companies) (Mavrotas et al.
2005). At the enterprise level, in 2003 92% of firms with 11-250 employees possessed 
PCs (94% in the EU-15), 82% were connected to the Internet (83% in the EU-15), 
while 48% had also a website (52% in the EU-15). These tendencies were reinforced 
through the “eBusiness” action of the OPIS, resulting in an 87% Internet connection 
in 2004 (90% for the EU-15). In 2006 this percentage was 92.5% for firms with 10 or 
more employees (94% for EU-15), while the 2008 percentage (96.6%) had surpassed 
the EU-15 average (95%) (Observatory 2009).
Regarding broadband, in 2004 only 21% of enterprises were using a broadband 
connection, by far the lowest percentage in the EU-15 and among the lowest even in 
the EU-25 (Eurostat 2005). However, since then there has been an increasing 
convergence: In 2006, broadband Internet access among enterprises of 10 or more 
employees was 60% (73% for EU-27), while in 2008 the figure was 79.8% (81% for 
EU-27). Nonetheless, e-commerce activity remained low, with 8% of the population
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purchasing electronically goods or services for private use (24% for EU-27) 
(Observatory 2009).
Very small enterprises (up to 10 employees) lagged significantly behind the EU 
average: in 2002 34% had a PC and 17.7% were connected to the Internet (Foundation 
for Economic and Industrial Research 2004). The “Go-Online” programme for small 
enterprises, which subsidised initial purchase of ICT and also provided training, was 
expected to have an important contribution in this context (according to a survey, 60% 
of small entrepreneurs were of the opinion that the programme could sufficiently 
address their needs) (EDET 2004b; OPIS 2004). By 2006 38% of firms with up to 9 
employees were connected and this percentage had become 50.9% by 2008 
(Observatory 2009). Although direct comparison with the EU average could not be 
made, circa 2007 there was a significant divergence between the firms with less than 
10 and those employing 10 or more employees, as well as between newer enterprises 
with young personnel and older ones, something which added to the picture of digital 
divide in Greece (Observatory 2007b).
4.5.3. Education and training
In the area of education and training, there has been considerable diffusion of ICTs 
and Internet in schools on a nationwide basis, with about 150,000 teachers trained in 
ICT skills. By 2002, 100% of secondary education institutions were online (36% in 
2000), while 47% of primary education institutions were online (only 3% in 2000) 
(Eurostat 2003). The national school net has been upgraded, 6204 ICT labs have been 
created (2002), telematic services and applications for students and teachers in higher 
education have been developed (Caloghirou 2003). With regard to training, there was 
an increase in the percentage of those who have acquired IT skills in a school or 
university environment, from 22.8% in 2002 to 27.5% in 2003, something again 
linked with the progress of the OPIS in educational contexts; 44% of those using a 
computer for professional purposes had received training in the workplace by 2002 
(close to the EU-15 average of 49%), while about 110,000 unemployed or self- 
employed had also been trained (Ministry of Economy and Finance 2004).
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The presence of equipment and infrastructures in educational contexts meant that 
communication and access to information were greatly improved and, since this is a 
central aspect in education, the entire education process improved, notably at 
universities. Nonetheless, despite statistics suggesting ICT diffusion in primary and 
secondary education establishments, in many cases equipment was not used due to 
lack of education and technophobia. On the wider societal level, the percentages of 
those trained in ICTs remained considerably low compared to the EU average. 
Characteristically, the share of active population that used a computer for professional 
purposes was only 35% in 2002 (53% for EU-15). The share of computer 
professionals in total employment in 2002 was only 0.5% (1.7% for EU-15) (Eurostat 
2003), while eSkills have stabilised over time and are among the lowest in Europe (in 
2008 Greece was 24 among the EU-27 with regard to the percentage of employed
thpeople who have ICT user skills, and 26 in terms of percentage of employed people 
with ICT specialist skills) (Eurostat 2009); these are indicative of Greece’s position 
vis-a-vis the information society .
4.5.4. Public sector
In the public sector, diffusion and deployment of ICTs has been limited in almost all 
areas. Exceptions have been certain parts of the TAXIS Net project (addressing fiscal 
procedures), as well as the area of education and training, with the development of the 
advanced Greek Research and Education Network (GRNET) interconnecting 
academic and research institutions, primary and secondary schools.
In 2008, 7 out of the 20 public services designated in the i2010 strategy were fully35 
available electronically (Observatory 2009). This gives an idea of the limited 
absorption of ICTs in the public sector (supply side) and can account for the low use 
of Internet-mediated interaction of the population with public authorities (Table 3 
above). Further, the relatively low degree of diffusion of ICTs in households also 
contributes to the slow evolution of eGov services (demand side). By contrast, at the
35 Meaning providing the opportunity to carry out a complete transaction as opposed to just receiving 
information or relevant forms or even submitting forms
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level of firms of 11-250 employees, the percentage of interaction with public 
authorities was 71% in 2006, much higher than the EU-15 average (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4: Enterprise interaction with public authorities (2006)
Source: Eurostat 2007
The share of ICT expenditure related to information technology as part of GDP 
remained less than 1.5% both in 2005 and 2006, again the lowest in the EU-27. 
However, the share of ICT expenditure referring to telecommunications was 3.3% and 
3.2% of GDP in 2005 and 2006 respectively, i.e. greater than the EU-15 average (3% 
and 2.9% respectively) (Eurostat 2007).
A significant issue is the extent to which new ICTs have been incorporated in the 
operations and service provision of large public organisations. A recent relevant study 
of 30 key public organisations (in telecommunications, electricity, water, posts, 
television and transport) undertaken using qualitative research methods revealed a 
number of impediments in the absorption of ICTs and the carrying out of electronic 
transactions:
• Organisational structures were found to be too much based on older 
bureaucratic models and were not customer- and service-oriented; as a result, 
there were regulatory and organisational weaknesses and delays.
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• The regulatory framework for public procurement was considered a significant 
force of impediment, together with the difficulty for suppliers to adapt their 
own systems of procurement.
• ICT departments were either non-existent or inadequately manned, while ICT 
education and training of staff was lacking and resistances were encountered, 
in particular from older staff.
• Lack of competition in monopoly sectors (e.g. electricity or water utilities) 
resulted in inertia in adopting new ICTs.
• The procedures for project allocation were long-winding: often, by the time a 
project was implemented its technology had become obsolete.
• The legal framework originating from the EU and its adaptations to the Greek 
context was incomplete and suffered from fragmentation, with different bodies 
responsible for its application.
• Regarding the demand side, there was limited use of electronic services in 
general and electronic sales in particular, which was linked with the low 
Internet diffusion in society, as well as with concerns about the security of 
transactions.
The same study demonstrated that only 16.7% of the organisations examined were 
using electronic procurement, while around 56% of them had information systems to 
provide electronic services to the public; however, these were mostly for 
communication and information provision, rather than for transactions and they 
tended to be only a small fraction of the overall set of services provided (Observatory 
2008b).
4.6. The ICT sector
The structure of the Greek ICT industry is both important and interesting for this 
thesis. Interesting, because it reveals differences with other ICT sectors in other 
national contexts.36 Important, because such differentiations are also expected to be 
dimensions of overall national particularities in the IS/KBE, which is the object of this
36 In particular Finland, which we use a quasi-reference point due to the good coverage of the ‘Finnish 
model’ in the literature and mainly through the work of Castells and Himanen (2002).
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thesis. In this chapter, we provide a snapshot of the structure of the sector, before 
moving to the implications of this structure and more qualitative aspects in chapter 5.
Based on studies undertaken in 2006 and 2007 (Observ atory 2007a, 2007b) and 
including more or less the totality of the (Greek) ICT firms in Greece (rather than a 
representative sample), the ICT sector comprises about 1800 enterprises in IT and 
telecoms and is broken down into the following categories:
• ICT trade (trade in office machines, PCs and telecoms equipment) 40.2%
• IT services (mainly larger firms offering integrated IT solutions) 35.9%
• Software products (firms offering mainly software licenses and standard software
products) 7.4%
• ICT equipment manufacturing 7.8%
• Telecommunication services 8.7%
Regarding the year of establishment, the vast majority of firms (88.2%) of the Greek 
ICT sector were established in the last 15 years (1990-2005). Further, in terms of 
geographical distribution in the country:
• 79.2% of firms are based in Athens
• 9.4% of firms are based in Thessaloniki
• only 11.4% of firms are based in the rest of Greece
As far as the size is concerned:
• 36.8% of firms have up to 10 employees (micro-firms in the EU classification)
• 44.7% of firms have between 11 and 49 employees (small firms)
• 14.8% of firms have between 50-249 employees (medium-sized firms)
• 3.7% of firms have 250 employees or more (large firms, excluding OTE)
In general, the relative shares of number of enterprises between IT and 
telecommunications are about 87% compared to 13%. However, the IT firms are 
much smaller than the telecommunications enterprises, the former employing 43 
people on average each, the latter 122 employees on average (excluding OTE, which 
is the largest employer). Overall, the vast majority of Greek ICT firms (81.5%)
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employ up to 49 individuals, and are classified as small firms, while only 3.7% (41 
firms) are large and these are, generally speaking, large retail chains or 
telecommunications firms.
ICT equipment manufacturing firms employ on average 85 employees, while 5% of 
them are large firms. Half of the firms in ICT trade and IT services employ up to 12 
employees, while the average personnel in software firms is 51. It is significant that 
61.4% of the employment of the ICT sector comes from telecommunications (a great 
share of this employment being from OTE), while 38.6% are employed in the IT 
sector. Significantly, if OTE is not taken into account, the telecoms employment 
accounts for just 38% of the sector (Observatory 2007a, 2007b)
A measure of the significance of the activity of the ICT sector is the percentage of 
ICT exports on total exports (1% in 2007, the lowest in the EU-27).
4.7. Institutional Changes
On the legal front, a series of EU directives over the 1990s have been translated into 
relevant legal frameworks in Greek law in the last decade.37 A landmark in the story 
of the information society in Greece has undoubtedly been the 2001 constitutional 
change, which introduced the right of all the Greek citizens to participate in the 
information society (Article 5A, paragraph 2). It is worth noting that the article in 
question does not only guarantee this right, but also instructs the state to facilitate in 
any possible manner the citizen’s access to electronic information, as well as its 
production and communication. Still, until at least 2006 Internet access costs
37 On the legal front, a series of EU directives over the 1990s have been translated into relevant legal 
frameworks in the Greek law. Selectively, the following are considered important: Law 2121/1993 on 
intellectual property, relevant rights and cultural issues; Law 2225/1994 on communication privacy; 
Law 2472/1997 on the protection of the individual vis-^-vis processing of personal data and its 
modifications in Law 3471/2006 and 3625/2007); Law 2867/2000 on the organisations and functioning 
of telecommunications; Presidential decree 150/2001, which adapts directive 1998/116/EC on 
electronic signatures; Presidential decree 131/2003, which adapts directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal 
aspects of services in the IS, in particular electronic commerce; Presidential decree 150/2001, which 
adapts directive 99/93/EC on electronic signatures.
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continued to be high, notably due to increases in OTE tariffs, which was paradoxical 
taking into consideration the state’s largest minority stake in OTE at the time 
(Papadimitriou 2006).
On 17 January 2006 the Greek Parliament adopted a new telecommunications Law 
(3431/2006) incorporating the EU electronic communications, legal framework. This 
law provides for the formation of a new consultative body, the Commission of 
Communication Policies, and defines the tasks and responsibilities of the 
telecommunications authorities. The Ministry of Transport and Communications is 
responsible for national policy and sets the procedures for the selection of the 
universal service provider; the EETT observes and reviews the application of the law 
and the established national policy and grants licenses where necessary. The providers 
are allowed to render relevant services after a special notification to the EETT 
whereas, when the use of scarce resources is needed, a general license must first be 
granted. Further, the EETT prohibits abusive exploitations of dominant market 
positions, controls the concentration of companies in electronic communications and 
has the power to impose fines and sanctions (EETT 2006).
The creation of independent regulatory authorities related to information and 
telecommunications, notably the EETT, the Hellenic Authority for Communication 
Security and Privacy (AAAE) in 2003, or the Hellenic Data Protection Authority in 
1997, has been a process resulting from the EU call to conform with the rules of the 
Common Market and has been regarded as a significant institutional change (Spanou 
2008). However, such independent regulatory authorities have either been bypassed 
by the government (e.g. the case of AAAE regarding a notorious affair of phone 
tappings, which led to a series of resignations of its members) (Pappa-Soulounia 
2007); or they have ceased to be independent (as in the case of EETT, the board of 
which is currently selected by the Minister for Transport and Communications, while 
the president and vice-presidents are appointed by the inter-ministerial council 
following the approval of a recent law).
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4.8. Conclusions
The IS policy in the EU has to be placed in a broader EU integration agenda, which 
has been very much a technological, as well as political project. The process of 
harmonisation in the European context, involving the set up of common standards and 
regulatory regimes, including technical instruments and practices, has been an 
essential dimension of the project to establish a common technological zone (Barry 
2001).
The EU rhetoric and policy regarding the information society introduced around 
1993-1994 was characterised by a quasi-deterministic tone treating the new ICTs as 
an exogenous variable with a transformative and constitutive role and calling for 
social and regulatory adjustments to accommodate their over-determining effects and 
exploit their competitive potential in a global environment. The Bangemann rhetoric 
introduced the idea of buying into the EU vision and building national societies 
according to it. The liberalisation of the telecommunication sector in Europe was 
presented as the first major step towards this direction. New regulatory models 
developed by the Commission, policy transfer between EU states, and ideas brought 
from the US who had pioneered telecommunications transformation were transmitted 
at the national level so as to shape the telecommunications market. Liberalisation had 
been completed in more or less all EU countries by the late-1990s (Jordana 2002).
Following a series of consultations pointing out the significance of the social 
implications and dimensions of the information society, the post-Bangemann agenda 
slightly shifted from the idea of transforming the EU according to the US ideals to the 
introduction of social aspects to make the project more acceptable and to invite co­
opting at the national level, as well ensuring that the tangible aspects of the relevant 
budgets play out. The emphasis on liberalisation of telecommunications was replaced 
by the rhetoric to make Europe the most advanced knowledge-based society with 
social cohesion and cultural diversity. Nonetheless, the introduction of social elements 
does not mean that these became dominant. Indeed, the indicators used in the eEurope 
initiatives (for cheaper and faster Internet, investment in people and skills, use of the 
Internet) reflected the interest in infrastructure and skills, eCommerce and 
eGovemment. These indicate the continuing dominance in policy circles of the
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techno-economic dimension of IS/KBE policy in the EU. Broadband and mobile 
technologies are seen as the key to social cohesion, which leaves the question of 
access to and use of these technologies open (Martin 2005). Cultural diversity, which 
had not been taken seriously before, needs also to be seen in the context of the EU 
enlargement and its promotion has been accompanied by a strong emphasis on 
governance and harmonisation.
The Lisbon strategy has established closer cooperation and commitment from a 
number of EU authorities, member states, civil society and NGOs in a number of 
policy areas, using the open method of coordination to transfer best practice and 
international policy experience. These developments have led to considerable policy 
convergence as to the general directions of all national information societies, 
determined at the EU level. Nevertheless, the Lisbon strategy leaves much room for 
variation in the information societies to be finally implemented at the national levels. 
In parallel, it has re-launched the significant role of the state, the structures and 
institutions of which are called upon to promote the implementation of the European 
information society project. The place of the state under these circumstances is both 
important and highly sensitive, in that it stands between different geographical scales 
of authority and has to strike a balance between supranational directives and 
national/local characteristics. At the same time, there has been an overall 
transformation in its role towards less direct intervention in the economy and society.
Indeed, the evolution of the information society project in Europe can be seen as a bi­
directional dialogue between the EU bodies and the member states. On the one hand, 
it forms part of the high level integration discourse and involves large scale policy 
transfer, expressed in the acquis communautaire, the body of European legislation 
which the candidate countries have to accept (Radaelli 2000). On the other hand, it 
has engaged the member states and mobilised national programmes of IT investments 
and rollout.
Greece has followed closely the tone of early EU reports in the formulation of an 
initial information society vision. Initial preoccupations had to do with the relative 
underdevelopment of the infrastructures of the country and the positioning in the 
development opportunities presented by ICTs. The liberalisation of
159
telecommunications in the 1990s can be seen in the light of this initial disposition, in 
line with the international atmosphere. Subsequently, and in parallel with the 
development of the eEurope initiatives, the country prepared more detailed and 
strategic plans with increased awareness both of the competitive potential and of the 
quality of life opportunities brought about by ICTs. The social and cultural 
dimensions of the information society were taken into consideration, as were also a 
number of socio-economic and cultural parameters historically endemic in the Greek 
reality.
The evolution of thinking in the Greek circles has overall echoed the EU discourses. It 
has moved from a telecommunications sector that had been extremely dominated by 
the state monopoly and the public operator OTE to liberalisation and the introduction 
of competition, subsequently to ideas around the regulatory reform of the sector, then 
to the overall information society discussion in the EU, with later ideas reflecting 
stronger emphasis on social aspects. This evolution has also mirrored the evolution of 
the group of people who have been central in the information society developments in 
Greece, in particular a team based at the National Technical University of Athens and 
certain external academics and technologists (YC 2008).
The evolution of IS policy has also been placed in the context of the Simitis 
modernisation project and relevant discourses of the 1990s. This is reflected in the 
emphasis on the role of the Greek state in the 1999 White Paper. Contrary to other 
European cases, characterised by an indirect mode of state intervention, in Greece it 
was (and still is) called upon to assume a more direct role, partly due to the extensive 
reforms required in the state/economy relationship, as well as to the significant public 
administration interventions that will be required to improve public bureaucracy and 
services (Leandros and Iosifidis 2003).
The modernisation project has been ambivalent and with equivocal results. 
Privatisations changed some of the dependencies of the economy on the state; 
decentralisation reforms have been implemented, but fiscal decentralisation has not 
progressed, while the size and capacity of local government has remained limited and 
subjected to central government control; the creation of a plethora of new independent 
authorities subject to different regulatory regimes was a progressive step in improving
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citizen/administration relations, but these have also contributed to further 
fragmentation in Greek administration and the blurring of the boundaries between 
public and private and have posed coordination problems with ministries and other 
administrative entities. Politics and parties continue to be heavily involved in 
recruitment and the operations of the public administration. Legalism, formalism, 
rigidities, as well as mistrust of citizens towards the public sector have remained. 
Reforms have been fragmented due to frequent cabinet reshuffling, alternations in 
government, and corporatist or clientelistic interests (Spanou 2008, pp. 168-169). By 
and large, the list of characteristics presented in chapter 3 (Featherstone 2005) have
-JO
been left unchallenged by the reforms of the 1990s.
Despite a comprehensive strategy, initial results indicated that the OPIS was slow in 
its implementation. In 2008, Greece occupied the last position in the EU-25 in terms 
of all indicators of information society development, with the exception of telephone 
lines and mobile phones. Private consumption, rather than production, was driving the 
information society, resulting in the diffusion of simple infrastructures (mobile 
telephony), while advanced infrastructures (e.g. broadband) were less spread. Digital 
divides were observed, as ICTs were much more diffused in firms than in households, 
disproportionately diffused in large and medium enterprises in relation to small and 
very small firms, as well as among individuals, in terms of sex, age, education and 
geographical location. Apart from specific success stories, there was limited 
incorporation of ICTs in government and public authorities overall, as well as in daily 
life and practice. As the IS Secretary 2002-2004, a very passionate and enthusiastic 
driving force behind the implementation of the OPIS, remarked: “One segment o f the 
Greek society has progressed, but the rest does not follow. It is evident that the 
information society has not advanced as much as it could have done” (YC 2008).
38 On many occasions, the overemphasis of modernisation on imaginary rational ideal societal types has 
seemingly screened out the complexities of the Greek situation, leading to unsuccessful reforms, while 
certain important dimensions and social practices that are indeed problematic have been overlooked. 
Tax evasion and citizen-state relations in terms of obligations and benefits, social attitudes and 
practices towards the environment, management and modernisation of the agricultural sector, a much- 
needed educational reform -particularly regarding secondary education based on private tuition as a 
substitute for the decreasing quality of public secondary educational institutions- and a number of 
contradictions in the value system of contemporary Greece are issues in real need of modernisation 
(Sevastakis 2004).
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On one level, the information society picture can be seen as a mere lack of capacity to 
comply with EU policies. On a different level, however, this picture follows the 
ambivalence of the modernisation project. Both IS and modernisation have been 
based on international deterministic discourses about competitiveness, efficiency and 
development and assumptions about ideal-typical societal models. Both have been 
interpreted in a national context with its own institutional, socio-economic, political 
and cultural profile. In accordance with our conceptual framework of capitalist 
diversity, Greece has followed its own distinct course vis-a-vis modernisation and the 
information society, which has involved contradictions and dualities.
This distinctiveness will be further elaborate upon in the next chapter, in which it will 
be shown that the manifestations of change have gone hand in hand with the 
persistence of historical legacies and characteristics. Chapter 4 provided a snapshot of 
the current situation of IS in Greece, based mainly on quantitative indicators. Chapter 
5 gives a more qualitative overview and presents the empirical findings of the Greek 
information society from a series o f interviews that took place between 2005 and 2009 
with a number of key experts involved in policy, representatives of the ICT sector and 
academics. In accordance with the conceptual framework of chapter 3, these are 
analysed by looking into the state/economy/civil society coupling, which includes the 
type of state activity and the degree of state intervention in the ICT market, economy 
and society. This analysis adds explanatory value to the Greek picture painted in this 
chapter and is intended to be applicable to other IS cases and useful for information 
society research in general.
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ICHAPTER 5: STATE/SOCIETY AND INFORMATION SOCIETY IN 
GREECE
5.1. Introduction
The White Paper of 1999 and the following OPIS horizontal strategy have provided 
the backbones for the promotion of the information society in Greece. They have also 
demonstrated a national state active in incorporating global imperatives and 
attempting to integrate these in the context of its national society. “Both in the White 
Paper and in the OPIS, our approach was intentionally very broad. We wanted to 
communicate to society the message that both the design and the implementation 
concerns not only ICTs and the public administration, but also the citizen in his 
different activities, his/her health, transport, rights, relationship with mass media, 
education, capacity for conducting business, unemployment, or fiscal matters” (GP
2006).
Nonetheless, the current consensus among the (limited number of) authors writing on 
the Greek IS seems to be that despite a robust approach to policy formation, as 
demonstrated by the 1999 White Paper and the OPIS, there have been barriers to 
implementation. Caloghirou and Constantelou provide an explanation as to why these 
barriers exist: ‘It is widely accepted that although countries appear to concentrate their 
efforts on sorting out similar problems ... the type, magnitude, and depth of these 
apparently similar bottlenecks are likely to be very different from one country to 
another reflecting their different stages of economic development. Thus, variations in 
response time and/or in the strategies selected for pursuing particular goals mirror the 
different circumstances and socio-economic environments within which individuals, 
companies, and policy institutions operate in each country’ (Caloghirou and 
Constantelou 2006, p.2).
Building on these remarks, we treat implementation impediments as symptomatic of 
broader characteristics of the national context in question that have been developed 
over time. These (social, political, cultural) dimensions have been consolidated into 
structural and institutional elements and have informed social practices.
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Our intention is not to evaluate the IS/KBE in Greece on a negative/positive scale. 
Rather, it is to focus on certain significant dimensions of the trajectory towards the 
Greek IS/KBE and try to connect them with historical legacies in a systematic way. 
We consider that it is important to capture the nuances of the processes of the 
evolution of the information society in Greece that cannot come across by quantitative 
indicators alone. For this reason, we now complement the sketch of chapter 4 with a 
more elaborate, in-depth and qualitative research agenda based on a series of 
interviews undertaken between 2005 and 2009 and involving key government 
officials and experts involved in the Greek IS strategy, representatives from the ICT 
sector, as well as academics.
Since the ICT market is dominated by a large number of IT firms and only a few 
telecommunications firms, the interviewees from the industry come predominantly 
from the IT sector. However, the convergence between IT and telecoms 
internationally and also in Greece in the last decade has been reflected in alliances 
between IT and telecoms firms, while the majority of the OPIS projects have involved 
joint ventures between an IT firm and a telecoms carrier. In effect, the material drawn 
from the interviewees refers to expectations and practices that are applicable to the 
entire ICT sector, as well as cases and examples that involve telecoms firms. OTE is 
also covered, the reason being that it has been a sine qua non in telecoms 
developments and consequently IS developments due to its dominant position in 
infrastructures, including broadband.
An ex ante assessment of the OPIS took place in 2000, in accordance with the EU 
imperatives of evaluation of previous experience39, and drew a number of significant 
conclusions from the implementation of IS projects under the auspices of the second 
CSF (OPIS 2000). During our interviews, it emerged that almost all the key 
dimensions noted in this preliminary assessment are still valid.
39 According to EU regulation 1260/99, national authorities and the European Commission have to 
agree regarding the methods, structures, procedures and timetables that are to be used for the purpose 
of the evaluation o f the CSF, operational programmes, or other relevant programmes and actions. The 
ex ante assessment relates to i) analysis of the results obtained from previous assessments ii) analysis of 
the strengths and weaknesses, as well as of the prospects and potential of regions and sectors iii) 
assessment of the rationale and the cohesion of the strategy under consideration iv) quantification of 
priorities and goals v) analysis of expected implications vi) evaluation of the quality of the 
implementation mechanisms (OPIS 2000).
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As a starting point, it has been observed that the society-technology articulation in the 
Greek context has historically presented particularities: "The degree to which the 
Greek society and economy has historically absorbed different technologies (from 
electricity to ICTs) is a Greek idiosyncrasy. Generally speaking, it has been observed 
that we are on the whole superficial users o f technology. There are deep causes for 
this tendency. The degree o f maturity o f the Greek industrial economy has been 
considered one o f  the main reasons why new technologies have been difficult to 
absorb by the Greek society. A second reason has been the role o f  the Greek state in 
periods o f modernisation and in development overall” (TK 2005).
Such particularities have been more often than not the object of study and research 
(though not in the information society context). The fact that Greece has historically 
shown receptiveness to the idea of technological modernisation at a first level, but has 
found difficulties in the actual absorption and deepening of new ways of living and 
working (Voulgaris and Sotiropoulos 2002) can be seen as perhaps the best 
justification for using a state/society approach (presented in chapter 3).
Whether one accepts that Greece is a ‘societe bloquee’ (Featherstone 2005) and 
emphasises the necessity to overcome institutional legacies or one draws one’s 
attention in non-normative terms to the complexity of structures and institutions 
informed by the particular historical dynamics of Greece, as Caloghirou, Ioannides et 
al. (1993) do, the state/society relationship can be a useful analytical lens to approach 
institutional legacies and provide clues as to several aspects of the social and political 
implementation of the information society in Greece. In particular, this perspective 
can highlight the role of state structures, and the relationship between the state, the 
economy and the civil society as manifested in the information society project. The 
operationalisation of these involves relations between state agencies, links between 
state organisations, businesses and civil society, policy processes and their 
organisational contexts (Evans 1995). The state/society perspective moves beyond 
abstract notions of the information society expressed in political statements to 
investigate implementation aspects, including procedures, capabilities, practices and 
social norms, as well as the relevant institutions, organisations and individuals. Such 
an approach can provide explanations of impediments, but also be informative 
regarding prospects of successful IS development, suggesting that an understanding of
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the national context and its particularities should be fundamental in the design and 
implementation of IS policies.
A similar attempt to analyse a national IS model in the EU context by looking into the 
state/society configuration and into the particular history of the national social 
formation has been the study of Castells and Himanen (2002) on the Finnish
thinformation society. A largely agricultural country until the beginning of the 20 
century, Finland has come to represent a model of IS that combines technological 
development and competitiveness with a strong welfare state and equal distribution of 
resources. In this respect, it differs from aggressively competitive IS models, for 
example the US or Singapore. The particular character of the Finnish IS has been 
attributed to a number of political, economic and cultural factors that have evolved 
historically, as well as with the articulation of these with the historical place and role 
of the state.
The development and dominance of Nokia as a leading edge technological innovator 
is often seen as one of the main reasons why Finland emerged as a major 
technological player in the international scene and has certainly contributed to the 
development of a competitive ICT industry and internal market. Nevertheless, the 
drive towards building an IS, in essence the extension into the present of a historical 
drive towards development and modernisation, was bom out of the need for survival 
both against foreign powers and harsh weather conditions. The Finnish state itself was 
bom as a survival project and each government achieved its legitimacy by ensuring 
national survival.
On a cultural level, the Finns have always viewed technology positively, notably 
because they have regarded it as a tool of survival against unfavourable weather 
conditions, rather than being sceptical against a technological way of living. In 
addition, the short history of the Finnish nation (gaining independence from Russia in 
1917) has facilitated an orientation towards the future, while a minority attitude and a 
national sentiment of inferiority has made the prospect of national excellence in any 
area particularly important.
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At the same time, the culture of survival has developed a strong sentiment of 
collectivity against common hardships, which was reinforced by a strong Protestant- 
Lutheran ethic placing emphasis on pursuing an equal society rather than being driven 
by an individualist ethos. In parallel, survival struggles have given rise to a strong 
labour movement, as well as a women’s movement, which has been pivotal in the 
development of the Finnish welfare state (Castells and Himanen 2002, pp. 127-139).
These dimensions informed a set of processes guiding the transformation of Finland 
to a leading knowledge-economy after a deep recession in the 1990s: industry shifted 
to knowledge-intensive activities and this was accompanied by a societal 
mobilisation; industrial policy involved intensive communication between industry, 
academia and the state; the government acted as an enabler of a favourable business 
framework; policy involved different interest groups, councils of ministers, industrial 
associations and intermediaries; on the societal level, networking was given 
prominence, while the public educational system responded to emerging ICT needs 
(Rouvinen and Yla-Anttila 2006).
The ‘Finnish model’ has been celebrated as a combination of competitive IS and a 
strong welfare state tradition, with social inclusion and absence of notable resistance 
identities (Castells and Himanen 2002). Nonetheless, the antilogue is that the policies 
adopted by the Finnish state (deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation) in view of 
the information society have eroded the traditional characteristics of the welfare fabric 
of the Finnish society and that inequalities and social exclusion rose in Finland in the 
1990s (Patomaki 2003). In this chapter we draw on the Finnish case as a counterpoint 
to the Greek information society.
The analysis of our findings of IS developments in Greece in the period 1998-2008 is 
carried out with the state/society linkage into mind. Building on our interview 
material, as well as our observations of IS developments in Greece in the period 1998- 
2008, we provide a narrative presentation of key dimensions that have marked the 
information society development in Greece and their links with historical legacies of 
the Greek state/society context, as codified in the list of national characteristics 
presented in chapter 3. This includes the political entities and policy processes that 
have been observed, the bureaucratic context, the relationship between the state and
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the ICT sector, notably in the context of public procurement, as well as the 
relationship between the state and civil society. Certain cultural dimensions that span 
the state/economy/civil society triptych are also presented. The case of OTE is 
examined in some detail, both because of its significance as an ICT player and as an 
exemplification of state/economy/civil society relations in the context of technological 
modernisation, public procurement and liberalisation/privatisation policy. The TAXIS 
project, possibly the most successful of the information society applications, is also 
elaborated upon as a case where state/economy/civil society relations have manifested 
themselves in the form of structural problems (party antagonisms, bureaucratic 
rigidities, user resistance), but also through inventive practices.
5.2. The OPIS actors
According to legislation passed in 2000 (Law 2860/2000) several institutional actors 
have been set up to manage and implement the OPIS (Leandros and Iosifidis 2003):
• The Managing Authority, operating under the Special Secretariat for the 
Information Society established within the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
which deals with the design, suggestion and approval of action lines for the 
OPIS, the follow-up and control of their implementation, as well as writing of 
annual techno-economic reports and supervision of financial, legal and 
logistical aspects.
• The Monitoring Committee, having a supervisory and advisory role and 
comprising representatives of ministries, public organisations, economic and 
social partners and non-governmental organisations (among them municipal 
authorities, regional secretaries, the Federation of Greek ICT Enterprises 
(SEPE), the Federation of Greek SMEs, the Technical Chamber of Greece).
• The Information Society S.A. (IS S.A.), a public not-for-profit organisation 
operating under the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Public 
Administration and Decentralisation, which is charged with the administration 
of public call for tenders for projects seeking funding under the OPIS. It also
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provides support and advice to government and other public and private 
institutions in the implementation of the OPIS, using external expertise when
40necessary.
• The Observatory for the Information Society, a kind of think tank to monitor 
the progress of the information society in Greece by conducting surveys and 
supervise benchmarking studies, transfer expertise and best practice relevant 
to information society issues from the European experience, as well as 
providing training tools for the private and the public sector; the Observatory 
actually started operating only in June 2005.
Other bodies that have taken part:
• The New Economy Development Fund (TANEO), established in 2002 and 
investing in venture capital for innovative businesses.
• Numerous forums and consultation groups intended to address various social, 
economic and technological aspects of the information society. The most 
successful of these has been the eBusiness forum, initiated by the EU and set 
up in 2000 as an open consultation mechanism involving stakeholders from 
government agencies, business, academia and the media with the following 
aims: a) to enhance SMEs awareness of eBusiness b) to inform policy-makers 
about developments in policy implementation, link with international policy 
initiatives and make policy suggestions (Constantelou 2001).
Finally, the totality (twenty nine) of ministerial general secretariats and thirteen 
regional secretariats have been involved, bearing the responsibility of decentralised 
implementation of projects together with the IS SA.
40 As one interviewee involved in the preparation of the OPIS stated, “After many struggles and many 
pressures from the EU, we movedfrom the second CSF to a central implementation mechanism o f most 
projects, which was the Information Society SA, with the intention o f  overcoming problems o f  
awareness, problems o f  coordination between ministries, lack o f  political will at high levels. Putting 
into place such an organisation in Greece was a big project and despite our best efforts the IS SA 
essentially started operating only as early as 2002” (TP 2005).
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Figure 5.1 summarises the actors involved in the OPIS implementation:
Secretariat for IS 
Ministry of Economy and Finance























Figure 5.1: OPIS Management Scheme and Organisational Structure 
Source: Caloghirou and Constantelou 2006
By 2002 the basic OPIS structures were into place and project implementation had 
started. The OPIS implementation process is described in (Mavrotas et al. 2005) as 
follows: the relative authority announces a new action, which belongs to one or more 
action lines. Proposals are submitted and evaluated and if they satisfy certain criteria 
they are incorporated in the programme, which means that they can get funding from 
the financing mechanisms. After the incorporation phase, a bidding procedure is set 
into place, in accordance with EU guidelines, and a final contractor is selected to 
execute the project. Contracts are signed between the contractor and the owner of the 
project (ministry or other authority) and the implementation phase begins. A project 
might be divided into subprojects with separate contracts. Monthly progress reports 
are also expected on the part of the contractor.
With its broad perspective, the OPIS included projects that belonged to one or more of 
the following thematic programmes, presented here with the percentage of the
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projects that had been incorporated by March 2004: education (94%), culture (72%), 
e-govemment (88%), health (70%), intelligent transport (64%), business support 
(74%), research (71%), education and training (63%), while the broadband and the 
municipalities programmes had been announced but projects not yet incorporated at 
the time (Ministry of Economy and Finance 2004). Overall, incorporation (the pre­
implementation stage) progressed quite satisfactorily, but the picture was different 
with implementation proper, where a number of structural characteristics and 
practices have manifested themselves, as described in sections 5.3 to 5.7.
5.3. Political entities and policy processes
The public policy process in Greece is overall hierarchical, with complex relations 
between ministers and personal advisors often operating across ministries, party- 
affiliation of ‘experts’, weak support from civil service and absence or 
underutilisation of think tanks and expert policy communities that would provide 
legitimation (Ladi 2005, Monastiriotis and Antoniadis 2009). In result, political 
initiatives suffer from antagonisms and competing interests within and across 
government agencies. Moreover, such antagonisms are exacerbated through highly 
conflictual relations between the two major political parties, based on opposing social 
identities and patronage systems (Featherstone 2005). In the case of the information 
society there has been from the beginning antagonistic behaviour between ministries, 
structural problems in the allocation of responsibility, lack of a coherent and 
continuous information society vision at the prime ministerial level and frequent inter- 
party conflicts.
5.3.1. Expectations, antagonisms and articulation of governmental power
The 1999 White Paper emerged from the political will, at least on the part of the then 
Prime Minister Simitis, to follow IS developments that were taking place in the EU at 
the time. A special advisor to the Prime Minister was appointed and was given the 
responsibility to form a group of experts: “The group worked very independently, but 
because o f  that it did not have political legitimation. Simitis embraced it, but 
ministers were not related to it. When we submitted the White Paper to the
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governmental committee, it became clear that had it not been for the preparations for 
the 3rd CSF, the information society plan would have been abandoneeF (GP 2006).
Subsequently, the OPIS was prepared in cooperation with the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance and was submitted to the ministerial council for approval: “There the 
whole programme ran the risk o f being abandoned, as the three ministers involved 
(the Minister for Economy, the Minister for Internal Affairs responsible for electronic 
government and the Minister for Transport and Communications, plus a fourth pillar, 
the Minister for Development, all wanted to break the OPIS and receive separate 
chunks o f  pertinent CSF funds directly for their ministries. The Ministry o f  
Development wanted all that had to do with business, the Ministry o f Transport and 
Communications all related to telecoms, the Ministry o f  Internal Affairs for all 
projects related to e-government, the Ministry o f Economy and Finance wanted to 
pilot the whole project, while there were others who wanted to control funds as well, 
e.g. the Ministry o f  Education regarding funds for computers in schools” (GP 2006).
Many interviewees have identified as a problem the fact that at least four ministries 
were fighting for the ownership of the OPIS. The preoccupation with controlling 
funds and the ownership expectations of ministries were opposing the horizontal 
nature of the programme, as well as ignoring the inherent implementation capacities 
of the ministerial agencies. The logic of a single, unitary programme, which was 
promoted by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, was to have a mini CSF spanning 
throughout all ministries and the entire society. Behind this suggestion lay an 
awareness of the idiosyncrasies of the Greek public sector and societal culture, 
notably juxtaposed with the respective dimensions of the Finnish model, which was 
then becoming well-known. In this spirit, it was acknowledged that, unlike Finland, 
Greece did not have adequate public administration experience and know-how vis-a- 
vis ICT projects. Due to the innovative nature of IT projects, the ministerial 
authorities did not have the knowledge to run them, as these were not classic public 
sector projects. Experience needed to be accumulated and economies of scale 
achieved in management and implementation. Therefore, although many different 
agencies were to implement the projects, it was considered necessary to have a central 
directive and supportive mechanism to push implementation entities. For these 
reasons, a single programme was suggested that would have three pillars:
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management, made up of the Special Secretariat and the Managing Authority and led 
by the Special Secretary; implementation support, provided by the IS SA; the 
Observatory, which would be in touch with foreign scientific developments.
Until the last minute, however, the impression was that due to the ministerial 
antagonisms there would have to be two separate programmes. The fact that the 
European Commission preferred a single programme helped the internal negotiations, 
but ultimately the deadlock was resolved at the level of the Prime Minister with two 
ministries taking the responsibility for the programme, namely the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Managing Authority 
of the OPIS belonged to the former, while the IS SA to the latter. There was also the 
Monitoring Committee, which belonged to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, but 
its president was the General Secretary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: “This 
duality, which was necessary for the programme to be approved, has taken its toll, in 
terms o f  delays, coordination difficulties, antagonisms and enmities with regard to 
who ‘carries the flag  ’ o f the information society in Greece” (GP 2006). Indeed, 
antagonisms between the two ministries run throughout the OPIS; the 2002-2004 IS 
Secretary recalled having frequently to resort to the prime minister’s office in order to 
resolve tensions arising from this antagonistic behaviour (YC 2008).
Different ministries had different reactions to the prospect of co-operating with the 
OPIS management authorities: The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health 
insisted on doing the relevant projects on their own and in their own terms, although 
they did not have the human resources for that. It was a matter of controlling the 
processes, not necessarily at the ministerial level, but certainly at the level of relevant 
committees that would be involved. 41 Big problems were also encountered in the 
field of telecoms, where the ministry wanted to be in control of the relevant projects, 
which were seen as being part of its own authority. Of course there have been
41 The example of implementation of information systems for the peripheral health systems (PESYs) is 
evocative. One information system was allocated to each PESY, with central coordination. Some 
PESYs wanted to do the IS on their own so as to be in control of the project; others asked the IS SA to 
get their specifications and arrange the public call for tender and the running of the project; the latter 
cases were successful, while the former were not, due to lack of knowledgeable staff to run the projects.
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exceptions, e.g. the Ministry of Education which was the fastest in implementing 
projects as it has understood from the beginning what was involved. 42
Further structural problems were encountered and were related to the nature of the 
articulation and allocation of governmental power. A strict hierarchy meant that an 
advisor or the IS Secretary himself could not overcome the central place of each 
minister in the exertion of authority (YP 2007). Taking into consideration that the 
OPIS was a horizontal programme spreading across different public administration 
agencies, this posed a problem of coordination across different ministries. At the same 
time, the involvement of the ministries was at the level of administrative cadres, while 
the ministers themselves never participated directly in the programme: while in 
Europe the necessity of involvement at the highest level was at some point 
acknowledged, this was not the case in Greece, as the involvement of a minister 
would necessitate the restructuring of the public sector (TK 2005). 43
Indeed, a certain degree of ‘indifference’ to follow the programme closely was 
observed at the high political level (ministers and Prime Minister) and was related to 
ignorance: “Ministers did not understand that it was not only a matter o f  putting 
computers in, but that one should redesign functions and processes, power structures 
and create a new culture. Theoretically they understood that computerisation was
42 As the 2000-2002 IS Secretary recollected, this success was also due to a decentralised 
implementation of projects: “The Ministry o f  Education had a long history (since the 2nd CSF) o f very 
large public projects fo r  schools (say, for 5000 PCs), whereby the call fo r tender had gone on and on 
fo r four years without any success, because o f errors, huge interests involved, frequent legal action 
from IT firms, etc. We, on the contrary, adopted a different logic: the creation o f  a PC lab in every 
school was treated as a separate project (so, say 3000 schools, 3000 labs, were 3000 projects); fo r  
each o f  them (about 20,000 euros) we prepared a draft call fo r  tender fo r the school committee (made 
up o f  the director o f  the school, the parents ’ association, teachers, local authorities etc) identifying the 
specifications (e.g. fo r  PCs, printers etc.) and asked them to carry out the call locally. In this way we 
managed to equip 3000 schools within six months and overcome the delays and failures o f  all previous 
years1;  (GP 2006).
43 The reason for this has to do with the historical developments of ICTs within each ministry. Roughly 
speaking, telephony preceded computerisation and the introduction of IT, and the latter was followed 
by the introduction of the Internet in each ministry. This historical evolution was mirrored in the 
development of separate departments for each of those aspects of ICTs, plus another responsible for 
issues of procurement. The resulting fragmentation impeded the integration of the ICT departments at a 
higher level, which could facilitate operations close to the minister on each occasion. Moreover, this 
fragmentation was not accompanied by specialisation and expertise, but rather by non-meritocratic 
criteria in the public servants involved, which contribute to the composition of a problematic picture.
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important, but in practice they did not give to it the attention that they gave to classic 
things, such as a bill to be introduced; they considered IT a luxury” (GP 2007).44
In result, a problem of political leadership has been pinpointed, since hierarchically 
the OPIS mechanisms could not impose the information society agenda on ministers, 
while the latter were not interested enough to pay attention to ICT issues. The 
experience of various aspects of antagonistic or indifferent behaviour of certain 
political entities involved has given rise to the claim that the vision needs to be held 
very high in the political authorities, ideally at the prime ministerial level (YP 2007). 
For this reason, there have been repeated proposals in the Digital Strategy 2006-2013 
(e.g. from SEPE) for having an ICT unit working closely with the Prime Minister (as 
in the UK), or a Minister for IT (YS 2006); nonetheless, this was never attempted, as 
it would have created tensions with other ministries (YL 2005, VA 2005).
5.3.2. Inter-party rivalries
Rivalries were also observed between parties and different governments. A 
characteristic incident showing the lack of inter-party consensus regarding the 
promotion of a common goal was the allocation of projects relevant to the 
SYZEFXIS45 project, which was done through an inter-party committee. A senior 
Ministry of Internal Affairs figure recalled: “The then opposition had declared that 
they would not participate in the process. In the discussion all proposals were by
44 The story offered by an IT executive is relevant and refers to the issue of electronic cards that would 
enable the citizens to deal with the public sector in a quick, efficient and secure way. “An employee o f  
the Ministry o f  Internal Affairs and myself went to Finland to participate in a relevant group; I  realised 
that nobody at the ministry was really interested, although I  assumed that this employee did update 
them as to the experience o f  the trip. Eight years down the line and this has been abandoned, though 
other EU countries have proceeded with this project. And it is a shame, as these cards would enable 
also the use o f  digital signatures, something which is quite time-consuming fo r  Greek citizens and 
relevant public sector employees whose time is spent on legalising signatures” (SK 2009)
45 SYZEFXIS, as well as the Citizen Services Centres (KEP) are OPIS projects run by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. SYZEFXIS is a large project (74 million euros) to provide an infrastructure for 
exchange of information of administrative nature (e.g. births, marriages, deaths etc, justice, road and 
urban planning and many other types). Its objectives are the improvement of public services functions 
through the upgrade of telecommunications infrastructure between them and the provision of integrated 
services to citizens using modem and user friendly government information and transaction systems.
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consensus granted to the different recipients. Subsequently, in Parliament, the shadow 
government was questioning why we had accepted the proposals” (PG 2006). This is 
indicative of the shadow government tactics that were taking place. These were often 
accompanied by sheer ignorance of what was at stake. A characteristic example, 
provided by the former IS SA president, has to do with the discussion in Parliament of 
Law 2860 for the management of the 3rd CSF in November 2000: “Many MPs could 
not understand what the IS SA was for. They thought that it was just a private 
company providing education like so many others. And there was a lot o f  suspicion 
that the IS SA would just waste funds” (SP 2006).
Various complaints have been expressed regarding the impact on IS of the change of 
government (from the centre-left PASOK to the conservative New Democracy) with 
the 2004 general elections. On one level, communication between the pre-2004 and 
the post-2004 officials has been characterised as “limited”, “superficial”, “quite 
detached” and “not substantial”. According to various information society officials, 
this resulted in severe delays and an overall stagnation of the OPIS.
According to the then president of the IS SA, by 2004 a certain momentum in the 
OPIS had been achieved after having spent considerable time to set up the 
mechanisms and be consistent with the formalities of the public administration. After 
the change of government in 2004, the new OPIS authorities tried to some extent to 
start from scratch, which had an impact on the performance indicators for 2004 in 
terms of projects allocated, but also regarding social indicators such as diffusion of 
Internet: “As a result, in 2005 about 180 million Euros were moved from the OPIS to 
other operational programmes, which clearly indicates that the OPIS had lost some o f  
its momentum (or that the expectations had been too high). I  think that there were 
areas that were moving quite satisfactorily at the time, e.g. the modernisation o f  
public administration and that their momentum should not have been lost” (SP 2006). 
The 2002-2004 IS Secretary added: “The 2004 government froze things for 18 months 
before identifying the same problems. This shows another Greek idiosyncrasy: 
elsewhere there could have been a relative continuity in the strategy. The fact that 
different governments are antagonistic with each other is a significant facet o f  
Greece” (YC 2008).
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The summer of 2005 saw the announcement of a new Digital Strategy, on the basis of 
which different opinions have been expressed and party antagonisms have taken place. 
For the pre-2004 OPIS personnel, the new strategy tried to do away with anything that 
had been established by the PASOK government. It did not include any significant 
new elements, although it could have done so in order to make adjustments according 
to previous experience. As such, it was a project management mistake, as it just 
delayed existing projects and questioned what had been hitherto achieved: “What 
should have been done was that the new strategy should have been targeting the 
fourth CSF, completing present and preparing for future projects. An intermediate 
evaluation o f2004 should have provided an assessment, set targets for the remaining 
third CSF (to finish with digital infrastructures, broadband in the public sector, 
provide digital content) and then articulate the finished projects with new projects o f 
the 4th CSF in order to provide services building on these infrastructures” (SP 2006). 
On the other side of the argument, the new OPIS personnel claimed that the criticisms 
expressed were not constructive and did not promote consensus and cooperation. (YL 
2005, VA 2005).
At a more significant level, there have been ‘accusations’ regarding the overall goals 
and directions of the OPIS and the Greek IS: “In the period 2002-2004 the OPIS was 
seen as the vehicle for achieving real convergence with the EU average through 
achieving digital convergence; this was after the EMU (which had established 
nominal convergence); the goal o f  digital convergence was abandoned by the new 
government .... Previously there used to be an IS strategy which attempted to identify 
the problems o f ICTs in Greece, build infrastructures and generate a critical mass o f 
users. Since 2004 we have had a paradigm shift, we have been characterised as 
‘socialists ’ and the new approach has been neoliberaF (YC 2008).
Notwithstanding the emotional charge of some of these and similar remarks, it seems 
that a different approach to the implementation of IS projects was introduced in 2004. 
In the period 2002-2004, when certain experience of project implementation had been 
accumulated, the issue of “strategic management” of implementation came into 
prominence. This was informed by the realisation that the recipients of the projects 
(ministries, local authorities and so on) were not in a position to monitor and 
implement on their own. The then IS Secretariat placed great emphasis on “universal
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responsibility” as far as the implementation of projects was concerned. 
Implementation would be decentralised, but with central monitoring and shared 
responsibility, as this was considered the most important issue in the Greek context. 46
After 2004, however, the new IS officials adopted a more detached, hands-off 
approach. The new IS Secretary himself declared that his role finished at the point 
when a particular project was incorporated within the OPIS and that implementation 
rested with the final clients (e.g., ministries or local authorities), something which was 
seen as amenable to recurring implementation problems. This approach also entailed 
that there was not any more a central allocating mechanism and that projects were 
allocated on an ad hoc basis, which provided the seeds for the operation of 
clientelistic relations and corruption (to be discussed in the next section).
5.4. Bureaucratic legacies
Antagonisms, coordination problems, limited knowledge and awareness and conflicts 
of power and authority in political institutions have been complemented by 
implementation difficulties emanating from the bureaucratic structures of the Greek 
public administration. Bureaucratic structures provide a significant structural 
dimension to state mechanisms, as well as being crucial in providing developmental 
advantage, as identified by Weber and by contemporary analysts (Evans 1995).
As mentioned in chapter 3, the Greek administration is often taken to belong to the 
southern European model of bureaucracy, characterised by pervasive clientelism, 
corruption at lower levels, uneven development of institutions, with some departments 
overstaffed and others underdeveloped, as well as rigidities and over-legalistic 
frameworks (Sotiropoulos 2004, 2006). To examine the function of these features in 
the implementation of the information society initiatives in Greece, we differentiate 
between two levels of administrative context: firstly, that of the design and
46 To promote this logic, a Crash Programme was designed and put into practice by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance in order to form a uniform strategic management and coordination mechanism 
that could speed up the implementation of the OPIS. This was an orchestrated action that was discussed 
with all parties involved in implementation (since November 2002); it started operating in 2003 and 
brought about significant and tangible results but was then frozen with the change of government.
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management of public sector projects, which involves project managers, ICT experts 
within public agencies and some high-level bureaucrats; secondly, that of middle- 
level and lower level civil servants which can be seen as the users of ICTs in the 
public sector.
5.4.1. Design and management of ICT projects
Despite a comprehensive vision and articulation, the implementation of the 
programme has suffered from fragmentation. As the public authorities involved in the 
implementation have lacked central and comprehensive planning processes and 
mechanisms, their suggestions have taken the form of fulfilling ad hoc demands and 
deficiencies, rather than becoming part of an overall strategy. In any case a systematic 
attempt to collect appropriate data and identify problems has been missing (LT 2005). 
This initial fragmentation has been accompanied by a secondary level fragmentation 
emanating from middle cadres (e.g. advisors or consultants operating across ministries 
and other public agencies and having a coordinating role in the implementation of the 
OPIS). These have often been politically appointed and therefore changeable in line 
with government alternations; moreover, they have aligned with various interests 
(including political and professional) adding to the unpredictability, asymmetry and 
uncertainty in the direction of the overall programme (TK 2005).
Fragmentation has been coupled with problems of cooperation, including the above 
mentioned reluctance from ministries to delegate responsibilities to the OPIS bodies 
for project implementation: “ What we underestimated and should have intervened 
more drastically with the weakness o f authorities (ministries, municipalities, local 
authorities, NGOs) to implement projects, as well as their frequent resistance to 
allocate the implementation control to the IS SA, which had been set up for this 
purpose, and was more suitable than the specific authorities for designing, running 
the competition, allocating and implementing ICT projects for the public sector” (GP
2007).
All the ministries had been asked to make a business plan for the information society 
in advance; some of these plans were quite grandiose, but the means for 
implementation were lacking, both in terms of finding appropriate personnel and in
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incorporating a project in their daily routines.47 It has also been admitted by several 
senior Managing Authority personnel that there was (at least in the beginning) 
insufficient acknowledgement of the fact that users had to be trained in order to 
overcome difficulties associated with the introduction of new ICTs.
For the above reasons, serious delays in the implementation of projects have been 
observed. Further, problems of coordination and central design have contributed to 
this overall picture of imbalances and discrepancies, with ad hoc and random 
implementation of projects. As a result, certain projects moved forward faster than 
others, with significant negative impact on the mutual dependencies and articulation 
between different projects (TK 2005). Fragmentation and limited coordination in the 
implementation of most actions has often limited awareness of the integrative 
potential associated with ICT projects. The requirements for concurrent technical, as 
well as organisational interoperability, institutional change, transformation of 
practices, educational programmes, culture and attitudes, necessary for any successful 
information system set up, have frequently escaped the implementation bodies (public 
authorities). 48 Technological fragmentation within public organisations and 
perpetuation of quite obsolete structures (e.g. different departments for telephony, IT 
and Internet, and different departments dealing with procurement for those 
technologies) and the absence of ICT strategic units in ministries have been pointed 
out as factors contributing to the approach of ICT projects through the logic of 
“automation o f  existing processes and day-to-day operations” rather than as a means 
for re-designing the state-citizen relationship (YL 2005).
Indeed, the observed persistence in traditional ways of approaching ICTs as large 
automation projects in the public sector, rather than thinking of them in new 
innovative ways was a very important aspect. Although the central mechanisms (the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance and the bodies established by the OPIS) were
47 As an example, the Ministry of Justice had asked for 60 billion drachmas to implement IT projects, 
but until 2007 they had implemented projects of the order of less than 1 billion drachmas.
48 In the context o f the Olympic Games, the Ministry of Justice implemented a project giving 
information about the crime record of an individual; this project was not linked with any other 
operational procedures of the relevant authorities, but remained a standalone application (LT 2005).
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espousing the logic of innovative approaches, the implementation mechanisms were 
stuck in the old, traditional ways of thinking.49 In the period 2002-2004, certain senior 
actors (e.g. in the Managing Authority and the IS Secretariat) were pushing towards 
smaller and flexible projects alongside open source software; it seems that 
subsequently these ideas were more or less abandoned and the post-2004 government 
retreated to the traditional ways of thinking, as is perhaps evident in the 2006 
agreement with Microsoft for software procurement in the totality of the public 
sector.50
5.4.2. Reception of ICTs in bureaucratic practices
At the level of rhetoric and expectations “there has been the illusion that through 
computerisation the public sector will become organised, while in fact organisation is 
a prerequisite fo r automation in most cases” (TK 2005). At the level of practice, 
however, reorganisation has happened to a limited extent by the introduction of the 
Citizen Service Centres and the TAXIS project of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance, whereby computerisation has brought some order to the fiscal system.51
There was certainly the expectation that the same would happen in other areas. In 
education, the introduction of infrastructures and systems has significantly improved 
research (through better access to various sources of information through high speed 
systems and networks on a par with those of the very advanced countries), but has not 
changed administrative processes, nor the ways in which education is provided.
49 For instance, the electronic public procurements, a project still ongoing, the initial cost and 
architecture chosen was based on large systems that provide all possible applications (what OECD calls 
‘whales’), rather than small and flexible systems, taking advantage of the Internet and carrying out a 
small number of particular applications or tasks; as the 2002-2004 IS Secretary recalled, when a 
delegation was sent to Finland and witnessed the Finnish experience of a similar project, there was a 
rethinking of the project in new terms, which also led to substantial cost reduction; however the 2004 
elections came and it was never implemented (YC 2008).
50 This agreement was quite controversial and stimulated the interest of the vast majority of the Greek 
press; the main argument against was that the government had made a deal with a firm that had often 
violated competition through monopolistic behaviour although there were more effective and cheaper 
alternatives (Mylonaki 2006).
51 It is interesting to note that the term TAXIS, which includes the prefix ‘TAX’ and the suffix ‘IS’ and 
refers to taxation and information systems, is a quite evocative name for a project intended to bring 
order, as ‘taxis’ is also the word for ‘order’ in Greek.
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Why has the introduction of ICTs not been accompanied by the reorganisation of the 
public administration? The classic problem of resistance from the public servants has 
been provided as the quick answer. Frequently, resistances are attributed to 
technophobia, ignorance and the uncertainties related the re-allocation of power. A 
blend of these factors seem to have played a role: on the one hand, “the administrative 
mechanisms and the civil servants have not understood the meaning o f 
interoperability, at the technical, organisational, functional lever  (TP 2006); on the 
other hand, the fear has been observed that, “i f  the new ICT projects were introduced 
the personnel would be made redundant or would not have any reason to exist any 
longer” (SK 2009); at the same time, resistances have been due to “inability to change 
one’s practices” (YC 2008).
Indeed, resistances seem to have been mostly due to the fear of losing power when 
procedures become codified and automated. The point of releasing power has 
particular resonance in the ‘flexible and untidy reality’ of the Greek public 
administration, involving the ‘absence of systematic codification of law that creates 
areas of legal uncertainty’ and ‘informal practices’ (Spanou 2008, p. 153), through 
which power is exercised and benefit is extracted by large segments of civil servants 
in their daily working practices. The introduction of ICTs in the Ministry of Economy, 
for instance, meant that the employees involved would no longer be able to negotiate 
with firms and citizens regarding their taxation and get commissions for providing 
favourable tax bills, as everything would be automated and codified. This is the 
reason why the introduction of TAXIS necessitated the provision of some allowance 
to employees. Likewise, in the health sector, despite efforts over a number of years, 
information systems have not progressed at all, as circuits of black economy and 
informal practices in health have been resistant to any introduction of new 
technologies.
The issues referred to here are often ‘petty corruption’, e.g. providing informally a 
small service through deviation from the rules in return of a small sum of money. A
52 The famous ‘fakelakia’ (‘small envelopes’ with often large amounts of cash hand-delivered from the 
patient to the doctor operating on them) has been a common practice in health administration in Greece.
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senior executive of a successful IT firm has given concrete evidence: “We have 
installed in all tax revenue offices credit card facilities that citizens can use to sort 
their tax payments. Out o f  one hundred such offices these are used in possibly five, 
because the cashiers do not want payment by credit card, since they make a little 
extra i f  the payment is in cash. Another example is the installation in these revenue 
offices o f waiting systems; in various offices they are systematically out o f order, in 
actual fact unplugged, so that certain customers can be given preferential order and 
the clerk can make a small income out o f  this” (SK 2009). In general, the old ways in 
which things used to be done are upset by ICTs and as a result certain employees who 
benefited from the old order end up empty-handed.
On many occasions, corruption has indeed been singled out as the gravest issue. The 
IT senior executive referred to above is one of many disenchanted with public sector 
ICT projects: “ICTs provide transparency which means that a lot o f informal illegal 
state practices are jeopardised. Neither the previous nor the existing (after 2004) 
government managed to tackle this issue, or they did not want to, because o f the 
party-centric character o f  the public mechanisms and the accompanying clientelistic 
relations o f  recruitment to these mechanisms. I f  this problem is not addressed, the 
information society in Greece will never materialise” (SK 2009).
5.5. Public procurement and the ICT sector
As mentioned in chapter 3, state/economy relations in Greece have been historically 
characterised by over-regulation and strict legal frameworks, while they have also 
suffered from an unhealthy relationship of mutual dependence, involving corruption 
and patronage in the allocation of favours and contracts (Kazakos 2001). It seems that 
the characteristics of Greek capitalism and its relationship with the state have been 
reflected in the state/ICT sector relations in Greece.
Incomplete industrialisation and the resulting small market have left their imprint on 
the Greek private sector and economic activity: “Investment is very limited; the 
private sector in Greece is mainly retail, with very low value-added, waiting mainly 
from the public sector to implement projects” (TP 2006). Following this pattern, the 
ICT sector presents limited scope, with very few medium and large enterprises and a
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vast majority of small firms (chapter 4). Interviewees have highlighted the fact that 
even a small number of large firms are perhaps too many for a limited ICT market 
(YV 2005, AT 2009).
Apart from certain exceptions, the private sector is not particularly dynamic and this 
tendency is dominant in the ICT sector as well: “In most countries, the ICT sector 
pushes the public sector forward, while here this does not happen; on the contrary, 
often the public sector needs to make the ICT sector aware o f developments. The ICT 
sector does not generate demand on its own, but awaits the generation o f  demand 
from the public sector, which it subsequently tries to satisfy” (TP 2006).
As the public sector in Greece controls the largest segment of the economy and of the 
IT sector in particular, it influences de facto both the course of the market at large and 
specifically of the IT market. The public sector is the largest ICT buyer, the others 
being the defense sector, where procedures are non-transparent, and the banking 
sector which is the most developed sector in Greece. Within the public sector, the 
largest user of ICT products and services is the education sector (something that is 
observed internationally, too). The health sector has also a substantial share in the ICT 
market on an international level, but not in Greece: “In the light o f  the dominant 
presence o f the public sector, the structural problems o f  the system o f public 
procurement are the key to understanding most o f  the problems that both public 
projects and public ICT projects encounter” (TK 2005).,
Public procurement involves goods and services purchased by public agencies and 
organisations (both central and local) for the purpose of carrying out their activities 
and serve their functions. It is intended to support administrative and regulatory 
policies, construction and modernisation of public infrastructures (roads, railways, 
electricity and telecommunications), provision of public goods (such as health and 
education), supply of central productive units and implementation of industrial 
programmes. In Greece, public procurement has exhibited the following 
characteristics: a) it tends to be monopsonistic/oligopsonistic and
monopolistic/olipolistic; b) local firms are protected from international competition, 
but cannot fulfil demand; c) the purchasing process shows multiple difficulties in 
evaluating proposals and is subjected to external influences, with resulting conflicts
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and tensions. Public procurement has not functioned as a developmental mechanism 
for the supplier industries due to a number of Greek particularities (small market, 
absence of industrial tradition, shallow technological activity with limited local 
research and development, small knowledge content, insufficient production capacity) 
plus a protective attitude from the state, which often contributes to complacent 
behaviour on the part of the suppliers (Caloghirou 1993).
5.5.1. ICT firms: grandiose expectations, myopic behaviour, clientelistic 
practices
Prior to the 1999 White Paper, which was the most comprehensive attempt to produce 
a strategy at this level, attempts at IT introduction in public organisations were more 
or less compilations of demands originating from ministries: “/« the best case these 
were designed by ministry administrative experts, who followed more or less 
developments at the international level and determined roughly what they needed; in 
the worst case IT  firms just submitted a list ofprojects that they could undertake and 
the products they could supply (with generic names) through their relations with the 
administrative cadres under their influence” (TK 2005).
This path dependency of the IT sector has determined to a large extent its behaviour in 
the context of the OPIS in particular. In the beginning (around 1999) the development 
of the information society in Greece was not given attention by the ICT executives. 
This was a time where a stock market frenzy had conquered the country and all were 
absorbed in stock market promises. Individuals were gambling with shares for quick 
profit and executives were seeking to maximize profits by buying and selling firms. 
After the stock market bubble burst and many firms and individuals went bankrupt, 
the ICT sector turned to the OPIS and regarded it as a saving device. Due to the large 
budgets involved, most ICT firms decided that they had to be part of the picture. The 
logic was that the OPIS would enable them build expertise in various applications and 
services which could then be adjusted to be sold to the broader regional market: “With 
this in mind, there were examples o f  firms which used to employ 200-300 individuals 
that through mergers were turned into groups with 1500 or more employees and that 
were transformed from distributors o f IT products to firms with heterogeneous and ill- 
defined business objects” (YS 2006). Many ICT firms over-invested in anticipation of
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the OPIS projects and employment in the sector augmented substantially between 
2000 and 2003 (LT 2005).
Under the circumstances, SEPE and the ICT firms were exerting pressure on the OPIS 
management authorities for the IT projects to begin as soon as possible, at a time 
when the mechanisms for running the OPIS were just being put into place and there 
was relative ignorance as to the specifications that the projects involved. The 
catchphrase: “ Where are the projects?” which the ICT sector was putting to the OPIS 
people, evokes the atmosphere of the period. As the former head of the SEPE 
eCommerce Committee admitted: “It was a mistake for SEPE officially to keep 
pressing and seeking to satisfy the demands o f  certain firms such as Intracom53 and 
others, instead o f  foreseeing the incapacities o f  the mechanisms to run these projects 
and considering alternatives, e.g. start investing in other areas, for instance the 
Balkans” (SK 2009).
However, this attitude was also linked with increasing expectations that had been 
cultivated by the state and eventually were not realised, something which created 
tensions. For some, it was a matter of advertising the OPIS in a wrong way: “When 
the OPIS was designed, it was publicised as ICT projects, which was not correct. The 
ICT firms thought that the budget o f about 3 billion Euros would be divided among 
them and that it was all about ICT projects in which they could sell products and 
services. However, the OPIS was not only ICT projects. It was also about 
restructuring o f  the public sector, soft initiatives such as entrepreneurship, education 
and training. This was a wrong way o f advertising it and it was received in a wrong 
way by the IT sector, they thought that it belonged to them” (YL 2005).
For most interviewees, however, it was the ICT sector that could not grasp the breadth 
and depth of the OPIS: “We wanted to show that IT was more than the ICT market 
and the ICT public projects, although the ICT sector was pressing us too much 
towards this direction. The sector was only interested in big public projects o f ICT 
procurement, while we were emphasising that this was but one aspect, albeit the most
53 A well-known large Greek IT firm, founded in 1986, which in the period of Simitis governance 
became OTE’s major supplier.
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tangible. We were interested in a broader framework, i.e. imbuing to an SME the 
logic o f  doing business over the Internet, or to an employee the logic o f  educating 
themselves in basic IT  skills. Or making a family aware that their children should 
acquire IT skills and connect to the Internet, including letting them know o f potential 
dangers o f surfing the Net” (GP 2006).
In any case, it seems that the ICT sector has approached the information society as 
separate projects, rather than a whole social transformation. Moreover, many 
interviewees have identified an outlook which has been about targeting quick sales of 
equipment and quick profit: “The ICT sector has always looked at the OPIS as a 
programme out o f  which they would amass riches, sell products, etc. They did not 
have a more ambitious and more constructive positioning regarding the information 
society in Greece” (YC 2008). And more: “The ICT sector was oriented towards the 
commercial part, i.e. to bring and sell computers, rather than develop and provide 
services; this was not a developmental logic, but rather a short-term profit logic, 
which in combination with bureaucratic evaluation procedures, an inflexible 
regulatory framework, and non-transparent procedures, created certain deformities'” 
(PG 2006). Supply and demand were therefore at a mismatch: “ While projects were 
orientated towards provision o f services, the IT sector had been used to providing 
only ‘boxes ’, hardware equipment, not services” (JK 2006). Indeed, the term ‘box 
movers’ was coined to signify ICT firms who were limited to acting as distributors of 
hardware equipment (XK 2005).
Instead, many interviewees have suggested that the way forward is not to sell 
computers but to generate an environment of demand; not to wait to be part of a big 
public project (e.g. TAXIS), but rather to try and contribute to the creation of small 
projects close to local needs and in cooperation with local authorities.54 Further, the 
need for IT firms to be more creative and try to develop innovative service and 
software solutions based on the needs of the (small) Greek market has been proposed:
54 For instance, in the case of broadband infrastructures for the SYZEFXIS project, the private sector 
was waiting for OTE (i.e. the public sector) to run the project, instead of approaching directly some 
local authority for the creation of an alternative infrastructure (a fibre optic ring, for example). In the 
few cases where IT firms did try to develop alternative infrastructure, they faced resistance from the 
municipalities, which treated them with mistrust (TP 2006).
187
“Software providers cannot be based on the logic o f  retail any longer, e.g. taking 
Microsoft products and reselling them to make profit, as there is no value-added in 
this way and these products are already expensive, so profit-making opportunities are 
limited. Customised products, based on some general platform, which however can be 
adapted to serve the specific needs o f the small business client, are what is needed, 
while general purpose large scale solutions are suitable only for large enterprises- 
clients” (TP 2006). For others, the ICT sector is trapped in an old, pre-Internet, logic 
of automation: “They do not seem to understand the modular character o f  ICTs, the 
fact that nowadays some things you can readily do through given platforms (e.g. 
Google) and it is a question o f adding content and created added value. They are 
interested in how much they can sell and to sell what they have” (YC 2008). 
Interviewees have also pointed out that the OPIS should not have been the only target 
of the sector.
Moreover, clientelism and micro-corruption have been frequently involved in project 
allocation and have been accompanied by a defiance of rules and codes of conduct 
during implementation. Given the degree of development of the Greek ICT market, 
firms resort to all methods and means available to succeed in getting a project or in 
preventing others from doing so. More specifically, there has been observed the 
phenomenon of a small number of hegemonic firms able to appropriate the majority 
of projects due to their capacity to take advantage of their relations with the public 
sector (e.g. personal relations with ministerial personnel), with obvious implications 
for fair competition.55 One such case has been Altec, one of the most hegemonic IT 
firms, particularly regarding projects for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where it has 
enjoyed certain connections. Other firms have been dominant in other areas, for 
instance Intrasoft with regard to the TAXIS project, as well as a lot of projects within
55 A senior executive o f a very successful IT firm active in the retail sector provides an example: “ We 
applied fo r the security component o f  the SYZEFXIS together with KPMG, the Athens Stock Market 
and some Swedish firms; there was a competing proposal submitted by OTE and some other players. 
We fa iled  to submit a particular certificate saying that we had not gone bankrupt (which o f course we 
had not); this was notified to us and we did submit it the following day. However, on this basis only, 
our proposal was rejected without it being considered. For such a crucial project, which had to do with 
the security o f  public transactions, a serious proposal was rejected, without assessment, because there 
were interests involved that wanted OTE to get the project. We did resort to justice, but in vain. Such 
examples act also as disincentives fo r any foreign interests and potential investment involved’ (SK 
2009).
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the Ministry of Health. The practice of such firms is to establish such connections and 
relationships with ministry employees and cadres, thus getting early access to 
information regarding the specifications of the project and as a result comparative 
advantage in the preparation of their proposals for the project in question (RA 2008). 
In many cases, these dominant firms are in the position to create the specifications 
themselves (for instance Intracom with OTE in many cases). Such phenomena led one 
interviewee to remark: “Characteristics o f the industrial era are replicated in exactly 
the same way today. We have state-dependent enterprises and the logic o f  
appropriation o f  resources and funds by the small segment o f ‘the s e l e c t e d (JK 
2006).
One recurring practice, demonstrable of the dialectic between inadequate public 
expertise and IT firms’ behaviour has been the Greek public procurement particularity 
of setting technical, rather than functional specifications. This means that instead of 
identifying just the needs that should be served by a specific project, these needs are 
often made more specific in terms of technical characteristics of the ICT solutions 
suggested. In the beginning this was demanded from the OPIS mechanisms in order to 
get concrete specifications; it was seen as a necessary evil. However, it soon became a 
fruitful field for the operation of clientelism: “When we pressed for having functional 
specifications in calls for tender (i.e. identifying the ICT needs in non-technical terms, 
not in terms o f  particular technical specifications) we were faced with vehement 
opposition. This is because some ICT firms wanted the calls for tenders to be 
technically specific so that a particular, well-connected firm, would have competitive 
advantage over the others” (YC 2008). Indeed many interviewees, both from the 
public sector and from the ICT sector, have confirmed that this is often the case (RA 
2008).
Technical overspecification has as a result often given rise to appeals claiming that the 
way specifications are presented they favour the products of one firm and not another, 
thus damaging fair competition. A point stressed is that the employees preparing the 
specifications are often assisted by external academics in the setting of the 
specifications, something which bears the question whether these academics were 
independent or part of the payroll of a certain firm. Further, the committees deciding 
on the winner of a competition have often lacked respect and trust, something that has
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also given rise to objections. Last, there have been phenomena whereby an objection 
from firm A to firm B for project X would lead to retaliatory action from firm B on 
firm A for another project Y.
Additionally, these tactics have generated a number of pathogenic practices. For 
instance, it is not uncommon to get appeals on the basis that the product offered is not 
exactly that mentioned in the specifications, although it might actually be an improved 
version as a result of technological evolution. In this way the process has to start all 
over again with delays of the order of two years or so.56 On the opposite side, an 
inferior product can be specified in the first place, the reason being that the employees 
who prepare the specifications are used to having product A rather than B. 
Alternatives to competitions of this sort have been considered, but reservations have 
also been expressed: “Instead o f this system, a better one would be to engage certain 
firms in long-term contracts and get from them services on demand without having to 
conduct competitions. But this presupposes a robust and independent public 
administration. I f  you do not have this you go by the book as far as specifications are 
concerned and then you get the objections mentioned above” (GP 2007).
In cases when a certain firm is assigned with the implementation of a project through 
favouritism, formal procedures are often sidelined and “buying one’s way in” is 
accompanied by a defiance of rules and codes of conduct. As the exact conditions that 
are present during allocation of some public projects are often unclear, mistrust and 
scepticism have become the norm. Moreover, firms have also been accused that they 
have been always looking for excuses not to implement the projects (invoking 
inadequate budgets or other reasons) and that they are interested in signing a contract
56 A case in point was that of an IT project that would provide a number (113) of body measurements 
for citizens in specially designed booths and would have been useful in a number of contexts, including 
clothing manufacturing. This was primarily designed for the Olympic Games of 2004 and also the 
Greek army which was to receive the equipment (scanners) afterwards. According to the president of 
the company which was given the project, the proposal for this was submitted to a relevant evaluation 
committee which included people from the Olympic Games Committee. This would have been very 
spectacular in the Olympic Games context as these booths would have provided in 20-30 seconds body 
measurements for those involved in the Games (including athletes and volunteers) in order for them to 
get appropriate clothing, something that had not happened before. The outcome, however, was that the 
project was ready only after the Games, because of continuous queries that delayed the process of 
allocation, while the IS SA, which could have given it political priority for it to proceed did not do so. 
(SK 2009).
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and then “managing the contract legally”, rather than implementing the project (YC 
2008).
The desire of the ministries to be in control of projects, a tendency mentioned earlier, 
is also revealing of deeper and not always transparent motivation: “In the best case, 
they want to be in control so that a project does not take place, in the worst case they 
want to be in control in order to allocate a project to whomever they want and get a 
‘commission ’ out o f  this. The ICT firms in Greece have been used to the logic that 
every committee for allocating, or evaluating a project will have to get a bribe and it 
is exactly this logic that is behind the insistence o f  ministries to undertake the projects 
themselves, expressed through immense pressures from the internal mechanisms to 
the minister. This is crystal clear” (GP 2007). Generally speaking, it has been 
standard practice that companies enjoying direct relations with ministries would rather 
deal with them directly than with the OPIS bodies; by contrast, those devoid of such 
relations tend to opt for a more transparent process of project allocation through the IS 
SA.
5.5.2. Regulatory framework
A further degree of complexity emphasised has to do with legal, regulatory and 
institutional framework of ICT project implementation and of public procurement 
mechanisms on the whole. Such frameworks have been informed by the tradition of 
large public projects in Greece. In addition, administrative procedures have continued 
to be quite complicated, reflecting the fragmentation of public administration that has 
been formed historically. The resulting very long life cycle of ICT projects has often 
surpassed the time span of governments and has conflicted with the very short life 
cycle of many components of ICTs (TK 2005).
As there is no separate regulatory framework for services (only one framework for 
products), “The minimum time lapse for a large public project (meaning over 1.5 
million Euros) has to be around 14 months. I f  one counts the design and approval 
phases this becomes 24 months and frequent delays extend this period to 36 months'” 
(YS 2006). For an ICT project, three or four years delay means that it is highly 
unlikely that it will be of any use, or that it will be used for the purposes for which it
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was designed. Routine projects, for instance the information system of the Ministry of 
Health or the Ministry of Development, have in this way been implemented 
(procurement has been completed), but have been of limited use, if any.57 The 
example of the Police-On-Line project is also a case where the contract was signed 
two years after the call for tenders, by which time the hardware involved had become 
obsolete (LT 2005). According to a senior Managing Authority figure, the most 
extreme case of this phenomenon is in the health sector, where “everything bought 
ends up locked in the basemenf\ where products and solutions are provided but never 
used. In the rest of the public sector often a small percentage of the capabilities of a 
system are put into use, e.g. from a system of 2 million Euros certain applications of 
100,000 Euros are deployed, while the rest is not taken advantage of (TK 2005).
The vast majority of the projects are co-financed with EU funds, making procedures 
even more complex, with extra monitoring mechanisms and increased transparency 
and accounting demands. The EU has placed only a small number of demands 
regarding projects: for instance, that the projects benefit all citizens equally, that there 
is transparency in the implementation and that the outcomes are positive; however, 
“We divided each o f  these imperatives into thousands o f  other small regulations that 
need to be followed. The regulatory framework is one important reason why 
significant delays occur. It is ‘sick’ and the procedures need to be followed to 
implement a project are extremely complicated. It is a very old framework, made up 
o f literally volumes o f  legislation, some o f which dates back to the 19th century” (YL 
2005). Many interviewees from the ICT sector have complained that this quite stiff 
framework makes the application process extremely cumbersome and time- 
consuming (TZ 2006, GK 2006, TA 2006, YP 2007).58
57 On the one hand, due to a multitude of laws and regulations, it is difficult to capture the complexity 
of a public administration task, and to achieve its rationalisation and standardisation. On the other hand, 
when this happens, the resulting information procedures are often narrowly conceived and cannot 
anticipate changes in the practice that might occur before technical procedures and their components 
are implemented.
58 For instance, firms need to submit separate proposals (literally volumes of documents) for different 
projects and this generates limitless paperwork and involves a huge amount of time. Nonetheless, 
changing procedures has also been considered very time-consuming. “At one point we pondered the 
possibility o f  having a 'bank’ fo r firms to submit certificates so that they do not need to submit 
certificates every time they enter a tender fo r  a project. Although there was general agreement and IT  
firms endorsed this, we soon realised that it would take three years to change the procedures because 
o f  various legal complications, so the attempt stopped there” (YL 2005).
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The issue of maintenance of projects is indicative of the problems posed by the 
regulatory framework. This came up during the group interview with members of the 
SEPE Public Projects Committee, whereby a great deal of time was spent trying to 
resolve the following ‘puzzle’: how to reconcile the necessity to provide maintenance 
in public projects (something legally binding and seen by law as important for the 
public interest) with the fact that remuneration is never expected to be received for 
maintenance (due to delays and anomalies involved in public sector projects and the 
long-term indifference of public sector officials and the state expectation that 
maintenance be free of charge (GK 2006, TA 2006, TZ 2006, KR 2006, NP 2006, TH 
2006, YP 2006).
A similar problem was experienced in the case of the army booths project mentioned 
above: “We provided a warranty period and also suggested that maintenance should 
be carried out after that period. The booths are indeed in place now in certain army 
camps. However, nobody has renewed the maintenance contracts: the IS mechanisms 
claim that their role was just to allocate the project, the Greek army claims that they 
do not have any budget for this. In effect, we carry out the maintenance free o f  charge 
at the moment, while the system is not used. This means that for each cohort they 
order more or less all sizes for each soldier, which results in a waste o f many millions 
o f Euros, instead o f  having an accurate picture o f  the needs and order accordingly. 
Obviously some interests are involved there (possibly o f the clothing manufacturers). 
For all these reasons we have decided not to deal with public projects any longer” 
(SK 2009).
The central monitoring mechanisms for the OPIS (Managing Authority, Monitoring 
Committee, IS SA, Observatory) have often been unable to intervene effectively in a 
chaotic system. An issue identified is the abundance of funds in certain areas of the 
OPIS and shortage in others (SP 2006); moreover, the funding agencies involved do 
not have sufficiently large numbers of adequately trained accounting managers to 
monitor the implementation of related projects. Overall, implementation difficulties 
had been in the beginning underestimated and there was an expectation that with the 
mechanisms in place, such as the IS SA, implementation would proceed; nonetheless, 
the IS SA quickly got overloaded, while other supportive mechanisms have not been 
deployed properly (YC 2008).
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5.5.3. OTE: the politics of technological modernisation
A complex state/economy relationship can be exemplified by OTE, the former public 
telecommunications operator in Greece. Founded in 1949, it had been the monopoly 
service provider before liberalisation and has played a controversial role in the 
evolution of the information society in Greece.
OTE has in practice been the formulator of telecommunications policy in Greece, 
mainly because of lack of relevant expertise within the ministries of National 
Economy and Finance and of Transport and Communications. The latter has designed 
the general directions of policy and public procurement, but OTE has determined the 
strategy of the sector (Caloghirou and Skayannis 1995).
OTE has historically been more advanced in technological terms than other public 
utility organisations in Greece, which, combined with its monopoly status, has 
enabled it to attract investment and generate wealth. Nevertheless, particularly during 
the 1980s, when investment decreased substantially, it had a negative image in the 
Greek society, due to its poor telephony service (long waiting lists and high prices, at 
least in long-distance calls). In 1985, following a presidential decree (58/1985), it 
became a socialised public utility: certain changes were introduced, including the 
participation of employees and of certain user group representatives in the executive 
board (Caloghirou and Lioukas 1995, OECD 2001).
In the beginning of the 1990s, OTE functioned in theory as an independent public 
utility, but in practice was heavily dependent on governments. It fit into the tradition 
of the Greek state’s intervention in the daily operations of similar firms, as well as in 
procurement and recruitment policies. The complex relationship with the state blurred 
the definition of the telecommunications goals and modes of operation of OTE, as 
well as impeding decision-making processes, while the preferential employment 
conditions and their abuse by the employees added to the financial burdens of the 
organisation. For these reasons, it became part of the modernisation debate of the 
1990s, about changing the modus operandi of Greek utility firms, which had been
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performing poorly, while suffering from the long-standing problematic relationship 
between party politics and the Greek public sector.
In view of technological developments and the European Commission deadline for 
OTE for full liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, two issues became 
prominent. Firstly, in terms of procurement, the digitisation of the OTE network. This 
had been decided early on in 1977, started only as late as 1990, and has always been 
intermingled with politics and corruption. Following a relevant political decision of 
the PASOK government, in 1988 the executive board charged Siemens and 
Ericsson/Intracom with the provision of 84,000 digital circuits and 20,000 digital 
subscriptions with further signing of binding contracts for the full cover of the OTE 
digital requirements for the period 1989-1993. In honouring these contracts, the 
executive board proceeded with further orders of digital circuits and this initiated a 
big public argument about OTE becoming dependent on these two suppliers and 
purchasing at higher than reasonable cost. This was accompanied by intense 
resistance from the association of OTE employees. Proposals were made for 
conducting open competitions for the future digital needs of OTE, something that was 
never adopted; rather, all the procurement needs of OTE and (after 1998) its 
subsidiary firms in the Balkans continued to be carried out by the two firms in 
question throughout the 1990s and until 2006 when digitisation was complete. 
Significant bribery and illegal commission payments took place throughout this 
period, the most renowned case being a 1997 contract with Siemens (Stratoulis 2009, 
Telloglou 2009).59 Another case had to do with the expansion of OTE in Romania, 
through its OTEROM subsidiary firm, which fell through, as OTE acknowledged in 
the process that it faced funding problems. The Greek media accused OTE at the time 
that through its aggressive policy in the Balkans it aimed at generating lucrative deals 
for Intracom, something that has been refused by the then president of the executive 
board (DP 2009). Many similar scandals came out about Intracom receiving OTE's 
state commissions as a result of political patronage.
59 This was a five-year (1998-2002) contract between OTE and Siemens of the order of 158 billion 
drachmas; it was subsequently revealed that it also involved direct payments from Siemens to party 
cadres and OTE high officers (Telloglou 2009).
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The second issue in the 1990s was the privatisation of the organisation. Two 
unsuccessful attempts took place in 1993 and 1994. The first, when the conservative 
government decided to sell a 35% share of OTE to an international telecoms operator 
and the stock market flotation of another 14%. The second, when the PASOK 
government offered a more acceptable solution to trade unions and procurement 
beneficiaries through a possible flotation of a 25% (of which 18% to foreign 
operators), keeping state control of OTE’s management. Both attempts aspired to the 
generation of funds for the modernisation of the telecommunications network of the 
country, as well as the creation of international partnerships, while the first one aimed 
also at the modernisation of Greek telecommunications at large through a big foreign 
enterprise which would invest in OTEs technological and organisational upgrading 
(Caloghirou and Lioukas 1995). The first attempt led to the fall of the conservative 
government. As the management of OTE was at stake, it faced opposition from a 
coalition of interests (the long-term procurement private supplier who had enjoyed 
preferential conditions, other business interests, trade unions, media, and party 
factions) accusing the government of selling-out national wealth (Pagoulatos 2005). 
The second attempt failed as the PASOK government under Papandreou could not sell 
OTEs stocks at a price that would reflect the value of the organisation.
In parallel, pressures from the European Commission for quicker liberalisation of the 
sector in the 1990s were also coming up against huge resistances from OTE and its 
employees; these resistances were quite potent due to the close relationship of the 
PASOK government with the OTE trade unions. When liberalisation of mobile 
telephony occurred in 1992, two licenses were granted to private companies, but OTE 
continued to enjoy a privileged position as infrastructure owner and telephony 
services monopolist throughout the 1990s and until 2001, when the time limits of the 
WTO and EU regulatory reform were eventually exhausted. In the meantime, partial 
privatisation had re-started in 1996 under Simitis, who followed a gradualist approach, 
ensured the cooperation of the management of OTE and avoided open confrontation 
with strong business interests for the purposes of establishing broader consensus in 
view also of the EMU accession project. An 8% initial public offering took place in 
1996 and by 2001 OTE had become the first public enterprise to be controlled by 
private capital; however, the state continued to have the biggest minority stake 
(OECD 2002). After the 2004 elections, downsizing was pursued by means of an
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agreement between the new management and the trade union for voluntary early 
retirement.
Even after full liberalisation, it took a long time for the newly established EETT to 
become strong enough so as to control OTE and give the opportunities for alternative 
providers to function. A comprehensive strategy for telecoms liberalisation was absent 
and OTE was pointing out that the potentially alternative providers were after selling 
profitable services using its own infrastructure, as opposed to developing alternative 
infrastructures: “The Ministry o f Communications was totally incapable o f designing 
and implementing projects and the telecoms strategy was taking place in the OTE 
building, not in the ministry. Things improved a little bit with the introduction o f the 
EETT, but problems still exist. There is still lack o f  human resources, o f  people with 
expertise in international practices who will know how to go about a broadband 
project in the periphery, competition issues, or rights o f  way” (GP 2007).
The dominant position of OTE has had implications for the development of 
telecommunication infrastructures, notably broadband. As OTE had the monopoly of 
broadband, it obstructed developments in various ways (e.g. by not providing 
broadband services at all, or providing them at very high cost). The broadband 
strategy was submitted to the European Commission in 2003 with specific projects 
and budgets, but was thereafter heavily resisted by OTE and the status quo around 
OTE. The OTE executives clearly understood that the development of broadband was 
a matter of public interest, but chose to operate under a profit-making logic.60 In 
relevant negotiations around broadband, OTE executives were pushing for the 
subsidisation of demand by the state, i.e. subsidisation of big user groups (e.g. 
students) in order to generate demand. The OPIS mechanisms (at least in the period 
2002-2004), however, were not prioritising the subsidisation of demand, because they
60 On that basis, OTE was accused of showing significant social and political, but also technological 
short-sightedness. During discussions about broadband infrastructures (of which OTE was sceptical), it 
was decided that optical network units (ONUs) should be installed close to households (at curb-level). 
This was considered a very progressive development; however, the limitation was that these units 
would not support broadband technologies such as DSL, as they were based on ISDN technology. It 
seems that nobody could foresee the impact of DSL at the time, although it was already well-known in 
Europe, or simply OTE had to sell the ISDN boxes they possessed, which manifests a logic of profit at 
the expense of possible more developmental alternative approaches (VM 2005).
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saw this as perpetuation of existing arrangements and high prices; rather, they 
promoted the subsidisation of supply, i.e. of alternative providers so as to build 
alternative infrastructures (VM 2005). Later other players entered the market, but they 
were dependent on OTE, since they were using OTE’s infrastructure. In any case, the 
multiplicity of stakeholders, both public and private, involved in the broadband 
strategy and defending their own interests have contributed to delaying broadband 
progress (Caloghirou and Constantelou 2006). The improvement in broadband 
indicators after 2004 has been due to the substitution of ISDN by ADSL lines and the 
increasing pressures on OTE for opening the market. However, monopoly effects 
have remained since the vast share of the market still has to use OTEs infrastructure 
(and pay accordingly) in order to be able to provide telecommunication services (YC
2008).
In 2007, Marfin Investment Group acquired 20% of the organisation, which was then 
sold to Deutsche Telekom, itself holding a total of 25% in 2008. By 2009, government 
was a minority shareholder with 25% of OTE’s stock, but did not have any control 
over management and procurement processes. Since July 31, 2009, following the sale 
of a further share of 5%, the Greek state holds 20% and Deutsche Telekom 30%.
In summary, OTE has been the pivotal organisation in the telecoms landscape in 
Greece. Significantly, it has been seen to perform different and sometimes 
contradictory functions. Its inheritance of the weaknesses of the Greek public sector 
(public deficit and overstaffing) had turned it into a problematic public utility and thus 
an idiosyncratic case to be tackled beyond the common European expectations of 
liberalisation. Its modernisation and digitisation particularly in the period 1996-8 gave 
him the profile of a ‘serious enterprise’ with an operational plan and sales and 
investment policies (DP 2009), as well as highlighting its function as public 
infrastructure which would be the backbone of the oncoming information society. As 
such, it subsequently became a profitable colossus, often demonstrating a capability 
not always expected (e.g. investing heavily in the Balkans after its privatisation 
started), but also short-sightedness in its technological investment decisions. Recently, 
it has operated more like a private firm with huge vested interests engaging in often 
‘unethical’ practice, including the impediment of telecommunications competition and 
rent-seeking by means of its monopoly infrastructure.
198
A consistent line throughout its history has been the systematic political interventions 
and political antagonisms in the process of its modernisation, together with a 
contradictory behaviour as a result of these political relationships (Caloghirou and 
Lioukas 1995). An effect of the operation of constellations of interests has been that 
the organisation has overall not been used strategically for the development of the 
telecommunication sector and the information society in Greece. And, while OTE has 
been liberalised from its domestic procurers, as a result of EU competition rules and 
corporate governance standards instructed by international investors (Pagoulatos 
2005), procurement processes have continued to be laden with corruption and 
politically-mediated relationships.61 To this day, OTE’s modem profile co-exists with 
old logics and intricate business, trade union and political interests (DP 2009).
5.6. State and civil society
In chapter 3, we characterised civil society in Greece and its relationship to the state: 
a) formal civil society (measured in terms of organisations and participation rates) is 
relatively limited b) civil society organisations (including political parties) are often 
dependent on state mechanisms c) informal civil society is important and should be 
taken into account (Sotiropoulos 2004) d) formal civil society is strong in its 
appropriating potential (Voulgaris 2006), with interest mediation characterised by a 
potent rent-seeking behaviour, while the state/trade unions/business groups relations 
demonstrate disjointed corporatism (Lavdas 2005) e) the state has historically shown a 
limited coordinative capacity vis-a-vis civil society (Voulgaris 2006). During our 
interviews it has been claimed that: “The role o f  civil society has been minimal, 
because civil society is fragmented in Greece” (PG 2006).
An important aspect of the state/civil society relation and its role in IS developments 
has been the ambivalent rapport between the state IS implementation authorities and
61 Recently, another big Siemens scandal caused great excitement in Greek society, as it was revealed 
that Siemens had paid substantial sums to the two large political parties on the eve of the 2004 election 
in order to be placed preferentially for the procurement of OTE, but also of the Greek public sector at 
large (Telloglou 2009).
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SEPE. The latter has been one of the agents pushing for IS projects, albeit exhibiting a 
logic of dependence on state projects and relevant competitions, as opposed to really 
being independently proactive in IS developments. It has been following the logic of 
immediate and easy profit, mainly through the sales of ICT equipment, rather than 
concentrating on the provision of advanced ICT services and looking strategically 
forward to the long-term development of IS and the multiplier effects of ICT 
investments. 62
In addition, our interviewees have revealed that there have been numerous occasions 
of stalled social dialogue between state authorities and SEPE representatives. The 
pressure to advertise ICT projects has been one source of adversarial relations. SEPEs 
insistence on a Minister for IT has been another and has given rise to a debate as to 
whether this would have solved the structural problems observed and whether it 
would have given the anticipated political legitimation. Similar issues have frequently
f/Xcreated tensions in the state/SEPE relationship.
Wider social forces and civil society groups have either not comprehended the 
dimensions of IS developments or have shown a logic of resistance or appropriation 
of the stakes offered: “Societal groups and local communities did not help the 
promotion o f  ICTs, either because actors were acting out o f  their own interest and 
only regarding their own interest or because they were not in a position to 
understand’ (JK 2006). Lack of understanding coupled with resistance and 
appropriative behaviour has meant that the social networks and local communities that 
could help advance and ‘propagate’ the information society by increasing awareness 
have either been absent or characterised by inertia. This has contributed to the picture 
whereby the society has not overall followed IS developments, as it has time and 
again emerged in the interviews:
62 Characteristically, during deliberation processes, SEPE representatives have repeatedly reacted 
against the prospect of spending funds on education programmes (something that would indirectly 
boost demand) and have instead demanded channelling them towards direct purchases of IT equipment 
(TK 2005).
63 We have witnessed this adversarial and antagonistic relationship during the announcement of the 
Digital Strategy in July 2005 in which we were present.
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“Greek society does not participate in this whole affair and has never understood 
what is there to be gainedfrom the information society'’ (TK 2005)
“The OPIS articulated policies that were out o f touch with the Greek context and were 
not acceptable by the Greek society (JK 2006)
“A dominant characteristic that has been observed since the beginning o f the OPIS 
has been the very limited awareness o f the population, and even o f  the ministries, vis- 
a-vis the information society. The needs are not clear, not understood” (TP 2006).
This state/civil society outlook is also underpinned by a particular cultural basis.64 
Indeed, socio-cultural issues have frequently been invoked in the course of our 
interviews as possible answers to the question of why Greece has shown delays in 
absorbing ICTs and progressing regarding the IS/KBE. First of all, references have 
been made to the overall relation between Greeks and technology: “Greeks 
understand ‘easy ' technologies but are not so receptive towards technologies that are 
more demanding and need more investment in time” (TP). Indeed, a historical 
observation is that Greece seems to follow technological developments and other 
international transformations and shows receptiveness to new technological 
tendencies and innovation; however, it has difficulties in assimilating technological 
innovation, i.e. inducing associated productive and employment transformations, 
institutional modifications and attitudinal changes (Voulgaris and Sotiropoulos 2002, 
Caloghirou 2007).
This observation might explain the current diffusion and popularity of mobile phones, 
which are straightforward and easy technological artefacts, albeit significant 
innovative tools. Importantly, mobile phones seem to fit with the extrovert and 
talkative Greek culture, as well as with the mobility needs of the self-employed,
64 The question of culture in the information society, and in particular the extent to which certain 
cultural features are amenable to or unsuitable for the development of an inclusive IS/KBE has not 
been adequately explored in the literature. One of the few examples where culture has been used as an 
explanatory factor (though not the only one) has been Castells and Himanen’s study of the IS in 
Finland. In this thesis, our intention is to avoid making cultural arguments or use culture as an 
explanatory category per se. However, certain cultural dimensions are worth exploring in our 
state/society framework of analysis as manifestations of historical trends and in interaction with the 
state/economy/civil society nexus that we have been applying.
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which form a large employment share. But mobile phones are also seen to be 
important as consumer devices (e.g. with emphasis on their appearance), rather than 
as artefacts with sophisticated functional capabilities (XK 2005).
The above historical trend is probably consistent with the present realisation in the 
context of the information society that “soft aspects” of modernisation (changes in 
attitudes and culture) have not been successful. In this respect, digital illiteracy has 
been referred to as a problematic dimension and has been often culturally explained as 
technophobia: “Technophobia exists and contributes to the digital gap according to 
age: there has been a dramatic change o f ICT deployment in young groups, while the 
over-60 segment is lagging behind compared to other EU countries” (YC 2008). 
Technophobia has been acknowledged as a problem early on in the design of the 1999 
White Paper and the OPIS and certain ways to tackle it have been pursued: “There is 
a kind o f technophobia, particularly among the elderly, which is due to the lack o f  a 
technological culture;65 this is why we tried to find  vehicles for communicating the 
programme and ICTs in the family, through young people that could persuade their 
parents to use ICTs; similarly in very small businesses, o f  which there are several 
thousands in Greece” (TP 2005).
For other interviewees, notably from the ICT sector, however, technophobia should be 
seen in terms of whether there is something of use for the end user (SK 2009). 
Language barriers and the lack of content in Greek have been pointed out as reasons 
why PC purchases are often not accompanied by an Internet connection, particularly 
among older people. For others, limited connectivity is simply due to high prices in 
connectivity. Changes in these dimensions are expected, as prices are dropping and 
content in Greek becomes increasingly available.
Secondly, the issue of investment vs. consumerist culture has been repeatedly invoked, 
often in a complaining tone: “The reasons why Greece is behind in my opinion is a 
lack o f  investment culture and the prevalence o f consumerist culture in Greece.
65 The example, suggested in the course of an interview, of a remote village population in Norway that 
arranged at their own initiative excavations to facilitate the passage of fibre optic infrastructure (XK 
2005) is something uncommon in the Greek context.
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Education has been important for the Greek family, but seen as a vehicle for  
economic security (not investment). Similarly, appointment in the public sector has 
been seen as a situation o f  acquiring professional stability and security. What is 
lacking is a culture o f  investment and long-term benefit. Mimicking can be a way to 
adopt ICTs but not investment culture. There has never been in Greece the logic o f  
investment, only the logic o f  short-term, easy and quick profit. Industrialisation in 
Europe meant investment; lack o f it in Greece meant lack o f  investment culture” (JK
2005)
The Greek picture can be contrasted with that of the Finnish who have always viewed 
technology positively and have developed a technological culture. The Finnish case is 
revealing of the intricate interplay between culture and the state/society relations in a 
national context. The above mentioned difficulty of Greece to assimilate innovation 
and modernisation has been historically documented and is pretty uncontroversial; for 
instance, there have been examples of legal reforms, which have not been followed by 
updated attitudes and practices.66 A possible ‘cultural’ explanation of the phenomenon 
is the well-documented ambivalence that penetrates political culture in Greece. 
Following from the relevant exposition in chapter 3, this boils down to the duality of 
approaching politics through a lens of personal/family benefit, while being 
disenchanted with political life, as well as to being romantically nationalistic, but in 
practice undermining the state (e.g. through tax evasion) (Voulgaris 2008, p.360, 
Tsoukalas 1993). This cultural dimension, however, has to be seen as part of the 
broader structural-cultural state/society nexus which involves among else: the south- 
European importance of familism (with its emphasis on maximisation of welfare of 
family members and its detachment from broader social collectivities); the history of 
the civil war and the subsequent left-right social divisions; the prevalence of 
clientelism and the party-dominated character of politics; and, increasingly, the 
cultivation of individualism through consumerism (Sevastakis 2004). All of these
66 The 1983 Family Law, which legislated a series of changes to promote sex equality in Greece, is a 
case in point. Among else it recognised children bom out of wedlock as equal to children bom in 
marriage. However, such changes have not been reflected in changes in practice: various legal forms 
routinely used still deploy the ‘out o f wedlock’ vocabulary and have not been updated, legal decrees 
treat the two categories differentially, while out of wedlock children carry a social stigma, something 
reflected in the extreme low percentage of out-of-wedlock children in Greece (5.8% in 2007, possibly 
the lowest in the EU-25).
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combined can be considered to have prevented the development of a universalistic 
culture and by extension to have deprived Greece of a socio-cultural basis for 
understanding, investing in and embracing the IS/KBE strategy as a broad, collective 
socio-economic project (apart from its consumerist aspects).
The historical outlook and idiosyncratic modes of civil society and the absence of 
collective and investment culture in Greece does not mean that civil society groups 
have been non-existent. On th6 contrary, there have been occurrences of positive 
mobilisation: the eBusiness Forum, part of the OPIS, was a very innovative process 
and an excellent example of deliberation; the e-Activistes online community, which 
has been quite popular and has attracted knowledgeable professionals; certain 
professional associations (e.g. the Greek Association of Information Technology and 
Communications Scientists and Professionals EPY in the 1980s), which have been 
very active in promoting the Greek IS; various Internet-based communities with a 
plethora of social, political and cultural agendas, for instance the Organisation for 
Safe Internet and the Association of Greek Internet Users.
Further, the deficit in significant civil society activity has been counterbalanced by 
cases of charismatic and enthusiastic individuals and isolated niches of creativity: 
cases in point have been a certain initiatives for broadband for SMEs, which 
succeeded due to some people being enthusiastic about them, as well as the EDET 
team which invested huge considerable passion and energy in order to overcome 
structural difficulties in the development of the academic network (SS 2005).
5.7. TAXIS: an exemplary case
The TAXIS project is an eGovemment application in the area of taxation in Greece. 
What makes it particularly interesting is that it can be seen both as a mirror of various 
dimensions of state structures and the state/economy/civil society relation that have 
been hitherto discussed, as well as an example of fulfillment of certain expectations.
The TAXIS project started in 1994 with a budget of 60 million Euros contributed by 
national and EU funds from the 2nd CSF. Its aim was to provide IT support to tax 
authorities in Athens, as well as local tax agencies all over Greece, for tax filing,
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calculation and payment transactions (Stamoulis, Gouscos et al. 2001). Its deeper 
objective was to introduce early on to the tax system of Greece rules and discipline 
that would not be subject to human intervention. This involved the introduction of 
depersonalised rules, infrastructure, education, collection of information (which was 
fragmented) for the benefit of the state, but also to serve the citizens.67 One of the 
most important actors, who became involved circa 1997 in his capacity as General 
Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, argued: “It was presented not as an aggressive 
and controlling mechanism, but as a system that created the anticipation that the 
citizen would be liberated from dependencies and lack o f  transparency’ (PG 2006).
Overcoming a number of problems in the beginning, the project set off in 1996-7. A 
consortium around the French company Bull was allocated the hardware elements and 
a consortium around Intrasoft was allocated the applications. Two phenomena were 
observed right at the beginning. Firstly, the conflictual relations between the two 
consortia; moreover, the ambivalent role of the ministry, which was used as a channel 
of communication between the two, but was also divided and involved in this conflict 
instead of rising above and acting as a glue for the whole project. Secondly, the 
complexity of Greek bureaucracy itself: “Bureaucratic procedures were so complex 
that at times they looked impossible to codify and captured by an information system. 
Greece seemed to be on the verge o f  proving that IT simply is not advanced enough to 
help administration! ” (PG 2006).
A confrontation with the often irrational institutional constraints some times entailed 
challenging the obvious: The ministry operated through sending small teams of both 
tax experts and IT experts to different tax offices around Greece. The idea was that 
the tax experts would introduce their local colleagues to the system in a way that 
would not alienate them by giving them a too technical presentation of the system; 
rather to deploy them as local allies that would contribute to the diffusion of the 
system. These missions, however, were subjected to a number of constraints. For 
instance, if the team was to travel a distance up to 17 miles, they had to leave on the
67 Before TAXIS, every personal transaction between citizens was subjected to the check that they had 
fulfilled their tax obligations, which created unnecessary bureaucratic trouble.
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day and not the previous day, something which resulted in delays: “On one hilarious 
occasion, Salamis, an island close to Athens, was to be visited. I  then challenged the 
view that Salamis was closer to the 17 mile range by arguing more or less that over 
time Salamis had moved further away from Athens, so as to ensure that the team 
could travel there the day before and use the fu ll morning o f the day in question to 
w orkr  (PG 2006). This was not about individuals being ‘sticklers’, but rather about 
an institutional framework placing huge constraints that had to be overcome on a daily 
basis.
Moreover, there were also political pressures from the shadow government. 
Parliamentary hearings and ‘question-time’ was very intense. The discussion took the 
form of a critique of the government. On one level, critique regarding delays which 
might render the technology in the meantime obsolete. Secondly, critique with regard 
to the procedures through which the competition was run. Thirdly, objections 
regarding the cost of the programme. For the General Secretary, all these revealed 
“an intention to de-construct the system”. Notwithstanding the personal involvement 
and subjective perspective, it does seem that inter-party conflicts were entering the 
debate on TAXIS, which could have been a discussion around common objectives.
An important source of pressure from the ICT sector was to adopt the newer versions 
of technology that were coming out instead of focusing on the functionalities 
required: “/  consider this a Greek characteristic, namely the pursuit o f  the flashy and 
the new, which is not necessarily better in terms o f functionality. At some point, 
during a talk, I  exclaimed: “Long live Win 3.1!”, as there were immense pressure to 
adopt the newer Win95 or Win98 that had just come out” (PG 2006).
A roll out of the system on a weekly basis was adopted and more or less the whole 
country had been covered in three years. Resistances were numerous from various 
sources. At the level of civil society there were attempts by the trade unions to 
overstress the negative aspects of the system with the intention of maintaining the 
status quo. At the level of central and local administration there were negative 
reactions against the prospect of decentralising operations. This was because civil 
servants had been used to having a well defined area of authority demarcated in a 
territorial way, i.e. a specific administrative district that offered also a well-defined
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clientele. The idea that citizens could go anywhere in Greece for their tax affairs and 
were not bound by geographical constraints was not received well by the 
administration.
Significantly, the citizens had been involved in the project from the beginning. A 
campaign had focused on the citizen-centric and social character of the system and the 
need for the citizens to embrace it if it was to be successful. When citizens started 
experiencing the system, through visiting the tax office and being served in a quicker 
way, they could see there was more discipline and transparency in the whole 
operation; characteristically, although citizens were subjected to certain delays 
because the civil servants had still difficulties operating the system, they would not 
react, generally speaking, which indicated that the use of the system made sense to 
them. Subsequently, a strategy was formulated to make certain popular applications 
available to firms and citizens directly through the extension of the IT infrastructure to 
what became the TAXISnet project whose services were accessible directly through a 
web site (www.taxisnet.gr) (Stamoulis, Gouscos et al. 2001). When the first 
applications (related to VAT) were made available and were successful, exposure was 
given by journalists, who happened to be the first users.
The TAXIS project is still considered the most successful story in the information
A f tsociety so far. It is an interesting case, firstly because it reflects the complexities 
and shows the persistence of historical practices of the Greek political processes, 
public administration and the economy and relevant resistances both from the supply 
side (administrators) and of the demand side (citizens). Secondly, it is instructive as a 
case of the state being active in promoting a large IS programme not in isolation, but 
rather in cooperation and communication with other social partners and citizens: “An 
important dimension was that we distributed a leaflet in which we asked for feedback 
on the system. This was the first time this happened historically in the Greek public 
administration. The administration was telling the citizen: “Please let me know!” And 
we had tremendous feedback with a number o f proposals and ideas, which we took on
68 The programme also received a best practice distinction in Brussels, which was a significant boost, 
as it helped put online more applications and increased its use.
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board’ (PG 2006). An interesting dimension was the role of the banking sector. Banks 
were necessary partners in this, as they were the cashing mechanisms. In the 
beginning they were reluctant but when they realised that something serious was 
happening they started competing with each other in order to get large shares.
With TAXIS, it seems that the state proved that it could competently manage the 
transition to the digital fiscal reality. Through the use of the system, the citizen started 
feeling respected by the public administration. The culture of how to evade taxation 
succumbed in many cases (obviously within limits) and more trust was established. At 
the same time, through the concentration of information, the system could detect tax 
evasion and this was communicated to citizens who could see that previous tax- 
evasive practices were not sustainable any longer. TAXIS had also a positive impact 
on small firms, many of which started using ICTs when the TAXIS applications were 
made available (XK 2005). It is also important to stress the role of political leadership, 
as Prime Minister Simitis was interested in the TAXIS and was following its 
development.
5.8. Discussion
Following the above narrative presentation of the basic dimensions of the information 
society development process, we now turn to an analysis of the role of the Greek state 
based on the frameworks of Jessop and Evans.
5.8.1. The Greek state as Competition state’
During the period 1998-2008, and through the introduction of the OPIS the Greek 
state has attempted to act as a ‘Schumpeterian competition state’ within a 
‘Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime’ as in Jessop’s conceptualisation. 
Through its IS policies, the Greek state has undertaken the role of promoting the 
IS/KBE in both material and discursive terms within a Schumpeterian regime, which:
a) has attempted to promote innovation by supply-side interventions and has played 
the key role in material and discursive promotion of the globally-informed 
IS/KBE
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b) has sought to accommodate labour market flexibility and economic 
competitiveness, and in particular has placed great emphasis on education and 
training with the intention of building a knowledge-skilled workforce, as well 
enterprises competent in the KBE at the national, municipal, and local level
c) has been postnational, constructed around the EU and its member states, so as to 
promote a European IS/KBE in accordance with the Lisbon agenda and the 
eEurope policies and adopting an open method of coordination leaving important 
steps to be decided at the national level, as well as involving other international 
institutional arrangements and sub-national and local actors and institutions
d) has been a governance, rather than a government, regime, involving as it has non­
state mechanisms, corporate and industrial actors, civil society organisations, 
professionals, and other experts
The Greek state has to be seen as a government entity, or more specifically, as a 
Schumpeterian competition state within this Schumpeterian regime. Through its 
information society policies in the period under examination, the Greek state has 
attempted to manage the socio-economic transition to the IS/KBE. In doing so, it has 
anchored its activities and policies in international developments involving different 
spatial scales, notably by following the spirit of EU directives and policies for the 
IS/KBE, and has also sought to involve national, sub-national and local government 
units. In addition, it has operated in an environment of other state and non-state 
mechanisms, including for instance its interest in evolving public-private partnerships.
In adopting the role of Schumpeterian competition state, the Greek state has absorbed 
in its approach (as demonstrated in the 1999 White Paper and the OPIS) the 
international shifts in economic discourse that have been taking place since the 1990s: 
emphasis on flexibility, lifelong learning, and most importantly on innovation, 
entrepreneurship and knowledge as an engine for growth and productivity. The Greek 
government has emphasised the role of the market mechanisms in the development of 
the information society, the importance of introducing a more flexible regulatory and 
institutional framework and the significance of the modernisation of public 
administration through the introduction of ICTs in processes and practices (Leandros 
and Iosifidis 2003).
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The OPIS has been a very ambitious programme because of its horizontal nature, 
budget, and multiplicity of goals, and has taken into consideration weaknesses of the 
Greek public sector, which had appeared in the previous CSFs. For instance, it looked 
for vehicles that could act as catalysts in order to bring about results. One of these has 
been the IS SA was conceived of as a private company providing consultancy services, 
but its operations were based on the operations of an improved ministry, i.e. a 
ministry that would retain its public service function but would also operate in a more 
rational way, taking into account performance and efficiency. It was to be used as a 
pilot that would provide the model for how ministries could have transformed into 
more flexible and efficient structures (SP 2006).
The Greek state has presented elements of the regulatory state ideal type, as 
summarised by Jayasuriya (2005). In particular, it has provided new regulatory 
frameworks which are taken to be more suitable in the new economic order. This 
process has involved adjustment to EU regulatory imperatives and directives, albeit 
with difficulties and delays in certain cases, not least regarding the 
telecommunications liberalisation framework and the resistances generated by the 
incumbent OTE. Further, it has institutionalised new independent regulatory 
authorities, notably the National Telecommunications and Post Commission (EETT) 
and the Authority for Communications Privacy Protection (ADAE).
Nonetheless, and in accordance with Jessop’s outline of the role of the state in the 
IS/KBE, the Greek state has not limited its activities to the economic sphere, but has 
sought (through its IS strategy) to address the whole socio-political sphere and the 
problems of social cohesion and social conflict as they re-emerge in the IS/KBE. One 
of the actors involved in the OPIS from the very beginning puts this across clearly: 
“The social functions o f  the state are important, e.g. catering for the needs o f the 
disabled. Improvement o f the operational model o f the state through technologies is 
desirable, but not at the expense o f the social values that the state stands for” (SP
2006).
Our empirical study has shown that as far as its IS/KBE strategy goes, the Greek state 
has been paying attention not only to regulatory aspects, but also to more 
developmental sides of the IS/KBE project, particularly as they are recoined in the
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prism of knowledge management (knowledge becoming the acknowledged central 
asset for economic growth and social development). Through information society 
policies, the approach of the Greek state has been one trying to balance the 
commodification of knowledge, through emphasis on intellectual property regimes, 
with intellectual commons, the social basis and public availability of knowledge. The 
issue of the nature and character of infrastructures has been repeatedly considered and 
problematised: important question is the role o f the state in a potential evolution
o f telecommunications separating physical infrastructures (which could he public and 
controlled by the state) and provision o f products and services under conditions o f  
competition on top o f  these infrastructures and facilities” (VM 2005).
In the area of broadband, in particular, the relevant White Paper reveals the need to 
balance competitive forces and state management. Further, it calls for the state to 
stimulate the broadband market by means of appropriate policies: ‘The rapid 
development of appropriate, generally accessible and affordable broadband 
infrastructure and the development of relevant applications and services must be set as 
a top priority for the State. The above national infrastructure, coupled with 
international broadband connections, is a necessary step in bridging the "digital 
divide" among citizens, both within and between regions of Greece, thus providing 
opportunities and potential for regional development of local communities up to a 
common European standard. The development and use of broadband services by the 
Public Administration, particularly in the sectors of Education and Health, could be a 
major enabler in raising awareness and ensuring penetration of these services across 
the State, promoting their use to citizens and businesses. The State, by actively 
promoting the development of broadband infrastructures and services can be a catalyst 
in Greece towards the targets laid down in the European Initiative eEurope 2005’ 
(Ministry of Economy and Finance 2002, p.x-xi). Indeed, the ongoing programme 
SYZEFXIS is intended to enable municipalities to participate in the IS/KBE and thus 
to reduce aspects of digital divide and function in a developmental way (KEDKE 
2006).
In the light of the above, the Greek policy-makers have promoted the social character 
of knowledge and its availability to all. Universal service, equal access to information 
and the participation of all citizens in the emerging IS have been seen as pivotal
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(Leandros and Iosifidis 2003). The example of education has been characteristic in 
this respect, as all primary and secondary institutions have been provided with PCs 
and have been connected to the Internet. Moreover, in the area of higher education the 
deployment of the infrastructure of EDET on the one hand, together with equal access 
to funding granted to all universities and technological institutions has resulted in 
state-of-the-art ICT infrastructure for all such educational institutions, regardless of 
their geographical location, prestige or quality of study offered. This constitutes a 
national differentiation, as this has not been the case in other countries (e.g. the US or 
Ireland), where access to infrastructures has rather been determined by market forces 
operating under rationalities of demand, cost, and profit in conjunction with 
regulation-guided state policies.
Significantly, education (primary, secondary and higher) has been the only domain 
where all ICT projects have been very early implemented and completed. This was 
partly due to the design (since 1995), according to which a wide human network was 
created, which included all Informatics departments and labs, and supported both the 
local universities and the local schools vis-a-vis the implementation of ICT projects 
(TK 2005)
At the sub-national level, there have been significant initiatives involving 
public/private partnerships for the absorption of ICTs in municipalities. In 2004, for 
instance, the Central Union of Greek Municipalities and Communities (KEDKE) 
undertook a strategic initiative for the formulation of a development strategy so as to 
advance the IS/KBE at the local level. This initiative has been carried out in 
conjunction with a relevant research group on IS/KBE at the National Technical 
University of Athens and PETA SA, a consultancy firm for local development. There 
have also been examples of ‘digital cities’ where a digital platform has been in use, 
notably the cities of Trikala (www.e-trikala.gr) and Amaroussion 
(www.maroussi2004.gr). In a document on the challenges of municipalities in the 
information society, a strong portion of ‘public cynicism’ is detected vis-a-vis a 
political system that seems to be democratic in principle, but not in practice. As in 
standard literature on eGovemment and eDemocracy, the opportunities offered by 
ICTs are highlighted towards creating social partnerships that bridge the gap between 
citizens and authorities. The need to go beyond public surveys on ICT deployment is
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highlighted and emphasis is placed on the creation of a ‘culture of electronic 
democracy’ through Internet dialogue as a means for public participation in legal and 
other processes (KEDKE 2006, p.20).
The Greek state has also demonstrated considerable eagerness to help enterprises 
enter the digital era (through the ‘Go-Online’ and ‘eBusiness’ initiatives). This can be 
seen as a developmental attempt to boost the ICT market, in the spirit expressed by 
the former IS SA president: “The economic role o f  the state should be directed 
towards creating demand conditions in the economy, rather than providing subsidies 
to support certain firms” (SP 2006). On that front, the state has set as a target to 
stimulate demand in the private sector through its own public procurement processes, 
but this objective has come up against various structural problems as presented above.
5.8.2. The Greek state as developmental state’
In Peter Evans’s conceptualisation, outlined in chapter 3, the ideal type of the 
developmental state incorporates the pillars of ‘embeddedness’ and ‘autonomy’, 
which Evans link in his notion of ‘embedded autonomy’ (Evans 1995). In his 
discussion of the IT sector in Korea, India and Brazil, Evans attributes the different 
technological trajectories to different state structures and different state-society 
relations. In the case of Korea, a robust and coherent bureaucratic apparatus and its 
dense ties to private industrial capital is seen as the source of technological progress, 
while the network ties between state and firms have been crucial in developing local 
IT capabilities.
By contrast, in India, the state/industry relation, at least in the beginning, has been 
characterised by Evans as ‘aloof and ‘semi-adversarial’ and not conducive to local IT 
development. In the Brazilian case, the state was better connected with local 
entrepreneurs, but its fragmentation presented obstacles in following a programme of 
transformation and in using the links with local firms effectively; while individual 
state agencies were cohesive, the overall state apparatus was ‘badly divided’. As a 
result the Brazilian state was not autonomous enough and this was exemplified in the
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inability of the Special Secretariat for Information to prevent free rider activity (Evans 
1995).
While embeddedness in the above examples refers to links between bureaucracy and 
private capital, in Evans’s subsequent reconceptualisation it is extended and includes 
multiple groups (i.e. civil society as well). Austria, in his view, presents a fine case of 
this extended notion of embedded autonomy, including a harmonious combination 
between a solid bureaucracy, with good links with a well-organised entrepreneurial 
class, as well as an organised working-class and other civil society groups (Evans 
1995). Using Evans’s logic, one could argue that Finland presents a combination of 
solid bureaucracy and well-built links with the economy and the civil society groups 
and other forces, i.e. a case of adequate ‘embedded autonomy’.
The language of ‘embedded autonomy’ is useful in assessing the role of the Greek 
state as developmental state in the context of IS/KBE development.
On the dimension of autonomy, the Greek public administration has been 
systematically subject to abusive interventions by successive governments, through 
the historic trend of frequent replacement of relevant bodies and top personnel with 
every government change and of the creation of different layers of employees (what 
Sotiropoulos calls clientelism from above and from below respectively). The resulting 
fragmentation and unbalanced distribution of resources have clearly painted their 
strokes on the canvas of disruption, lack of coherence within public authorities and 
agencies and non-accumulation of expertise and experience in the Greek public 
administration. In the context of the IS, these trends have informed the notable 
absence of a pool of project managers and other skillful personnel aware of 
technological needs and of the contours of the Greek public administration labyrinth, 
as has been made evident in the case of the OPIS actions.
The political deployment of the public sector as a mechanism for absorbing excess 
labour force and for exchange of political favours through the operation of the forces 
of clientelism has also attributed to the Greek bureaucracy cultural characteristics 
important in the discussion of the reception of ICTs in public organisation and 
practices. This reception has seen resistances and the perpetuation of practices which
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are not demonstrable of a Weberian bureaucratic culture based on rational/legal 
expertise, but rather have been informal and often corrupt. Clientelism, rather than 
meritocracy and accountability, is the key to maintaining these practices: “One 
problematic dimension that is characteristic to Greece is the umbilical cord between 
state and public administration where clientelistic relations dominate and where 
distinction and career development are related to party affiliation and membership” 
(GP 2007). Further, it can be argued that these have been institutionalised by the 
permanent status that employees in the public sector enjoy.
Negative societal attitudes towards public administration and the pejorative stereotype 
of having a ‘civil servant mentality’, which is widespread in Greek society, have also 
fed on the low self-esteem of public employees who have as a result lacked the 
incentive to view ICTs as tools to enhance the provision of a public service they do 
not pride themselves on.
Last, these practices have been sustained by the fact that expectations and declarations 
of the reorganisation of public administration have not been accompanied by high 
political and managerial prioritisation and commitment in integrating the new 
technologies in daily organisational activities and routines in the Greek public sector 
(Caloghirou and Constantelou 2006, XK 2005).
On the dimension of embeddedness of state mechanisms in the economy, the 
state/ICT industry links have been characterised by relations of dependence and 
antagonism, while the links between state and entrepreneurs at the local level have 
been weak. Despite the comprehensive OPIS strategy, various characteristics of the 
public procurement system have been perpetuated; as this was a top-down 
intervention the structural weaknesses pertained: “Theoretically the political will to 
proceed was there, but this was not enough, as nothing had changed at the structural 
level. The strategy took into consideration the Greek needs, but could not have 
resolved the structural problems the Greek public procurement suffered from” (TK 
2005).
The ICT public procurement profile has presented some, though not all, of the 
dimensions mentioned by Caloghirou (1993). Specifically, though it has not been
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monopolistic in theory, there have been dominant firms which have attributed to it an 
oligopolistic character. Further, for many firms it has been 
monopsonistic/oligopsonistic, the public sector being their sole client. This profile has 
contributed to the establishment of idiosyncratic state/ICT relations. ICT firms, 
although private, have relied extensively on state promises for funding that either have 
not been materialised, or have not been accompanied by appropriate monitoring of 
industrial performance (Voulgaris 2003).
Inflexibilities, rigidities and overlappings and overall inefficiencies in public 
bureaucracy have been considered the main reason impeding entrepreneurial activity 
and increasing operational costs in the sector. Corruption and fiscal instability seem to 
add to the picture. A further problem perceived by the ICT firms is that the existing 
information society strategy for the public sector is inadequately designed, with no 
clear short-term and long-term goals and neither supported by a fit institutional 
framework nor given political priority at the national policy level. The telecoms 
framework in particular shows delays in the adoption of EU directives with 
implications for the operation of competition, while the still slow pace of broadband 
infrastructure diffusion is taken to delay the development of the ICT sector 
(Observatory 2007a, 2007b, YP 2007, YS 2006, SK 2009, LT 2005, AT 2009).
As for the practices of the ICT industry, they have been overall informed by the path 
dependencies of Greek industrialisation and public procurement. Opening the ‘black 
box’ of the sector itself, extreme antagonisms and the deployment of often 
questionable or unethical practices seem to dominate the picture. A culture and 
mentality of low professionalism and short-term profit are dominant, which play a 
part in limited coordination and collective attitude and inform a superficial approach 
to ICT projects. With few exceptions,69 ICT firms have offered generic products with 
low added value and low knowledge content, have not been innovative, have not built 
productive, research, and management capacities, have often resorted to clientelistic 
behaviour and have been complacent in enjoying state spoon-feeding, but not 
ambitious enough to provide project outcomes and induce change. ICT public
69 e.g. Mellon, an originally Greek firm providing financial services, which has expanded to become a 
multinational firm currently employing more than 2,200 people in 11 countries.
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procurement has been subjected to various political influences and has not overall 
functioned as a developmental lever for the ICT sector.
Fragmentation in the activities of the sector and its “shallow” base with low 
specialisation and knowledge content contribute to the slow development of the sector 
and the superficial character of the ICT market. This is related to the level of ICT 
diffusion in households and the public sector, which is indicative of a market that does 
not invest in innovative products and processes, where firms are not competitive and 
not capable of developing integrated ICT solutions. A symptom of the lack of 
maturity is the few occurrences of strategic alliances, which means that firms remain 
small in size and scope. In parallel, the low level of ICT skills drives down the 
demand for ICT products and services in SMEs (Observatory 2007a, 2007b).
The ways of engagement of OTE in the OPIS has not been characteristic of 
embeddedness either. It has been suggested that it could have been used strategically: 
for instance, to provide broadband services for educational goals, without being 
subsidised, and make profit out of the provision of services. But lack of political will 
and a set of strong interests revolving around OTE (and not necessarily understanding 
the challenges and opportunities involved) ensured that attempts to use the 
organisation in this way failed (TK 2005).
Last, but not least, the degree of involvement of local entrepreneurs in the process of 
information society building has been low. Despite attempts to decentralised 
implementation, often big ICT chains entered the competitions and got the contracts at 
the expense of smaller local firms (which could not compete in prices); in the case of 
primary and secondary education, local firms were reduced to subcontracting roles for 
the large ones, dealing with installation or after sales service.
Regarding the embeddedness of state mechanisms in the society, state/civil society 
ties have been loose and superficial, while the Greek society has not overall embraced 
the information society programme.
The involvement of working groups and electronic fora, as indicated in the OPIS 
structure (Figure 5.1) has to be acknowledged as a step in the direction of increasing
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embeddedness in the context of the information society. This novel element has been 
in line with the EU guidelines for inclusion in the information society and has 
functioned in two ways: firstly, it has been intended to provide OPIS with 
technological and socio-economic expertise under conditions of rapid technological 
and social developments at the international level; secondly, it has been considered a 
mechanism for diffusion of information and participation in the information society 
policy processes on the part of scientific, professional, entrepreneurial, and various 
other social groups belonging to civil society (OPIS 2004). As an element of design, 
this involvement has been clearly in line with Evans’s notion of embeddedness, 
though the actual composition of the groups in question, the degree to which they can 
be representative of the Greek society and the extent to which their feedback has been 
taken into consideration are far from clear.
At the level of implementation, TAXIS has been the best example of a project 
generating demand for ICT deployment both in the public and in the private sector, 
and accordingly boosting the ICT market. It has demonstrated political vision and 
systematic management and leadership in achieving electronically available services. 
It has also mobilised a certain degree of citizen participation and feedback and can be 
seen as a case of ‘embedded autonomy’. For these reasons TAXIS got roots in the 
Greek economy and society, gradually changing attitudes towards technology and 
towards the relationship between the citizen and the state in what regards the former’s 
fiscal obligations to the latter. Its multiplier effects have been limited, but they exist. It 
could potentially have had more, had it been involved in the rational management of 
economic resources in various domains, particularly where management of resources 
is problematic.70 Placing ICTs in an educational context through projects with central 
coordination and decentralised implementation in schools involving local actors has 
also been seen as a sign of increased embeddedness.
For some interviewees, embeddedness entails a more flexible state with decentralised 
execution of projects: “The Greek state has not yet understood the strategic role that 
it has to play. It has not understood that it needs to release some functions and to
70 For instance, agriculture, which could have benefited by connecting to the TAXIS system so as to 
facilitate payments and other transactions, applications for subsidies etc.
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undertake certain other functions. Most OPIS initiatives have been centrally 
executed?' (TP 2005). Another aspect of embeddedness has to do with providing 
adequate support. It has been acknowledged that there should have been better 
provision of technical advisors/experts who would provide consultancy throughout the 
processes of project implementation to those entities (ministries, firms, individuals) 
who did not possess sufficient know-how.
Antagonisms, interests, and the logic of appropriation seemed to have acted against 
the possibility of embeddedness:
"Imagine a landscape where there is from the beginning a tension between the two 
ministries involved, a huge public bureaucracy behind them, two authorities 
(Managing Authority and Information Society SA) that are allocated responsibility for  
public projects, but belong to the two ministries respectively and reflect the tension 
between them, seventeen ministries dreaming that the programme belong to them, a 
sole telecommunication operator OTE, at that point in time, which understands that it 
has to adapt to new circumstances, but refuses to change and obstructs developments, 
and a business community where each entrepreneur dreams that the 2.8 billion Euros 
is only for themselves. Where there are many actors involved and where each o f them 
(ministries, business associations) thinks that they own the totality o f the programme 
what can you expect? ” (JK 2006).
The issue of political leadership as a developmental attribute of the state has been 
time and again invoked:
“The OPIS was never linked with a broader policy agenda surpassing the logic o f  
funding, i.e. everything done was linked with the funds available and there was no 
broader political agenda within which somebody would declare that this was a 
dominant political issue in Greece regardless o f  the availability o f  funds. France, for  
instance, saw the issue in a more developmental way, i.e. linking it with industry, but 
France had a technological background to do so, while Greece suffered from  
incomplete industrialisation” (GP 2006). Indeed, several members of ICT firms and 
the official SEPE leadership have confirmed this as a basic problem and have 
persistently called for a high-level IT agenda with the setting of clear and urgent 
priorities and political responsibility and accountability at the level of a Minister for 
IT (YS 2006, YP 2007).
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In the beginning communication of the OPIS was quite slow and not adequate in 
addressing Greek society at large; it just generated expectations for the ICT sector. 
This was considered in retrospect a mistake, as associations such as the Technical 
Chamber of Greece, or the Economic Chamber have been missed out on. This 
approach has had negative implications particularly for the soft initiatives of the 
programme, such as entrepreneurship, the importance of which has been 
underestimated (YL 2005).
As the first (2002-2004) IS Secretary confirmed, the need for a more general 
education around ICT issues was not given priority. Rather, there was in the 
beginning a noted reluctance to fund publicity. The programme was not publicised 
early on, although the European Commission had asked the OPIS mechanisms to do 
so. A significant reason why this happened refers again to the structural problems of 
the state/economy relationship, in this case the relationship between the media and 
political authorities. There was a fear that publicity would be involved with political 
processes leading to phenomena of nepotism between media organisations and 
ministries. This is another recurring structural problem which involves the advertising 
funds of the various ministries. In the case of information society, “zY did have an 
impact, in the sense that I  was reluctant to sign anything to do with advertising 
campaigns for fear that there would be subsequent pressures as to who gets the 
campaign” (GP 2007). Further, the advertising project (part of the OPIS) faced delays 
and obstructions of the kind described in the previous section. As a result, for some 
time there was no separate communication strategy or initiative because the relevant 
contract had not been signed until at least 2005.
Overall, there has been a lack of social consensus as to what the information society 
involves at the societal level and what its objectives are. This is owing to the generally 
recognised fact that there has not been so far a social dialogue of political authorities 
and implementation mechanisms with citizens, firms and social forces for 
identification of information society goals.71 Our interviewees have emphasised that a
71 This changed to some extent in the preparation of the Digital Strategy 2006-2013, where a public 
deliberation apparently took place with questionnaires sent to various entities (private individuals,
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comprehensive strategy at the level of design was not followed by the identification of 
a set of strong political priorities, supported by political will, for information society
77development. This seems to be a historical trend as well: it has been observed that 
the programmes in all CSFs, including the OPIS, have been operating through the 
interaction of state mechanisms and experts with ICT sector players, but without clear 
priorities regarding the societal level and without the building of social consensus 
towards these priorities.
Certain suggestions have been put forward as to how better integrate social forces. 
Flexibility and identification of local needs have been emphasised: ‘7  think that we 
need to move from large-scale to small-scale projects that will be publicly available 
for all and can be adaptable to one ’s own needs. For instance, a cultural portal can 
be used by a municipality for its own purposes. The positive aspects o f such an 
approach are that you achieve economies o f  scale and a degree o f  homogenisation o f  
technology. The negative aspects are that you will need local knowledge to 
understand one’s own needs and have human resources that have the skills and 
ability to understand how they can apply the available modules to local needs. In this 
model, the state has to play a role o f  coordination role, take strategic decisions and 
invest for all ... What I  am saying is that we will have a central implementation 
mechanism, but you also need to have something for local communities to understand, 
in order to actually implement projects. In my opinion it is important to try and build 
synergies at the local level o f  society: between local authorities, local business, 
universities o f  a region, etc. ” (TP 2006). This is clearly towards the direction of 
greater embeddedness and identifies some of the challenges involved in bringing it 
about.
banks, companies, civil society etc.) and analysed, as well as with daily workshops with participation 
of citizens and about 10 NGOs taking part to discuss the Digital Strategy (YL 2005). However, the 
impact of this process on the actual drafting of the strategy remains unverified.
1,2 In the words of a former President of the Managing Authority “had the OPIS focused on a small 
number o f  strategic priorities made clear in advance, the next step would have been to engage 
stakeholders and partners towards the implementation o f the objectives” (TK 2005).
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5.9. Conclusions
The political ambition to establish a Greek IS/KBE found its expression in the well- 
designed, ambitious and well-funded OPIS, which was very innovative, in the sense 
of overcoming fragmentation to produce a centrally directed and homogenised IS 
policy. At the level of the basic actors involved there was an aspiration that a 
programme was being designed that would overcome historic structural differences, 
notably in the public sector (TK 2005).
The experience of putting the programme into practice has nonetheless exposed a 
number of structural difficulties that were much deeper than its actions could 
penetrate. The drivers of the information society in Greece have been the government 
and the OPIS bodies and mechanisms and the ICT sector; for many interviewees, the 
end users (ministries and the public sector overall) have been characterised by inertia. 
The push from the government, the pressures from the ICT sector and the inertia of 
the end users have created a number of deformities in the OPIS (SK 2009).
Overall, the public sector has presented inadequacies both as provider and as 
consumer of digital applications and services. This has been due to insufficient ICT 
and project management skills, as well as absence of adequate consultancy services in 
the public sector. At the micro-level of organisational practices, the introduction of 
ICTs has been received by institutional inertia and the persistence of informal 
practices and phenomena of micro-corruption. Over-legalistic and rigid regulatory 
frameworks add to this complex picture of the south European model of bureaucracy 
which has confronted information society projects. The rationalisation and digitisation 
of the public sector is regarded as a sine qua non for ICT-based social transformation 
(Caloghirou 2003). '
Unlike national cases where large ICT firms have acted as leading innovators (e.g. 
Nokia in Finland), the ICT sector in Greece has been characterised by a very small 
number of large firms and a vast majority of small and very small enterprises. Corrupt 
practices have been observed, while a multiplicity of vested interests with short-term 
economic or political objectives have been involved in public procurement 
mechanisms. The state/ICT sector interaction patterns are an expression of historically
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formulated state/economy relations of dependence which have resulted from the 
incomplete industrialisation and the small market of the Greek economy (Voulgaris 
2003), the fact that the economic accumulation model of Greece has small knowledge 
and technology content, which are not treated as developmental mechanisms (YC 
2008), as well as the tradition of clientelism. In terms of future prospects, 
interviewees have identified state dependency, the small size of firms and of the 
market, their introvert behaviour and their low appetite for innovation as the main 
problems of the sector (AT 2009).
The historically ‘idiosyncratic’ Greek civil society (partly weak, partly strong in 
appropriating potential, but in any case feeble in the promotion of universal goals) has 
not contributed to the evolution of the IS/KBE project in Greece in any substantial 
way. Social networks and local communities that could help advance the information 
society by increasing awareness have been limited or characterised by inertia. The 
absence of a tradition of universality and the prevalence of clientelism and social 
heterogeneity have denied so far broad processes of social inclusion vis-a-vis the 
information society project, despite the rhetoric expressed in the OPIS. Limited 
awareness of potential benefits and dominance of individualism and short-termism 
have postponed the realisation on a social level of multiplier economic and social 
effects resulting from the promotion of the information society. Resistances to the 
prospect of an ICT-related social transformation have been attributed either to 
technophobia, notably in older individuals, or to a lack of motivation to change 
practices.
These observations are reflected in the indicators of low ICT usage, which can be 
interpreted in relation to the lack (in the public sector) of successful applications that 
could have drawn attention and users. At the same time, the ‘critical mass’ of Internet 
users which would create demand for certain applications, services, and information 
content is yet to be achieved.
These ‘negative’ impressions are not the entire story of the IS/KBE in Greece. In 
certain areas of the public sector, e.g. education, where the educators and researchers 
involved know what the requirements are and are in a position to drive them through, 
there have been successful outcomes, at least as far as education and research proper
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is concerned. The completely different case of TAXIS, centrally designed and planned, 
but made meaningful the Greek society, has also been met with considerable success. 
The public sector presents an uneven picture, comprising ‘islands’ where ICTs have 
been diffused and are deployed significantly and other environments bearing the 
classic public sector characteristics (YC 2008). In most successful cases the relevant 
local communities have been involved (as in the domain of education) but have also 
been supported by central authorities politically and economically.
Positive aspects have also been identified by ICT representatives, according to recent 
studies: the Greek ICT sector enjoys human capital with high educational background 
and entrepreneurial drive and finds itself in circumstances where new markets open 
up (notably in the Balkans); global economic processes push development and 
investment, while social acceptance of the new technologies increases; EU funding is 
available and technological innovation is constant and stimulates demand, while 
infrastructures become cheaper and there is room for improvement in ICT diffusion in 
firms, citizens and the public sector. As the ICT market is too small, large firms in 
particular seek international markets for exports and investment (AT 2009). Certain 
tendencies have been considered encouraging: in 2007 56.7% of firms (42% in 2006) 
declared that they were doing business abroad; only 10% of the firms used the public 
sector for over 50% of their business; investment and employment were on the 
ascendance, while the rate of innovative products has increased , though in most 
cases this refers to foreign products being adopted (Observatory 2007a, 2007b).
The Greek state has shown signs of operating in the mode of Jessop’s competition 
state, as well as showing a predisposition for a developmental strategy, in rhetoric and 
in the intentions of some of the experts involved in the OPIS. However, the overall 
impression from the implementation experience, which summarises the findings in 
this thesis, is that the Greek state/society coupling has demonstrated limited 
‘embedded autonomy’. Implementation of policy has been enmeshed in various 
personal and institutional interests, clientelistic relations and micro-corruption (lack of 
autonomy of the state from society). At the same time, the information society project
73 Three out of four firms have put into the market some new or significantly improved product or 
service in 2005-2006 (Observatory 2007b).
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has been designed top-down without social dialogue and with subsequent limited 
mobilisation of civil society, while the links between state and entrepreneurs at the 
local level have been weak and presenting problematic aspects (inadequate 
embeddedness of state into society).
Taking the above into consideration, it is small wonder that the ‘interpretation’ of 
information society policies in the Greek context has meant that abstract notions of 
information society expressed by political ambitions have been in tension with the 
institutions/organisations used for the implementation of policy, as well as with a 
number of social norms, procedures and capabilities of various actors and 
organisations. And that there is hitherto in Greece a lack of an entrepreneurial class 
interested in informational transformation, as well as of a civil society politically 
organised towards a similar goal. The tensions and politics involved in the process of 
information society development in Greece, as exposed in this chapter, shed light on 
the duality of the Greek IS, where a quite advanced small segment is contrasted with 
the majority of organisations, firms, households and individuals.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
The starting point of this thesis was a twofold theoretical and empirical research 
interest: on the one hand, in the place of the nation-state in the light of global forces 
and processes in the contemporary western world; on the other hand, in the 
establishment of new societal arrangements emerging in tandem with advances in 
ICTs. Studying relevant debates, we have created our own set of alliances. Regarding 
the nation-state, with the critical thinkers who neither underestimate the challenges 
facing the nation-state, nor overestimate the effect of global forces in bulldozing the 
state out of contemporary social, political and economic reality. Regarding the 
information society and the knowledge-based economy (IS/KBE), with the critical 
thinkers who have been at pains neither to rule out the pervasiveness of ICT-related 
technical change and its significant contribution to changes in the social realm, nor to 
exaggerate ICT-related socio-political change as a radical break departing from 
previous social realities.
The implications of the above have been the following: Firstly, to allow for an active, 
but also changing nation-state in its forms, functions and roles. Secondly, to approach 
the study of IS/KBE by drawing on the social, political, economic reality of what has 
pre-existed, namely of the reality of modernity, in an attempt to build on and extend 
this (previous) reality to the arguably new arrangements induced by an interaction of 
the political, economic, social and cultural forces and processes with the ICT present 
challenges. This latter implication opens the possibility of shaping the emerging 
IS/KBE depending on particular circumstances. If the national context is taken as the 
context of interest, examining the role of state mechanisms in the development and 
type of emerging IS/KBE at the national level becomes a reasonable research agenda. 
This has indeed created a link between the two starting pillars that has driven this 
thesis and has been its area of investigation.
Nonetheless, this logical link could not by itself have been enough to provide to a 
thesis the necessary legitimation. This is even more so because the state/information 
society relationship seems to be seriously understudied in the literature. Rather, the 
legitimation needed was drawn from history. The role of the state in economic 
development has been extensively studied in different historical contexts. More
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generally, the state has provided the legal, infrastructural and other underpinnings to 
the societal arrangements and economic activities of modernity, as May (2002) argues. 
Further, there have been schools of thought that have linked economic accumulation 
with social regulation placing state institutions at the centre of these activities, e.g. the 
French Regulation School.
If one retains the argument about an active contemporary state and about an emerging 
IS/KBE paradigm of some sort, then examining their relationship or rather the role of 
the former in the evolution, shaping, implementation, organisation, regulation of the 
latter becomes acceptable and viable as a research area. This has provided early on a 
raison d’etre to this thesis, as well as a contribution to the thin literature on the subject. 
Jessop’s framework of a Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime (emerging 
within a broad post-Fordist transformation), part of which is a transformed nation­
state shifting its priorities from welfare to flexibility and competition and in particular 
the promotion, implementation and governance of the emerging IS/KBE paradigm, 
subsequently provided a useful conceptual framework through which to study the 
state-IS/KBE relationship.
The second implication mentioned above has highlighted the importance of historical 
continuities in societal arrangements and social relationships in the present 
‘information age’. Taking into consideration change, but emphasising historical 
continuity and the moulding of the IS/KBE paradigm in accordance with the specific 
context, has alerted us to the value of approaching the IS/KBE in its particular 
circumstances. Being interested in the national frame of reference, this way of 
approach steered clear from a lens of homogenisation (i.e. an ideal type of IS/KBE 
that will eventually emerge in any national context) and towards a study of the 
variations of the IS/KBE in each national context. Such variations would no doubt 
result from specificities that existed in the national industrial society and that would 
either persist in the information age or would be changing in interaction with 
information society developments towards a unique national information society 
physiognomy carrying through historical characteristics of the national frame in 
question.
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Indeed, capitalist variation has been studied and the various ‘models’ (of welfare state, 
the economy, or institutional arrangements) can testify to this. We have referred to 
some of these models identifying national differentiations and clustering national case 
into groups with similar characteristics, but have emphasised that historical continuity 
does not mean stability and purity of the models in question. ‘Recombinant 
capitalism’ (Crouch 2005) has been only one of the terms coined to demonstrate that 
particular national characteristics can combine with others from different models and 
generate new cases under conditions of globalisation, liberalisation and IS/KBE. 
Indeed, we have at certain moments in this thesis resorted to models for analytical 
purposes (e.g. the south European model of bureaucracy as presented by Sotiropoulos), 
but our emphasis has been on the historical continuity and the persistence of 
characteristics, rather than the replication of the entire model itself.
Departing from models, we sought a theoretical approach that could help us study 
historical continuity and variation by taking into consideration the role of the state. 
This lens derived from historical sociology and was the state/society approach 
deployed by scholars such as Theda Skocpol and Peter Evans. The notion of 
‘embedded autonomy’ was thought to be analytically useful in our interpretations of 
our empirical findings.
Methodologically, as the national context has been central to our approach, we have 
chosen to ground our theoretical premises to a particular case of emerging IS/KBE, 
namely the Greek case. Our intention has been to study the IS/KBE developments of 
recent years, when a coherent information society strategy was formulated and 
numerous projects were designed and implemented in various areas across the society 
and the economy. More specifically, to look for national particularities in these 
developments and to link them with historical antecedents and continuities of the 
Greek industrial society. Our aim has also been to examine the role of the state in the 
above developments through its policies and its overall role in the implementation and 
regulation of the IS/KBE initiatives. In order to carry out these objectives, a 
conceptualisation of the Greek context was proposed using the state/society approach 
as a skeleton and providing to it flesh by drawing on authors who have written 
extensively on the Greek social formation and its particularities. The relevant debates 
were identified and certain ‘Greek’ characteristics, historically formulated, were
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pointed out and presented through the state/economy/civil society triptych. The 
usefulness of these characteristics was that they guided the analysis of the empirical 
material collected through interviews with key experts involved in the information 
society developments in Greece.
The empirical study set off with the study of policy documents that have been 
instrumental in shaping the IS/KBE agenda in Greece. We have looked into these in 
conjunction with corresponding key EU documents in order to understand the 
underlying philosophy in both cases. There we have found determinist undertones 
echoing the discourse of IS/KBE as necessity and emphasising the need ‘to adopt and 
adapt to the realities’ (Webster 2006, p.267). After the rhetoric, we switched to the 
reality itself. Using basic statistical indicators, we found a picture of low diffusion and 
deployment of ICTs in the Greek society at large, a picture that would be 
conventionally seen as Tagging behind’.
Subsequently, we carried out a set of interviews with experts involved in some 
capacity in the information society initiatives and their implementation. Through these 
interviews, we have acquired a more detailed, elaborate and ‘low-level’ picture of the 
difficulties of implementation of policies and projects in the unfolding of the Greek 
information society, despite following closely the EU rhetoric and having formulated 
a comprehensive strategy. Moreover, we have been provided with the explanations as 
to why these problems have occurred. These have had to do with factors such as the 
institutional arrangements in the public sector that were not seen as ‘fit’ for the 
IS/KBE age; antagonistic power relations in policy-making circles; the operation of 
clientelism in implementation mechanisms at various levels; the lack of a Weberian 
(rational and efficient) culture in the public administration; the small IT market and 
the intricate links between the IT sector and the state mechanisms, where again 
clientelism is predominant; the absence of civil society driving forces that could have 
given impetus to developments; the apparent lack of interest in information society 
developments shown by large segments of the Greek population.
By providing an account of how policy-makers organise their operationalisation 
strategies at the micro-level, as well as of the underlying mechanisms that guide the 
implementation processes (Caloghirou and Constantelou 2006), we have addressed a
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gap in the literature on the information society. What is interesting for this thesis in 
the light of these findings is not the picture of lagging behind, but rather the 
persistence of historical societal legacies that have apparently continued to be salient 
in the context of information-society developments. Legacies related to the nature of 
Greek public administration, the policy-making processes, the state/economy relations, 
the civil society outlook and modes of operation, as well as cultural characteristics 
which also have historical underpinnings (e.g. lack of collective spirit and 
heterogeneity that links back to a postwar era troubled by Civil War and subsequent 
social divisions).
These characteristic dimensions can only paint a partial picture of current affairs in 
Greece. There is a number of other aspects that are quite distinct in late developers in 
general and Greece in particular: the capitalist mode of production, which is 
embedded in family business, the intense social inequalities, or the particularities of 
the agricultural sector. For each of these dimensions, it would be interesting to address 
the following question in relation to their continuing existence or not in the 
‘information age’: are they reproduced in more or less the same form, are they still 
existent albeit in different forms, intensity and scale, or do they more or less 
disappear? The answer to these questions is important from the point of view of the 
emerging type of information society encountered in the national context. Further, 
there are other dimensions that play a part in the analysis of a national information 
society and could form research questions, e.g. what are the new social strata that 
emerge and what are their characteristics? (NM 2007). Such questions are out of the 
scope of this research but can inform other research agendas related to information 
society.
The methodological implication of the thesis is that historical studies of societies can 
be informative of contemporary information society developments. Generalising from 
the Greek case, we have argued that national variations should be taken seriously in 
discussions of the information society, as the adoption and implementation of 
information society policies is a contested process that comes up against these pre­
existing historical legacies of the national society in question. Legacies which are 
expected to contribute both to the trajectory and to the eventual physiognomy of any 
national information society (as further research in other national cases might
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demonstrate). If the establishment of an IS/KBE presupposes a series of 
organisational, institutional and cultural changes, as commonly assumed in the 
literature, then these changes cannot be taken for granted. The paths to the 
establishment of an IS/KBE will be informed by past institutional structures and 
practices, differentiated in their manifestation, uncertain in their outcomes and 
context-dependent.
The EU rhetoric on the information society and the knowledge-based economy, as 
expressed in the early documents and subsequently in the Lisbon Agenda and the 
eEurope initiatives has clearly promoted an ideal type of an IS/KBE driven by ICT 
developments. The EU policies have sought to establish a new pan-European social 
reality with ICTs at the centre of economic and social activity underpinned by a 
common liberalised telecommunications framework and a digital convergence of 
different media. In doing so the EU circles have implicitly (and even explicitly) 
adopted the assumption of non-exceptionality as far as societal arrangements are 
concerned, i.e. the idea that media convergence and ICT-diffusion will result in 
societal convergence as well. Our overall contribution has been to argue against a 
homogenisation approach by drawing on a particular case study. Our research has 
challenged this ahistorical and shallow vision by demonstrating the persistence of 
history, variation and national exceptionality. Obviously, exceptionality cannot be the 
exclusivity of the national frame of reference and our findings open up the possibility 
of multifarious variations in social, political, cultural and economic arrangements in 
any scale and any context in the ‘information age’; these have to be identified in 
future research.
Thus, we have offered a critical account, in some detail, of a national case of 
information society, notably in a broader geographical area (southern Europe) that has 
been relatively understudied in terms of IS/KBE. At a higher level and by drawing on 
the Greek case we hope to have contributed to the formulation of more general 
theoretical propositions as to the articulation of pre-existing and historically shaped 
state/society configurations with IS/KBE policies in any national context.
In consistency with the continuing importance of nation-state under conditions of 
globalisation, one central dimension of national variation has been the mode of
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intervention of the state itself. Our approach has ‘brought the state back in’ (Skocpol 
1985) regarding the development of the information society. It has highlighted the 
significance of its policies and functions, together with the importance of non-state 
forces (e.g. civil society) and their links with state mechanisms. In the Greek case, the 
state has demonstrated elements of the competition state model (change), but has also 
kept its traditional style and nature of intervention (continuity); this combination of 
change and continuity needs to be empirically examined in other national cases in 
some future research.
Do ICTs and the information age pose significant accountability problems for the 
state? (Sassen 2000b). If the Schumpeterian competition state, as theorised by Jessop, 
indeed captures the basic dimensions of the state as a transformed entity functioning 
as agent of competition acting strategically in an international arena, where it coexists 
with other economic, political and social agents, does this global system challenge 
state accountability to its citizenry and by extension its legitimacy? Castells seems to 
be aware of this problem when he argues that on the one hand states ally themselves 
with global economic interests and abide by global rules so as to promote productivity 
and competitiveness of their economies, while on the other ‘to be good citizens of a 
multilateral order, nation-states have to cooperate with each other, accept the pecking 
order of geopolitics, and contribute dutifully to subdue renegade nations and agents of 
potential disorder, regardless of the actual feelings of their usually parochial citizens’ 
(Castells 1997, p.308).
Development and the attributes of the developmental state might be able to sustain 
state legitimacy by defining activities and state roles that are meaningful to citizens. 
In this respect the role of the state in the IS/KBE is essentially linked with the 
question of whether the IS/KBE is to be a social transformation important at the 
national and local levels and also relevant to citizens. If this is so, then the 
developmental state has certainly a role to play, particularly in the light of the 
technologically-driven and market-driven agenda of the EU: ‘In many cases ... the 
provision of infrastructure has been well in excess of demand and the expected 
benefits have not materialised .... In some cases a supply-side approach may be a 
necessary condition to encourage inward investment, but to encourage use by SMEs 
and the wider community requires a more proactive stance’ (Gibbs 2001, p.74). In the
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Greek case, a desirable role of the state can be summarised as follows: enabler of ICT 
deployment through investment in creating digital content, services, infrastructures 
and in providing training; activator of firms and the market; supporter of research and 
development and, most significantly, mobiliser of the entire societal spectrum 
(Caloghirou 2007).
These roles are in line with Evans’s conceptualisation, in which the ability to effect 
social transformations (and be a developmental state) depends on the autonomy of 
state mechanisms (including bureaucracies), together with close state/society 
relations: ‘Developmental states must be immersed in a dense network of ties that 
bind them to societal allies with transformational goals. Embedded autonomy, not just 
autonomy, gives the developmental state its efficacy’ (Evans 1995, p.248).
This outlook also fits contemporary post-national theorisations in which the state co­
exists with non-state actors in social regulation and development. Still, the increasing 
salience of globalisation processes, as well as the different power positions that 
different states enjoy in the international arena highlight the limitations of a generic 
theory of the state and its functions. Identifying what a particular state does or should 
do in a specific context or how states work together towards a goal might be a more 
fruitful exercise (Sassoon 2008). Generally speaking, however, and given that the 
information society is potentially inflected in accordance with national, regional, local 
socio-economic, political, cultural circumstances, the state remains a key actor in the 
direction that a national information society eventually takes, with respect to the 
reproduction or otherwise of the nexus of pre-existing idiosyncratic macro­
relationships dominant in the society and economy in question, in which the state 
itself has historically participated. In broader terms, it seems that the state will 
continue for some time to provide the legally defined and politically authorised 
regularities, as well as the local powers of coercion and administration that the 
impersonal capitalist system requires: ‘The increasing disparity between the global 
economy and the territorial nation-state in no way signals the end of capitalism’s need, 
however contradictory, for a spatially fragmented political and legal order’ (Meiksins- 
Wood 2002, p. 179).
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STEFANOS KARAPETSIS (SK) 
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JACQUES KOUNE (JK) 
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NIKOS KAKKARIS (NK)
YANNIS LARIOS (YL)
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VASILIS MANGLARIS (VM)
NIKOS MOUZELIS (NM)
STATHIS PANAGIOTOPOULOS (SP) 





KONST ANTINOS ROGALAS (KR) 
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YANNIS SYRROS (YS)
ANGELOS TSAKANIKAS (AT) 
LAMBROS TSITILAS (LT) 
ARISTODHMOS THOMOPOULOS(TH) 
YANNIS VOULGARIS (YV) 
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Legal Advisor to the Ministry of Health 
Sales Manager, SPACE Hellas
Special Secretary for the Information Society 2004-2009 
Special Secretary for the Information Society 2002-2004 
General Secretary of the Ministry of Finance 1997-2000 
General Manager, Public Sector, LogicDIS 
President, Mellon Group
President of the OPIS Managing Authority 2002-2004 
Member of EDET
Advisor to the Special Secretary for the IS 2002-2004 
President of the IS Observatory 2004-2009 
Advisor to the Special Secretary for the IS 2004-2009 
Account Executive, Public Sector, SAP Hellas 
Academic, President of GEANT 
Academic
President of IS SA 2004-2005
Special Secretary for the Information Society 2000-2002
Managing Director, SyNET
Academic, President of OTE 1996-1998
Sales Director, PANSYSTEMS SA
Advisor to the Special Secretary for the IS 2000-2002
Marketing and Development Director, Ericsson Hellas
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President of SEPE 2004-2009
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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1. What have been the driving forces at the international, national or sub-national 
level behind the information society policies in Greece? What, if any, can be 
seen as forces of resistance to such policies?
2. How would you assess the role of political will regarding the design and 
implementation of information society policies?
3. It has been mentioned that the public sector was not ready for such an 
ambitious operational programme (the Operational Programme for the 
Information Society). What have been the structural problems that have been 
observed?
4. What have been the characteristics of the relationship between the 
implementing and managing mechanisms of the state and the public 
administration with the IT sector and market? How can this relationship be 
characterised in terms of effectiveness vis-a-vis the development of the Greek 
information society? To what extent and in what ways have inherent features 
of the Greek society (e.g. clientelism) played a part in the unfolding of this 
relationship?
5. What cultural characteristics of specific segments of the population or of the 
Greek society at large do you think that have played/or could potentially play a 
role either in acting as obstacles or in serving as vehicles for the development 
of the Greek information society?
6. What has been and what could potentially be the role of civil society regarding 
information society developments in Greece?
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7. What has been the role of OTE in advancing or impeding the implementation 
of information society policies (including policies for the diffusion of 
broadband infrastructures)?
8. How would you overall assess the design as well as the hitherto impact of the 
Operation Programme for the Information Society as the main tool for 
promoting the information society in a Greek context? What areas of success 
and what areas of delays/failures can be identified? What changes have been 
observed at the legal, organisational, institutional, political, cultural level?
9. What future prospects could you identify as to the Greek information society 
(or Greece in the global information society)?
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